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TOUGH TALK, TEAR GAS, TRAGEDY: THE FIGHT TO FRAME ONE
DAY'S EVENTS IN ECUADOR

By

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TOUGH TALK, TEAR GAS, TRAGEDY: THE FIGHT TO FRAME ONE DAY’S EVENTS IN ECUADOR

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University of Nebraska, 2014

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The term “30-S” (30 September) has become somewhat of a shorthand symbol or Twitter hash tag that abbreviates a momentous day in Ecuador’s history. Unrest broke out on that day, leaving several people dead. Such difficulties are not new to the South American country, but aspects of 30-S made it different. For one thing, the day began with members of the National Police refusing to go on patrol. Instead they staged protests against a new law adjusting their pay schedules. The law was an unpopular step in a series of changes brought about as President Rafael Correa has sought to mobilize what he has termed a Citizen’s Revolution in Ecuador.

Correa began as president in 2007 and his administration has seen more stability than the country has seen in two decades. Shortly after taking office he established public media, which played a role in distributing his messages during the 30-S crisis.

An event of magnitude in Ecuador, 30-S seemed a simple term, but behind it lay questions still being asked. Was democracy rescued from a coup attempt? Others ask, “What coup?”

Media framing of 30-S is the subject of this thesis. Several days of content from two Ecuadorian dailies, *El Comercio* (commercial) and *El Telégrafo* (public) were

compared. Opinion columns and news stories made up the data, with determinations later on how they fit into the frames. The frames were specific to 30-S in a content comparison that used quantitative analysis.

The analysis indicated two distinct story lines, with commercial and public media accounts diverging on key story elements. The contested story elements included assertions by public media about a coup attempt, Correa as a hostage of insubordinate police, and finally, that of an assassination plot against the president. The commercial media rebutted these, proposing instead that what began with police insubordination was exacerbated by the involvement of elected and appointed officials.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to Kathy, my wife of 25 years. She has stuck with me when it's been tough. And it has been tough plenty of times. I am thankful to her. To our four children, who knew that when their dad left the house after supper, it was for another evening class.

To my employer, Reach Beyond, whose human resources team granted me study leave to conduct this research and write this paper.

To Jesus Christ, who rescued me. I serve a risen Savior. To my mama, Kathryn Kurtenbach, who signed me up for journalism camp a long time ago. It put me on a path that I am still treading. To my dad, the late Vincent H. Kurtenbach (June 26, 1925-Nov 2, 1989):

When the tractors were shedded, When the livestock were all bedded,

Then there was time to read. He informed himself of the affairs of the world
with the daily newspaper.

Finally, this paper is dedicated to those who died in a tragic and unnecessary page of Ecuador's history—30-S. Listed in alphabetical order, they are Augusto Angulo, 32, civilian, Juan Pablo Bolaños, 24, student, Edwin Efrén Calderón, 29, policeman, Manuel Quimin, 26, civilian, Jacinto Cortéz, 25, soldier, Froilán Jiménez, 28, policeman, Johnny Jácome, 40, civilian, Darwin Panchi, 21, soldier, Franklin Romero, 17, civilian, Nixon Grueso, age unknown, civilian.

Acknowledgements

A few years ago I wrote my first version of a 30-S paper, which Dr. John Bender reviewed and graded. Taking up the topic again, I am grateful for his ready agreement to serve as my thesis adviser. His suggestions helped me construct a theoretical framework for the research. He then he helped me to understand different media models. With this, I could place 30-S and its framing contest within a larger context. I believe this helped the paper to have more depth. I am grateful for his patient help and timely advice.

Ken MacHarg, a longtime friend, has lived in Ecuador for several years. Now in retirement in the United States, he has found that Ecuador still lives within him. He reviewed numerous drafts of this paper. The narrative is more concise because of him.

Xavier Almeida, a longtime friend, served as my local mentor in Ecuador. U.S.-educated and with a wealth of Ecuador media experience, he also taught me a word in the Kichwa language—*tusugchir*. A harvest term, it means to blow off the chaff, shake the bag of grain, or more simply put, to pack it in. I am still attaining to this goal. He also helped me to better understand my host country, offering detailed explanations of past events in this fine country. The historical aspects of this paper are richer due to Xavier. If error of fact has crept into the paper, I take the responsibility for it.

Professors Mary Kay Quinlan and Linda Shipley wedged into their already busy schedules the time to serve on my thesis committee. Their commitment is appreciated.

Ralph Kurtenbach

Quito, Ecuador

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Introduction

Any decision or initiative linking these [public] media to advocacy and promotion of a standing government would represent a reversal, not only to the journalistic culture but also to possibilities for democratizing the nation's media space.¹

On September 30, 2010, civil unrest rocked Ecuador and left two policemen, two soldiers and several civilians dead. The day began with police abandoning their patrols to protest newly passed legislation affecting their pay. It concluded with a rousing speech by President Rafael Correa at the government palace. This followed a violent scene nearby in which elite police and army troops extracted him from the Police Hospital in Quito, exchanging fire with mutinous police. One man was mortally wounded in the shootout.

Ecuadorians immediately recognize “30-S” (30 September) as a term that captures the day’s events. Yet in the South American nation, two different narratives compete for people’s understanding of just what happened on September 30 and how the day is remembered. While many would agree that Ecuador’s young democracy manifested resilience under testing, the explanations differ on just what provoked stresses to the country’s institutional stability and civic order.

This debate about who bears responsibility for 30-S has been carried on publicly via the media. Commercial media have blamed the president, whose speech to protesting

¹ Open letter by editorialists of Ecuador’s first public newspaper. Published less than a year before 30-S (*Editorialistas. . . preocupados por creación de medio propagandístico del Gobierno*)

police at a Quito barracks prompted riot conditions which he fled. Even recognizing poor judgment by the National Police, commercial media have pointed to President Correa's response as equally unwise. Striking a different stance, the nation's public media reiterated the president's claim that what happened was a coup attempt against his administration.

Many see the results of 30-S as not only sad, but also tragically avoidable. For his part, President Correa has referred to it as the most difficult day of his government as he promotes what he calls a *Revolución Ciudadana* (Citizen's Revolution) to reshape a nation to benefit everyone, not only the country's elite.

A strategic framing contest accompanied the 30-S happenings, with the coup explanation offered by Correa being rejected later the same day by commercial media. This contest of narratives took place concurrently with several flash points on the streets as a government-organized march of Correa supporters confronted the protesting police at the same hospital the president had entered that morning.

In *Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power*, communications theorist Robert Entman posited, "It is through framing that political actors shape the texts that influence or prime the agendas and considerations that people think about." (p. 165) In addressing this strategic framing contest, this paper shall compare coverage by two Ecuadorian newspapers. *El Comercio* is a privately-owned or commercial newspaper; *El Telégrafo* is the country's first public newspaper. The research shall be a blended approach of quantitative and qualitative analysis. First, the content from each newspaper shall be examined as it appeared on the pages (or on the homepages) of these papers

during the seven days following 30-S. Second, two Ecuadorian journalists shall be cited in this paper, with complete transcripts of their comments on 30-S. Several research questions are asked and shall be addressed later in the paper.

CHAPTER 1

September 30, 2010 (30-S)

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”

“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master — that’s all.”

—Through the Looking Glass by Lewis Carroll (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson)

When Rafael Correa took office in 2007, he put Ecuador onto a new path. His Country Alliance (*PAIS*) party began steering the South American country away from what the fiery leader referred to as “the long night of neo-liberalism,” referring to the nation’s attempt at a market economic model. (Ecuador: End to “Long Night of Neoliberalism”) Soon afterward, an elected assembly drafted a new constitution. Approved in 2008, the Constitution became the 20th such body of law for the South American country since its independence from Spain in 1830. The document put into gear a series of changes in law governing everything from water rights to wages for public service workers. In the latter change, a new public service law was introduced by Correa to the *Asamblea Nacional* (National Assembly, or Congress) in mid-2009.

On August 11, 2010, the legislative body approved the public service legislation with 108 votes in favor, two against, and nine abstentions, according to Patricio Rivas in *Breve cronología de la Ley de Servicio Público* (Brief chronology of the Public Service Law). Correa raised his objection to it on September 3, using executive line item veto.

After discussions throughout the month, the National Assembly on September 29 approved only 14 articles. Another 67 items failed to receive the required votes. The legislators approved the redacted version of the law on the night of September 29, 2010. The new public service law was known as the *Ley Organica de Servicios Públicos* (Organic Law of Public Service, or LOSEP). Before eight o'clock the following morning, the first hints of a protest had hit the streets in Ecuador's capital, Quito, and in the port city, Guayaquil. Members of the *Policía Nacional* (National Police) staged a nationwide strike by abandoning their responsibilities. Instead of patrolling, they blocked streets and roads with burning tires (a common protest practice) and displayed placards denouncing the new public service law. Additionally, Air Force troops obstructed the runway at the Quito international airport. In Ecuador's largest city, Guayaquil, looters fled with electronics and other stolen goods robbed from stores and soon the erosion of order without police on patrol was televised. Also, police security guards at the National Assembly's meeting hall in Quito repelled efforts by assembly members to enter and convene session.

Elsewhere in Quito, some 500 mutinous police had gathered at Quito Regiment No. 1, a large barracks adjacent to a complex of hospitals and medical offices, including the *Hospital de la Policía* (Police Hospital). President Correa arrived, and then, accompanied by security personnel and his Interior Minister Gustavo Jalkh, he made his way into an area of the barracks yard. From there he was ushered to a second story where he addressed the protestors from an open window. Several minutes of attempting to persuade the protestors of his administration's benevolence to the police proved futile.

The crowd jeered him frequently, as evidenced on a video uploaded to YouTube, *Palabras del Presidente Rafael Correa en el Regimiento Quito*.

Finally Correa abruptly switched to a biting tone and a staccato delivery, “Men if you want to kill the president, here he is; kill him if that’s what you want, kill him if you can, kill him if you’re worth it, instead of being in the crowd hidden cowardly.”

“If you want to destroy the nation, here it is. But this president will not take one step back. You ungrateful rogues, nobody has supported the police as this government has,” he shouted into the microphone, yanking loose his tie and shirt collar. (*Revuelta ocultó intento golpista*)

Correa’s entire speech lasted less than 10 minutes, after which, he, Jalkh, and the small contingent of security began to leave. The president—using a cane because of recent knee surgery—was shoved and insulted as he moved amid the enraged protestors. The hostilities worsened after a tear gas canister exploded near Correa and gas quickly filled the area. In the confusing and tense moments that followed, presidential aides desperately fitted the chief executive with a gas mask. Video of those tense moments showed one mutinous policeman attempting to rip off the mask from Correa’s face. (The man, Jaime Paucar, later surrendered himself, was sentenced to a two-year prison term, and was pardoned by the president.)

Other video images (posted to social media sites) showed the president finally arriving at the gate of an adjacent property where he was met by Colonel César Carrión, the director of the Police Hospital. Once inside the emergency room, Correa received treatment for asphyxiation. At this, rebel police were reported to have surrounded the

health facility and placed sharpshooters on the helipad. Correa however, “was not held incommunicado, continuing to govern from the hospital, and some nurses and doctors claim that he was not kidnapped at all and that he did not want to leave—which would make sense, since the angry policemen who had already assaulted him were guarding the building.”(De la Torre)

Using his cellular phone in an interview with *Radio Pública*, he offered that “they tell me – and it’s hard to believe – that protesting people are all around . . . not enough bodyguards for me. This is the kidnapping of the President of the Republic, and this is something extremely serious.”(*Radio Pública*, as aired on HCJB.) Correa’s second assertion via the *Radio Pública* broadcast was that “what happened today was a failed coup d’état.” It was followed by a challenge to the protestors that he would leave the hospital either “as president or as a corpse.” (De la Torre)

These characterizations of the police as coup plotters and kidnappers were later that day rebutted by Martin Pallares, a columnist and the new digital media projects director for the *Grupo El Comercio*. Acknowledging that the police indeed were insubordinate, Pallares said however, that “the intention to overthrow the president was not expressed at any time and at the worst, they detained Correa in the Police Hospital where he arrived by a misguided act of imprudence. Besides, one should not forget that President Correa never stopped governing.” (Pallares) Examined by physicians Correa was found to have no injuries to his recovering knee despite leaving the police barracks amid shoving and threats, according to Cristian Zurita², a radio reporter who spoke with

² Cristian Zurita Pozo. He should not be confused with Christian Zurita, co-author of the book, *El Gran Hermano* (The Big Brother) with Juan Carlos Calderón. A lawsuit filed by Correa in 2011 claimed the book

an attending physician. Zurita reported for HCJB Radio, which is a non-profit, religious and cultural station owned by a U.S.-based mission organization.

News of a reported coup attempt soon brought Correa affirmations of support from Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and others, as well as a regional body, the *Union de Naciones Suramericanas* (UNASUR) and the Organization of American States (OAS). Ecuadorians, who had already endured three coups in 13 ½ years, hunkered down to weather the September 30 incidents as best they could. Already shell shocked by political instability, many stayed home, or attempted to retrieve their children from schools after Ecuador's Ministry of Education cancelled classes. The hours dragged on in this emotionally charged environment. Meanwhile in the hospital, Correa digitally signed a decree that declared his nation in a state of emergency, referred to in the Spanish language as *Estado de Excepción*. Since the decree ordered broadcast of government programming only, the narrative of kidnapping and coup plot as outlined earlier by Correa was repeated throughout the afternoon and evening. Citizens craving an alternate narrative viewed the homepages of *El Comercio*. The crush of visits overwhelmed the newspaper's servers and crashed the website of *El Comercio*. "This absence of the *El Comercio* web page prompted speculation by many of a possible sabotage or perhaps an act of prior restraint but that did not occur," the newspaper reported. (*Elcomercio.com no tuvo ningun tipo de censura*)

El Comercio's Martin Pallares explained later that "we decided to start giving information through our social media accounts and that's how we kept the people

contained lies about his older brother's government contracts and the following year, a judge ordered the authors to pay \$2 million each for moral damage. (*Autores de libro El Gran Hermano deberán pagar 2 millones de dólares*) The president later pardoned them and the case was withdrawn.

informed for at least . . . three hours.” (Pallares) An *El Comercio* reporter, Susana Morán, used her Twitter account to provide updates.

In spite of the paper’s having publicly discounted government sabotage of its homepage, he said in a 2014 interview, “You cannot discard that option either . . . if the government was interested in bringing our page down.” (Pallares) He characterized what *El Comercio* offered its readers as “the only non-official account of what was going.”

In this, he was partly correct. *El Comercio*’s content differed from that put forth by *ECTV* (public media, national) television station with nationwide coverage, where program host María Isabel Cevallos, told viewers “This was clearly a coup attempt.” (*Dos lecturas como se armó la versión de golpe*). But so did the content of a public station— a municipal station in Quito — which had broken the government-imposed control over all information.

“The decision was [that] we are in the hospital, we have more information than what the government is giving,” said the station’s director Francisco Ordóñez. “Furthermore, as the president was there in the hospital, then, the government was who? [Secretary of Public Administration Vinicio] Alvarado? We considered it appropriate to tell what was happening in the hospital.” (Ordóñez, 2011)

“Public media does not need to be taken [over] by the government. Public media must have its own dynamic of immediate information as events happen, and a capacity to react to it. Here we did not see that,” he said in an interview afterwards. (Ordóñez, 2011)

Zurita had reported from the police barracks that morning and by late afternoon he was filing HCJB Radio reports from the Police Hospital. He and other journalists began to realize that people posing as hospital visitors were actually army personnel with backpacks. They had infiltrated the rebels' perimeter, collaborating with elite police operatives gearing up to extract Correa from the hospital. "I did not count how many," Zurita said, "but the hallway of the room housing the President of the Republic was almost crowded with GOE [Special Operations Group]."

With rumors circulating about the situation that was brewing, some journalists tried to leave the building. This proved difficult because all exit doors and accesses had been blocked by the mutinous police. The journalists, nursing staff, newborn babies and President Correa himself would need to survive in the best way they could during the army's rescue operation at the Police Hospital. Some sought safety under beds and others cowered in corners or tried to find areas relatively free of the tear gas that had been fired to damp down rebel resistance to the rescue operation.

"God! An intense exchange of bullets is under way, I'm stuck in a bathroom," wrote Susana Morán from the Police Hospital (Debate over Meaning of Standoff in Ecuador). According to an article in the *New York Times*, her Twitter followers climbed to more than 6,000 from 600 as she tweeted updates from inside the hospital.

Upon locating Correa, the crack troops at the hospital seated him in a wheel chair, fitted him with a gas mask and made their way out of the besieged facility. In leaving, they exchanged gun fire with the mutinous police outside before whisking him away. Amid the gun battle, a rescuing soldier, Froilan Jiménez, fell mortally wounded

on the street. The televised coverage was live and monochrome images from the street showed viewers what was happening. Not long after this, Ecuadorian stations televised images of Correa and a group of aides as they stood on a balcony of the presidential palace. The president asked for a moment of silence commemorating the dead, and then gave a rousing speech lasting several minutes to supporters who had gathered in the plaza. The speech on the balcony portrayed not a man beaten down by the forces against him but as one who – in contrast with three earlier presidents who fled under mounting popular pressure against them – had emerged as a winner. He had endured the 30-S challenges, including the “images of him walking with a cane through the violent mob of striking police officers, his face deformed by tear gas, evoked the suffering Christ.” (De la Torre)

“After his spectacular rescue and his appearance on the balcony of the presidential palace before his cheering supporters,” wrote De la Torre, “Correa seemed to have transformed into the extraordinary president, the embodiment of democracy and of the revolutionary process, who risked his own life and was attacked by a mob. His leadership has now acquired truly charismatic proportions.” (De la Torre)

Three days of national mourning for the dead began the following day on Friday, Oct. 1.

Chapter 2

Police Regiment No. 1

“Patriotism means to stand by the country. It does not mean to stand by the President or any other public official save exactly to the degree in which he himself stands by the country. -Theodore Roosevelt³

Public and commercial media reported several 30-S occurrences similarly. For instance, Ecuadorians were informed of a work stoppage by police and some Air Force personnel, unpatrolled cities with resulting crime and blocked airport runways in two cities. They also learned of clashes in Quito between legislators blocked from convening a session and the police obstructing entry to the National Assembly hall, as well as police aggressions against reporters there. Some of the day’s “facts” were generally agreed upon and reported.

Some incidents posed threats of a worsening scene. However, Ecuadorians have learned to adapt to such circumstances and they took the disturbances in stride. Even as the September 30 unrest heated up, normality ruled the early part of the work day. Reporter Cristian Zurita’s 90-minute commute to HCJB from his home in south Quito posed no problems. Dispatched for coverage at the police barracks, he witnessed President Correa’s challenge of, “Kill me if that is what you want to do. Kill me if you want to kill the president.”

³ Quote cited by Gerald D. Swick in his review of the book, *Theodore Roosevelt’s History of the United States: His own words selected and arranged by Daniel Ruddy. Roosevelt had made the statement in the context of Abraham Lincoln’s opposition to President James Polk’s war with Mexico.* (Swick)

Suddenly a new story element entered the media coverage of the protest – President Correa had intimated that the police wanted him dead. From that point, the two main 30-S narratives diverged and told the public different stories. Attention to topics such as the public service law and subsequent anti-LOSEP protests now switched to Correa’s assertion that someone might want to kill him. With this newer, fresher story angle, the questions about the National Assembly’s acquiescence to Correa’s line-item veto of the law, or even citizens’ safety on unpatrolled streets were scaled back. Now images of Correa’s “kill me” challenge appeared both on domestic stations and later global media outlets. Within Ecuador, the noontime broadcasts likely garnered substantial audiences. Earlier that year Radio Quito 760 AM for example, was reported by a *Mercados y Proyectos* audience study with a total audience of 175,785 throughout the day. (Day parts were not separated for the AM.) Its FM counterpart, *Platinum* showed a total audience of 64,480 at noon time.

The same report showed HCJB FM with a total audience at noon of 85,165. Its AM audience was reported at 77,500. For January 2010, *Radio Pública* was shown in the *Mercados y Proyectos* study to have 4,610 total audience between noon and 6 p.m. Internet penetration in Ecuador was at 29% in 2010, according to the Geneva-based International Telecommunications Union.

The president’s statements partially eclipsed other story aspects. Several month’s afterwards, Patricio Rivas published a chronology of LOSEP because “a subject that will disappear from the collective memory is the initial complaint of the insubordinates—the public sector law, or LOSEP.” (*Breve cronología de la Ley de Servicio Público*) Any focus on reactions to the *Ley Organica de Servicio Publico* had been lost to newer

information, a newer frame. A shift occurred from what protesters' were saying to what Correa had shouted from the window at Quito Regiment No. 1.

After abuses at the hands of protestors, Correa conducted a phone interview from the Police Hospital, stating that "what happened today was a failed coup d'état." (noon Sept 30. Radio HCJB) Terminology such as "police rebellion," "mutiny," "uprising," and "insubordination" continued to describe the day, but Ecuador's public media fully embraced the president's notion of something far worse lurking beneath the protest – a desire to overthrow him in a coup attempt. About noontime, public media began disseminating the idea that the Correa government had been subjected to an attempted a coup d'état.

One might argue that such words as revolt, rebellion, mutiny, insubordination, and coup d'état are so close in meaning and that Correa had offered a correct assessment during that *Radio Pública* interview given while he first receiving treatment at the Police Hospital.

To pursue this notion further, an examination of the *Webster's New World Thesaurus* reveals that synonyms for "revolution" are "an armed uprising", "revolt", "rebellion", "mutiny", "insurrection", "riot", "anarchy", "outbreak", "**coup d'état**" (emphasis added) or any one of 32 additional words.⁴ (Laird, p. 386) As well, the *Diccionario de La Lengua Española* (Dictionary of the Spanish Language) casts together as similar in meaning the words "sublevar", "sedición" and "motín" (revolt,

⁴ destruction, overturn, upset, overthrow, reversal, rising, crime, violence, bloodshed, turbulence, insubordination, disturbance, reformation, plot, underground activity, guerrilla activity, public unrest, upheaval, tumult, disorder, foment, turmoil, uproar, uprising, row, strife, strike, Putsch, subversion, breakup, secession.

riot uprising, mutiny) along with the notion of promoting a sentiment of protest. This dictionary also likens insurrection to uprising and rebellion. (*Diccionario de La Lengua Española* p. 602) An analyst cited by *El Comercio* immediately after the September 30 episode, Galo Khalifé distinguished between “a few police to be demanding things and protesting” and the military takeover of airport runways. He said, “Airports are strategic sites. In a society with a tradition of coups for many years, it is not irrational to interpret such an act as a coup attempt.” (*dos lecturas como se armó la version de golpe*) Khalifé’s viewpoint however, differed from that of Martin Pallares, who rejected the government’s narrative even as various officials were pronouncing their loyalty to Correa during the public television *ECTV*’s continuous program.

“I see a difference between coup and mutiny or *sublevación*, because when you’re talking about a coup you’re talking about a more rational attempt to overthrow the regime and I don’t see I don’t [that] see in a mutiny or in a *rebelión policial*,” said Pallares afterwards. “That’s the way I called what happened that day. There was no evidence of leadership trying to overthrow the government. Correa was always having control of the situation. He was giving orders during his stay in the hospital. He was able to give some interviews.” (Pallares) *Grupo El Comercio*’s coverage after 30-S (excepting the opinion of Khalifé) looked similar in stance to the conclusions Pallares had drawn on the day of the 30-S events.

This thesis sets out as its operational definition of coup d’état, one taken from the Centre for Social Studies and Documentation of Mexico. Coup d’état is defined as: *the sudden change of the government in a country, imposed by force, promoted by people who occupy positions in the government or the army. The coup is not a revolution. This*

would involve the participation of the people, whereas and the coup takes place in the upper echelons of the country's leadership group [...] the general method to push a coup is to seize government buildings, and communications media, public and transport, in order to control people's lives . The coup is usually an undemocratic action, even when directed against a dictatorial government, because the procedural process excludes the participation of the people and ignores their will. In general, a coup aims to establish a dictatorship instead of to replace a democratic government, or to install a new dictatorship, if the deposed government was already a dictatorship. (Sotalín)

The operational definition specifies that a coup is “promoted by people who occupy positions in the government or the army.” This element was notably absent on 30-S in Ecuador, according to Pallares. The definition also contains reference to the takeover of “government buildings, and communications media, public and transport,” which Khalifé pointed to as a very real threat to the elected president, Rafael Correa. A central question of 30-S revolved around whether or not a coup had been attempted against Correa. Commercial media said no; public media said there had been attempt to overthrow his administration. Some key additional story elements centered upon whether or not Correa was or was not a hostage within the Police Hospital, and whether or not his life was in danger at any time on September 30, 2010.

During the three years since 30-S, there has been no melding of the two opposing narratives – no effort to reconcile polarized versions. There is no compromise version for the Ecuadorian historical accounts. Indeed, the 30-S discourse in the public media and commercial media have only galvanized as separate and distinct narratives about what really happened on September 30, 2010.

The stakes have gotten too high, squeezing out both opportunity and desire to formulate a composite account that brings in aspects of each side's story. Upon the April 2011 release of historian José Paz y Miño's book, *Insurrección o Golpe de Estado* (Insurrection or Coup D'état), Victor Hugo Torres Dávila observed that, "On the 30th of September Ecuador lived through a police insurrection and at the same time an attempted coup d'état, the kidnapping and attempted assassination of President Rafael Correa, a happening which runs the risk of disappearing from history if the 'justice' absolves those implicated and makes fun of the Ecuadorian people who went into the streets to defend democracy." (Torres, p. 185)

Torres pinpointed the three key assertions of the official version—all of them delivered by Correa himself—beginning with the initial charge by the president implying that evil forces intended to kill him. What followed later at the Police Hospital were the hostage statement to *Radio Pública* and in the same interview, the notion that beneath the surface of the protest lay in reality, a conspiracy against his administration and Ecuador's democracy. These three assertions stand not as mere claims, allegations, or as conspiracy theories today; these have become, to many Ecuadorians, instead indisputable facts forming an historic reality. As people listened to the radio exhortations of Minister of Foreign Relations Ricardo Patiño to go to the streets and demand of the rioting police the release of the president from the hospital, they reacted on these "facts." Many joined a counter protest to refute the work stoppage and demonstration initiated that same morning by the police.

Truly the complexity of the day's events had cascaded, as passage of the *Ley Organica de Servicios Públicos* (public service law) just a day earlier was nearly buried

under newer happenings that were judged as more newsworthy. Heads of state around Latin America responded to Ecuador's unrest as the story spread, first regionally and then internationally. Leaders pledged their support to President Correa, the constitutionally elected leader. One short year earlier in Central America, these leaders had not been swift or firm enough to successfully thwart the 2009 overthrow by military leaders of Honduran president Manuel Zelaya. At that time Correa had claimed, "We have intelligence that suggests that I am next [to confront a coup attempt.]" (Leftists fear domino effect of Honduras coup) A year later this claim served as an antecedent to his allegations of conspirators within the crowd at Quito Regiment No. 1. To many Ecuadorians, the police riot that followed his "kill me" statements strongly supported Correa's accusation and challenge shouted into the microphone from the barracks window. Others, such as Pallares, were not convinced and said that Correa had overlaid upon the events, an official interpretation of 30-S and that he had done so for his own purposes.

Jeers from mutinous police nearly drowned out the president's voice at times but a mere 13 hours later Correa reveled in the cheers of supporters in the plaza below the balcony of the presidential palace, Carondelet. That same night, his speech to the cheering supporters in the plaza below, the *Plaza de Independencia*, positioned himself as having attained what no elected Ecuadorian president had achieved in recent years – to overcome the forces against him and not to suffer the humiliation of a coup. This had not been accomplished by Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997) or Jamil Mahaud (1998-2000) or by Lucio Gutierrez (2003-2005) before him. In recent history the last elected president to finish a term had been Sixto Durán Ballen, who served from 1992 to 1996.

Correa's three years in office prior to 30-S had brought other controversy, protests and violence surrounding the sweeping institutional changes that accompanied a shift from a capitalist economic model to 21st century socialism. The years since 30-S have seen the victory for Correa's administration described in the government's rhetoric as, "the day democracy was rescued" by those who took to the streets to demand his rescue.

Various academic investigations into 30-S have examined content published by commercial media. After examining published content of four commercial newspapers including that published by *El Comercio*, Isabel Paz y Miño concluded, "Tearing down the thesis of a coup attempted on September 30, 2010, in Ecuador has been the job of the editorial and opinion pages of the four principal dailies of the country: *El Comercio*, *Hoy*, *El Universo*, and *Expreso*. (Paz y Miño, p. 1) She analyzed 323 editorials and opinion pieces, with more than a third of them categorically denying the ideas of a coup attempt, a kidnapping, and of the president's life being in danger. "They have insisted that what happened that day were only an insurrection, an insubordination, a police strike for salary demands, and President Correa was not detained, in fact from there [the hospital], he issued orders, and that the rebels did not attempt to kill him," wrote Paz y Miño. (p. 1)

No academic study however, seems to have similarly scrutinized the coverage by public media. This seems a lack, given the opposing narratives on 30-S, especially on the topics of coup, kidnapping and threat to the president's life. Public media viewed these topics through one frame; commercial media took a different view entirely.

For this research commercial media shall be defined as those deriving their income from advertising and subscriptions. Public media shall be defined as those deriving their income from government subsidies and subscriptions. A further explanation of public media states that its journalistic model indeed does hold up fairness as a programming standard. This sets it apart, at least in theory, from a purely propagandistic model. For example, *RTVEcuador* (Ecuador public television, with its programming guidelines also posted at *Radio Pública's* website) stated "On issues of controversy explore all the conflicting opinions and will award each of them a proper exposure time and equitable treatment." (*Guía Editorial*, p. 27) In this, one finds that public media sets out in theory at least to be editorially distanced from, and not beholden to a sitting government. The Editorial Guide places --- whether in theory or in reality is the question --- a distinction between public media and government media. But this distinction, and the journalistic balance that it demands of public media, was not evident to a dozen or so Ecuadorians who felt they needed to invade the studio of *ECTV* in order to inject a non-governmental version into the public discourse of the 30-S coverage.

Chapter 3

A Tale of Two Marías

A text message from my mother said she couldn't keep my children from seeing what was happening. They were crying desperately and my ten-year-old wanted to come and rescue his mommy. –María Isabel Cevallos⁵

By the time the shards of glass hit the floor at the entrance to the public media building in Quito in the evening, María Isabel Cevallos had already been hosting live programming on *ECTV* since much earlier in the day of 30-S.

A broadcast journalist since the 1990s, her career already included HCJB, two commercial stations, and public relations work for public entities, including Ecuador's air force and influential members of the *Asamblea Nacional*. In 2008 she began at *ECTV*, where she hosted an interview program, *Lo Público*. On one occasion, she interviewed President Rafael Correa, one year before the 2010 police rebellion. (This interview is referred to in a future chapter of this paper.)

Around 11:30 a.m. on 30-S, the president had characterized in the *Radio Pública* interview his hostage-like drama upon entering the hospital after fleeing the police barracks. By early afternoon, he had electronically signed the decree declaring that Ecuador was in a State of Emergency. Beginning at 2:08 p.m. all broadcast stations in Ecuador were directed to carry the programming of *ECTV* and *Radio Pública*. Terms

⁵ Dramáticos Testimonios de personas afectadas el 30 de septiembre

spelled out in the order was that it was “indefinite and mandatory” until the time of a second order. (*Cadena Nacional Radio y TV Emergencia, Indefinida y Ininterrumpida*)

At some point during 90 minutes between late morning and early afternoon, María Isabel Cevallos had told *ECTV* viewers, “This is clearly a coup attempt,” according to *El Comercio*. (*Dos lecturas de cómo se armó la versión del golpe*) However, that which may have been clear to her was not clear to the 13 protestors who had broken down security doors and barged into the studio where Cevallos was broadcasting live on the air. News accounts of this 30-S occurrence related that she broke from the narration to begin describing a chaotic scene developing around her, publicly identifying those protestors whom she recognized. Amid this studio invasion, one of the protestors was asked to step forward to talk to María Isabel Cevallos before the studio cameras.

So in this way, before the viewing public –not just on *ECTV* but all of Ecuadorian television–two young women with the same first and last names–María Cevallos– began delivering via question and answer, the two 30-S narratives that had taken shape earlier that day. María Alejandra Cevallos was at the time, an alternate in the *Asamblea Nacional*, representing the *Partido Social Cristiano* (Social Christian Party), which was not part of Correa’s *PAIS* coalition. A university student, she had accompanied a dozen other protestors in the studio invasion. In post 30-S coverage, together they became known as The Thirteen.

Among The Thirteen as well was Pablo Guerrero, a lawyer and associate of an earlier president, Col. Lucio Gutierrez. Inaugurated in 2003, Gutierrez had fled Ecuador

just two years later amid protests, but later returned not only to Ecuador but also to public life. Members of his party, the *Partido de Sociedad Patriótica* (Patriotic Society Party), and Gutierrez himself were suspected by the Correa administration of masterminding a 30-S plot to unseat the president, even by violent means.

The impromptu interview was aired on *ECTV* prior to a loss of the station's signal. The latter occurrence was attributed by María Alejandra Cevallos to the public media's deception of her and the others who had broken into the studio. In the on-air conversation between the two Marías, their accounts of 30-S could not have differed more sharply. María Alejandra Cevallos later spoke with Guayaquil-based *El Universo*, which is a commercial newspaper.

El Universo: How was the interview on the set of *ECTV*?

María Alejandra Cevallos: As always they treated us to make us look bad. They tried to steer the conversation and make us look as if we did not understand what was happening. What we did was make the interviewer see that if we were there, it was because we wanted people to see the other truth of things.

El Universo: You are civilians⁶. Why at some point was it said that you were police in disguise?

María Alejandra Cevallos: I am 24, I have neither the physical condition nor the desire to join the police. That version was just a deception of the government to undermine a disenchanted civil society.

El Universo: What was the explanation for the loss of *ECTV* signal?

María Alejandra Cevallos: None. I finished talking, and there were supposed to be two other people and Dr. Pablo Guerrero [ex-lawyer for opposition leader, Lucio Gutierrez]. When I had finished talking, they cut the signal. They never

⁶ According to a The Thirteen website, *Los Trece*, among the studio invasion group were Coronel Galo Monteverde and an army major, Máx Marín. Others were university professors. This fact would render the questioner's term "civilians" a broad classification.

told us that the signal was gone. They tricked us because they went on interviewing and we no longer were on the air.

El Universo: It was reported that you belonged to [the party of Gutierrez] Patriotic Society (SP).

María Alejandra Cevallos: I do not belong to any political group, and don't know if any of those present belonged to SP. (*María Alejandra Cevallos*: “*Lo que queríamos era que se transmita también la otra verdad*”)

The first narrative—by the journalist María Isabel—had begun with the president's *Radio Pública* interview from the Police Hospital just after he and security staff had run the gauntlet amid riot-like conditions at the police barracks. Elements key to that account included the idea that forces hostile to President Correa had masterminded a coup attempt which included an assassination plot. As well, the president was reported to be held hostage by rebellious police at a hospital nearby.

The second narrative—that of María Alejandra Cevallos, a law student—demanded that after hours of exclusively *ECTV* programming on all Ecuadorian broadcast stations public and private, a different telling of 30-S events be made available.

“All day we had been watching this,” she related to *El Universo*. In the afternoon people began texting and social networks were calling to stage a protest to demand an end to the media dictatorship that had been imposed.” (*María Alejandra Cevallos*: “*Lo que queríamos era que se transmita también la otra verdad*”)

Gustavo Abad, an Ecuadorian journalist and researcher, later wrote that articles 164 and 165 of the country's voter-approved Constitution (in 2008) contain provisions that if the country is in “serious internal commotion,” it is within the president's executive power to “suspend or limit (...) the right to the freedom of information ...” and that furthermore, *censura previa* (prior restraint of information) may be imposed

when the country is in a State of Emergency.” Abad maintained that exclusive nationally syndicated programming by public media was not only legal, but also necessary.

In other words, the decision to impose programming from one lone source—public media—was not merely a decision about news, it was also a decision of policy, Abad wrote. Commercial media might chafe at that, he continued but, “to rebel against a State of Emergency is heroism under a dictatorship, but to do so in a democracy is a coup d’état.” (*Estado de excepción y diversidad informativo*)

A former writer for *El Telégrafo*, Silvia Buendía, concurred with Abad, saying that the broadcast restrictions were both legal and constitutional. “Did Cevallos not know that this censorship was based on an emergency decree?,” asked Buendía. She also criticized what she considered poor reporting in the published newspaper interview. “Cevallos said she represented no political group or movement,” wrote Buendía. “And Santiago Molina [the reporter] was satisfied with that. Why did he not inquire further about Cevallos? Did it not occur to him that this was the same Maria Alejandra Cevallos, who is an alternate to Assemblyman Nicolás Lapentti in the National Assembly?” (*La otra verdad: El caso de María Alejandra Cevallos*)

Abad acknowledged that neither had the public media’s handling of the on-air content upheld journalistic standards. “It is one thing to strengthen the general order and to ensure the president’s safety and it is another to subject us to hours of apologetics by a political leader who encourages people to expose themselves to bullets, as one announcer did on public radio.” (*Estado de excepción y diversidad informativo*)

An *El Comercio* writer, Rubén Buitrón referred to it as a media blackout. He wrote, “On the screens of all channels (or rather, of a single screen, official) paraded ministers, assembly members, officials, analysts, news anchors, drivers, journalists and reporters with one speech: ‘defend democracy’. But what democracy should one go out and defend? Defend that which backed an uprising that attacked police and retained the President? Or defend laws that are imposed from Carondelet, which prevent people from finding out in the media all angles of reality, and leaves in the streets dead policemen, soldiers and students? Let’s not have any of the so-called ‘public media’ and none of the media blackout strategists come to ask us to defend an obscurantist democracy, gagged, void of diverse and pluralistic information.” (*El apagón mediático*)

With the State of Emergency decree, the government did not gain a 100 percent compliance of broadcasters around Ecuador. In Ecuador’s third largest city of Cuenca, *Cuenca Radio Antena Uno* (Cuenca Radio Antenna One) broke from the official version and concentrated on useful information for listeners dealing with the crisis according, to the station’s director Gustavo Cardoso. He told *El Comercio* that in consulting the Radio and Television Constitution and Regulation manual, he found that in State of Emergency, the government may order short syndicated messages, not continuous programming indefinitely “as was done yesterday.” With local programming, “we could inform on which streets were passable, discount looting rumors, interview the governor and finally, spread calm among the citizens, which is the media’s duty.” (*Dos lecturas de cómo se armó la versión del golpe*)

In Quito that evening, the singular source programming from *ECTV* collapsed sometime after the shooting started as the extraction of Correa by elite forces began at

the hospital. “At 8:00 o’clock, *Ecuavisa* was the first privately-owned channel that left the National syndication. Afterwards, the others began transmitting their newscasts to summarize the day and the live coverage of the confrontation between police and military troops outside the Police Hospital,” one *El Comercio* story reported. (*La TV comenzó a mostrar ayer escenas inéditas*) It was in this way with live coverage of the rescue at Police Hospital that the policeman, Froilán Jiménez, fell mortally wounded on the street in front of a viewing public. Within a half hour the programming had shifted dramatically from a studio-based, managed news situation—with the exception of María Alejandra Cevallos—to live programming that portrayed the last moments of a young Ecuadorian policeman’s life, shot while rescuing the president from members of the same National Police force.

Three years after the events of 30-S, a judge dismissed a complaint filed by the attorney Pablo Guerrero, one of The Thirteen, apparently in a demand for compensation for psychological damages after criminal charges were brought against him. Guerrero’s complained named María Isabel Cevallos for naming him among the protestors during their intrusion into *ECTV*. In addressing Guerrero’s \$250,000 demand against Cevallos, the judge stated, “The Attorney General could not presume that the journalist committed a crime in relating the occurrence,” reported an *El Telégrafo* story. “On that point, it has nothing to do with her, and if the plaintiff suffered psychologically for having to confront a criminal charge against him, it is not anybody’s fault but his own.”

(*Comunicadora absuelta y Fidel Araujo culpable*)

“I have beat this complaint just by doing the best journalistic work that I can, committing only one sin—that of live narration of what I observed on September 30, 2010,” said María Isabel Cevallos.

Of The Thirteen, María Alejandra Cevallos and six others (Paul Camacho, Francisco Endara, Víctor Hugo Erazo, Patricio Fajardo, Max Marin and Galo Monteverde) were sentenced on December 5, 2013 to four years in prison upon convictions of sabotage. (*Cuatro años de prisión para implicados en la irrupción a canal oficial*)

Pablo Guerrero and his brother, another protestor, were granted political asylum in the Czech Republic. Four are fugitives of Ecuadorian authorities. Charges against one were reduced to accomplice to the invasion and six face criminal charges of sabotage. An *El Telégrafo* story stated that, “the Attorney General’s Office corroborated that the accused successfully suspended the public channel’s programming and afterwards, via the media, incited to support the police protest, which disturbed the peace.” (30S: *Ratifican fallo contra 6 acusados*) Guerrero was cited in *El Comercio* as telling *Radio Armónica* that his May 2011 request to the Czech Republic for political asylum was based upon Article 14 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which the newspaper reported, “states that in case of persecution, everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum in another country.” (*Pablo Guerrero es el primer sudamericano con asilo político en República Checa*)

A search of the Internet did not show positive proof that María Alejandra Cevallos indeed had begun serving prison time on her sabotage conviction. María Isabel

Cevallos left program hosting at *ECTV* in early 2013 and currently works independently in communications. She is presently facing another complaint filed by those of The Thirteen, similar to the earlier one directed at her and dismissed by a judge. She declined a request to be interviewed for this paper, saying her lawyers had advised her to grant no interviews.

Chapter 4

Growth of Public Media

State media should not be government media. –Roberto Follari, communications researcher, in an interview with commercial media

*We are each entitled to our own opinion, but no one is entitled to his own facts. –
Senator Daniel Moynihan*

Ni Jorge ni María Isabel appeared on the opinion/editorial page of a leading Guayaquil daily newspaper about a year before Ecuador's political scene erupted with the police rebellion. An *El Universo* editorial, "Neither Jorge nor María Isabel" explored the role of public media in Ecuador. It described María Isabel Cevallos' televised interview on *ECTV* (public, nationwide) with President Rafael Correa as a one-hour conversation of "trifling questions . . . not consistent with citizens' expectations of the so-called public media." (*Ni Jorge ni María Isabel*)

At the other extreme of interviewer decorum, emulating television interviewer Jorge Ortiz would be a mistake equally egregious. At the time Ortiz hosted a one-hour talk show on a major Ecuadorian television station, *Teleamazonas* (commercial, nationwide.) The editorial claimed that Ortiz "mercilessly corners guests, preventing them from finishing their responses, and aggressively and unilaterally deciding what is spoken and what is not." (*Ni Jorge ni . . .*)

A gold standard for good journalistic interviewing lay somewhere between these examples, the article spelled out. Balance lay somewhere between genuflecting before a head of state, and in the latter case, playing Grand Inquisitor with a hapless soul who

agreed to be interviewed. Then the writer broadened the focus, observing best practices for journalists and explores definitions of media systems and more specifically, the role of Ecuador's growing public media.

Ecuadorian public media were created in 2008 as fulfillment of a campaign promise of Rafael Correa in his 2006 presidential bid, according to Romina Ordóñez, who chronicled the public media's trajectory over the last several years. As with the *El Universo* editorial, Ordóñez compared the nation's public and commercial media. She observed advantages for example, to the advent of public media offered in a country dominated by the commercial news model. However, "the polarization over the policy of Rafael Correa, has led to public media playing a role of sustaining the government's version of events," wrote Ordóñez.

Ordóñez explained that public media were joined in this narrative by other media that were formerly commercially owned. The latter had come into government administration following their owners' bankruptcies. In 1999, media entities of foreclosed owners began operating in a sort of escrow limbo under the *Agencia de Depósitos Garantizados* (Guaranteed Deposits Agency) until Correa assumed office. He then made use of *El Telégrafo* and numerous other entities (Gama TV, TC Televisión, CN3-Cablevisión, CD7 sports channel, Radio Carrousel, Radio Super K 800 and Radio Pichincha Universal) by reshaping them into part of the country's public media. Emblematic of this achievement is the *El Telégrafo* opinion/editorial page heading, "Founded in 1884, and re-founded in 2008 as a daily of the State, pluralistic and democratic."

The Ordóñez research listed the following as public media (pp. 105-106):

1. <i>ECTV</i>	Ecuador Television - begun November 2007
2. <i>El Telégrafo</i>	Newspaper (March 2008). Formerly commercial, owned by <i>Banco del Progreso</i> .
3. <i>Radio Pública</i>	Public Radio (August 2008). Formerly <i>Radio Nacional</i> (public, national).

New York-based Carlos Lauría, who in September 2011 researched the Ecuador scene for the Committee to Protect Journalists, added:

4. <i>Agencia Pública de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramérica ANDES</i>	Regional news agency
5. <i>PP El Verdadero</i>	Tabloid
6. <i>La Onda</i>	Magazine
7. <i>El Agro Valles</i>	Magazine
8. <i>Samborondón</i>	Magazine

Along with *El Telégrafo*, other media too have joined a growing public media group (Lauría):

9. <i>Gama TV</i>	Television, formerly <i>Gamavisión</i> , private
10. <i>TC Televisión</i>	Television, formerly private
11. <i>CN3-Cablevisión</i>	Cable Television
12. <i>CD7</i> (sports channel)	Cable Television
13. <i>Radio Carrousel</i>	Radio
14. <i>Radio Super K 800</i>	Radio
15. <i>Radio Pichincha Universal</i>	Radio

In fact, public media have grown beyond these listed, according to *El Universo*, which put the total in 2011 at 19 media outlets. (*En cuatro años, régimen cuenta con 19*

medios de comunicación) The article cited César Ricuarte, executive director of the *Fundación Andina para el Observatorio y Estudio de Medio* (Andean Foundation for Observation and Study of Media, or *Fundamedios*) as saying, “The state has become the great player in communication” and characterizing the government’s role in media as “from being non-existent before this government, to becoming a major protagonist.”

The Citizen’s Revolution launched in 2007 by President Correa has not lacked publicity. “It bears repeating on this point,” wrote Carlos Borja in a university thesis, “that the government has not neglected –on the contrary– it has cultivated in great detail, not only the management of state media infrastructure (*ECTV*, *RPE*, *TC*, *GAMATV*, *El Telégrafo*, *El Ciudadano*, *el PP*), as instruments of publicity and propaganda (*Enlace Ciudadana*, or Citizen Link. (p. 23) (The *Enlace Ciudadana* is a syndicated television and radio broadcast of the president’s live weekly address to an audience. Each Saturday this is held in a different location around Ecuador and lasts about three hours).

“For his part, Correa intervenes every Saturday during the *Enlace Ciudadana* (Citizen Link) broadcast,” continued Borja, “and insists on showing how outrageous are the actions of his opponents and the statements, editorials, opinion pieces of those from the traditional media; these interventions have sought more than once to position his administration as a victim and his detractors as the villains.” (p. 27)

Two North Carolina academics, Conaghan and de la Torre, observed that this blend of political marketing with Correa’s governance has helped him to maintain power and implement the revolution’s institutional change. Their research revealed in Ecuador a “permanent campaign in order to stay in power, but at the cost of creating an ‘uneven playing field’ for the political opposition and compromising ‘functioning mechanisms of

accountability.” (Conaghan and de la Torre, 2008: 281, cited by Kennemore and Weeks).

At the time that Conaghan and de la Torre wrote, Correa’s pressures upon independent journalism had drawn the scrutiny by Reporters Without Borders and the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) (Kennemore and Weeks). Lauría observed that “in a remarkably short time, he [Correa] has erected an extensive state media operation.” The Correa administration not only creates a narrative but also challenges competing media messages. Around Christmas 2009, a national television network was closed for 72 hours after authorities deemed coverage of a petroleum exploration issue as jeopardizing public order. Lauría wrote at that time, “The government’s assertion that by reporting on a matter of public interest *Teleamazonas* [a commercial television network] incited public disorder is patently ludicrous. The administration of President Rafael Correa has repeatedly threatened to take direct action against *Teleamazonas* and the critical press and this suspension is nothing but an attempt to intimidate the media into silence.”

Lauría made those assessments on the Ecuadorian leader’s approach to media prior to the 30-S coverage. Since then President Correa’s name recognition has risen, garnering him notoriety in some circles and acclaim elsewhere. “For nearly two years,” wrote Nick Miroff in a 2014 *Washington Post* story, “Correa has sheltered WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange at Ecuador’s Embassy in London while he curbs press freedoms at home, even cracking down on political cartoonists.”

Another factor contributing a phenomenal growth of public media was the *Ley Organica de Comunicaciones* (Communications Law), which the National Assembly

approved in June, 2013 after a hard fought fight that lasted four years. Amid sweeping changes to programming are requirements for half of music produced in Ecuador to be of national origin and “40% of [televised] programs that air shall be domestically produced,” according to *El Telégrafo*. (*Nueva Ley de Comunicación beneficia a la producción musical y audiovisual*.) The newly created position of Superintendent of Information and Communication was filled by Carlos Ochoa, who is responsible for monitoring media content and as needed, imposing penalties. One article of the *Ley Organica de Comunicaciones* prohibits what is called “media lynching.” *El Telégrafo* describes the concept as “the repeated publication of information in order to discredit or reduce public credibility of natural or legal persons.” (*La Ley de Comunicación del Ecuador se aprueba con 180 votos*) In Ecuador, Ochoa met with Benoit Hervieu, director of the Office for the Americas of Reporters Without Borders, to review the journalism organization’s concerns about aspects of the law. Hervieu told reporters afterwards he could not grasp at what point in final debates the Assembly approved the media lynching provision. He said he found the concept “problematic” with “a dynamic that is very hard to determine.” (*El artículo sobre linchamiento mediático preocupa a Reporteros Sin Fronteras*)

A positive aspect of the *Ley de Comunicaciones*, according to Hervieu, was the rebalancing the broadcast frequencies, which the Correa administration has referred to as a democratization of the frequencies. A Quito daily, *El Comercio*, reported while the legislation was still under consideration that “52% of radio frequency concessions and 38% of television frequencies (that is, 807 frequencies) that are now in the hands of the private sector shall revert to the State for redistribution if the Media Law is approved.”

(807 frecuencias deberían ser revertidas) The change shall eventually bring about a frequency spectrum nearly evenly divided (33%, 33%, and 34%) into the broadcasting realms of commercial broadcasting, public broadcasting and community radio respectively. People are exploring the ramifications of this decision and how the new allocations may be used in a nation where media have largely been privately held and profit driven.

“The mere act of naming them public media planted an idea of the prevailing purposes of communications in Ecuador, and opened a debate about the meaning of public in our country,” wrote Romina Ordóñez, who voiced “a need to define, to construct what public media means.” She viewed the need for defining public media as having begun in 2008. (Ordóñez, p. 8) That was the year that *El Telégrafo* turned from commercial to public. Then in late 2010, Ecuador’s police rebellion ignited into a crisis of proportions that captured the attention of regional political bodies like *Unasur*. The 30-S events offered up a day’s worth of events that were subject to journalists’ interpretation just a year after the writer of *Ni Jorge ni María Isabel* had offered readers the idea that “state media still fail to clearly differentiate the government from the public— what is common to all and not even related to partisan positions.”

Chapter 5

Commercial Media and Its Critics

I'll tip my hat to the new constitution, take a bow for the new revolution

Smile and grin at the change all around, pick up my guitar and play

Just like yesterday, then I'll get on my knees and pray

We don't get fooled again –Pete Townsend

Guillermo Navarro Jimenez sees what he believes is a hidden agenda behind “an apparent neutrality and independence” of Ecuador’s commercial media. The Ecuadorian journalist and essayist charged in a March 2012 article that, “given their dependence on the economic power they [commercial media] have created and controlled, and of the political power that they must serve in order to maintain the status quo,” the commercial media have acquiesced to the dominance of political powers and special interests (Navarro). His article, “*Ecuador: ¿Medios públicos o empresas públicas?*” also warned that pursuit of the bottom line – profits – would result in content that is trivial and sensational. Forfeiting their watchdog role, the media would yield to power brokers instead of holding them accountable, Navarro cautioned.

The article raised arguments against the commercial press similar to those of President Correa, whose dislike for what he deems the *prensa corrupta* (corrupt press) or the *prensa mercantilista* (mercantilist press) has become legendary. The president’s statement that “the mercantilist press doesn’t believe 30-S is important” was used to headline a 30-S anniversary edition of *El Telégrafo* (public). According to Correa, the commercial media’s front page coverage of “the day that the people defended

democracy” was skimpy. Several months later on February 22, 2014, the president’s weekly nationwide broadcast aired from Quito. After showing a produced video segment lambasting commercial media, the president followed by saying, “You see the double standard. That is how the free and independent press manipulates everything to serve its own interests. So when newspapers no longer circulate, then I won’t do these Saturday speeches anymore.” (*Enlace ciudadano No. 362, desde Quito*) His speech lasted for 3 ½ hours.

This government/commercial media tension was reflected similarly by Roberto Follari, whose views on communications systems appeared in both *El Comercio* (February 2010) and *El Telégrafo* (February 2013). A communications researcher at *Universidad Nacional de Cuyo* in Argentina, he also instructs at the *Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales* (Latin American Social Sciences College, Flacso) in Ecuador. “In some of our countries (Argentina, Venezuela, for example) the state media appear as if government-run, because the private media are seen as political opposition, and are fulfilling a role for which they are not authorized, even from a legal point of view,” Follari told *El Telégrafo*. “I insist, all media are entitled to have an opinion but first, they must say we are this, or that, as they do in the U.S. for example. And not to lie by saying they are independent. (*Roberto Follari: Los medios de comunicación tienen un rol político*)

Three years earlier an interview with Follari by *El Comercio* produced the following exchange:

El Comercio: But the public sector is also trying to create monopolies of communication with state resources.

Follari: This accumulation of media by the state would be a monopoly if there were no others. In having both private [commercial] and public, the issue is to see how many each [private and public] has. There should be plurality.

El Comercio: Public media might merely parrot the official discourse...

Follari: [Ecuador's proposed media law] is not intended to have the state replace large corporate media groups, but that civic organizations would gain influence. State media should not be government media. What happens in our countries is that there is political polarization. (*El medio estatal no debe ser un medio gubernamental*)

In Follari's answers, *El Comercio* found its own way to frame the story by headlining it "State Media Must Not Serve as Government Media." Three years later after publishing an interview with the same academic, *El Telégrafo*, decried that commercial media "Possess a Political Role Not Rightfully Theirs." Each found in Follari's views a way to frame the story in a way favorable to their paper's ideology.

More recently, a similar scenario surrounded news of Freedom House's annual reports downgrading Ecuador's rating on press freedoms. The U.S.-based, international agency issues such reports annually. Ecuador was rated "partly free" for a decade, but then in 2013 Freedom House ranked the country as "not free." (A schema factoring in legal, political and economic conditions was used.) The report cited as negative factors the government-sponsored regulations on electoral campaign coverage, a presidential directive to withdraw government advertising from commercial media critical of his administration, and "a general reduction in political and investigative reporting due to an increasingly hostile environment for the press created by the Correa government." (Freedom of the Press 2013) A page 5 *El Comercio* story headline "Freedom House Alert on Democratic Setback" duly warned readers. One year later, the public newspaper, *El Telégrafo*, responded to another poor rating with the headline that "Nobody Knows What Freedom House Bases This On." Ecuador's first public

newspaper cited a government agency authority as saying that Freedom House's had released "a document in which it is not known what methodology was applied and besides that, how the organization is financed." (Of a \$46 million budget the majority is a U.S. government appropriation, according to the story which attributed the statistic to Roberto Wolhgemuth of Ecuador's *Consejo de Regulación de la Información y Comunicación*, or Cordicom.) The *El Telégrafo* article was quick to point out that the nation's commercial media – specifically *La Hora* – had no qualms about publishing Freedom House's claims on its front page. (*Nadie conoce en qué se basó Freedom House*)

These polarized narratives on the views of Roberto Follari from Argentina and the U.S.-based organization, Freedom House, were published months or years apart from each other. Whereas the passage of time can at times shape story nuances differently or bring out different emphases, simultaneous coverage occurred during the events in Ecuador on September 30, 2010. In the evening as images of the Police Hospital were on the television screens, people in their homes watched as armed mutinous police were firing upon armed military men. And yet like the Follari and Freedom House stories, the narratives differed from one another. *El Telégrafo* told a different story from that which was told by *El Comercio*. The polarization of the Ecuadorian culture – felt for decades if not centuries – was compressed into one stressful, violent day. Ecuadorian media, commercial and public, reflect this social and political polarization. As communications theorists Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini write in *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*, (concurring with views posited decades beforehand by earlier theorists Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm) "The press always takes on the form

and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted. We believe that an understanding of these aspects of society is basic to any systematic understanding of the press.” (Hallin, Mancini, Part 1, Chap. 1 Kindle Edition) The 30-S narratives fit into a larger context – that of Ecuador’s overall media system. That bird’s-eye view of media systems is spelled out in the next chapter, using the Hallin and Mancini schema to place Ecuador within one of the three broad media systems: liberal or corporatist/clientist or polarized pluralistic.

The warning of Guillermo Navarro Jimenez regarding media addressed concerns about both commercial and public media. If constituted as a public business, public media would be watching the bottom line – that is, profits – and thus migrate toward market-friendly content that Navarro deemed of lesser quality. In this it would mimic commercial media, losing content quality and perhaps manifest, “an increasingly blatant political action that leads to becoming governmental media [which in turn form] instruments of political power. . . .” (Navarro) And if, as Follari claimed, commercial media in Ecuador are postured as political opposition to President Correa then Navarro warned that this same political activism can also occur under the banner of public media.

Chapter 6

Ecuador's Media System

The newspaper's duty is to its readers and to the public at large, and not to the private interests of its owners. –Eugene Meyer, owner of The Washington Post

As the history suggests, the media in the Mediterranean countries are relatively strongly politicized, and political parallelism is relatively high. –Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini⁷

Communications theorists Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini state that determining what kind of media system operates “has to be based on a clear understanding of its social context—of such elements as the divisions existing within society, the political process by which they were (or were not) resolved, and the prevailing patterns of political belief.” (Part 1, Chap.1, Kindle Edition)

Since Ecuador's independence from Spain in the early 1800s, rigid societal class divisions and a wide disparity between rich and poor have existed. Military and civilian dictatorships ruled the country during the 19th century and into the 20th century. Just one socialist newspaper, *La Tierra*, (The Land) has operated, according to Enrique Ayala Mora, who wrote that it began in 1933. It was according to Ayala, “the only instance in our history of a newspaper published as an expression of a political party.” Publishing for three decades, the paper exerted great influence in public life and especial on Ecuador's culture. “This paper was supported by the socialist militancy and suffered repeated attacks and closures,” he wrote. (Ayala)

⁷ Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics (Part II, Chapter 5)

At the other side of the political spectrum, the free trade economic model has made inroads in Ecuador. It is one of seven South American countries where Spanish-language *Wall Street Journal* pages appear in partner newspapers, including *El Comercio*. The nation's political scene has experienced the mercurial rise and fall of populist firebrands promising changes to public policy in place to further an elitist power structure. Rhetoric that rails against corporate control and moneyed interests holds special appeal to those on the margins of society. One particularly flamboyant leader – sometimes held to be a populist – was José María Velasco Ibarra. He was elected five times to the presidency. Despite the fact that all but one of his terms ended in his removal through coups, he is credited with governing the country for nearly 13 years over a period of four decades (1934-1935; 1944-1947; 1952-1956; 1960-61 and 1968-1972.) No other Ecuadorian president has served for that long, either in consecutive terms or otherwise.

In the 1990s, Abdalá Bucaram was elected president. A Guayaquil populist whose antics earned him the title *El Loco* (the Crazy One) his term lasted just six months and ended in a coup by the Congress which ousted him on grounds of mental incompetence. What followed was a decade of fragile democracy, and then the present period that Rafael Correa has proclaimed as a Citizen's Revolution.

Ecuador's political environment and the broader socio-economic picture have affected the development of newspapers such as *El Comercio* and *El Telégrafo* over the last century. Hallin and Mancini characterize media systems around the world as generally within one of these categories: a) Liberal Model, prevalent in Britain, Ireland, and North America, and characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms

and of commercial media; b) Democratic Corporatist Model, prevalent across northern continental Europe, and characterized by a historical coexistence of commercial media and media tied to organized social and political groups, and by a relatively active but legally limited role of the state; or c) Polarized Pluralist Model, prevalent in the Mediterranean countries of southern Europe and characterized by integration of the media into party politics, weaker historical development of commercial media, and a strong role of the state. (Chap. 1, Kindle Edition) The authors' research on media systems of the United States, Canada, and Western Europe applies elsewhere as those media models tend to be dominant worldwide. Although media of South America were not referenced in their book, the authors "hope they [the models] will be useful to scholars working on other regions as points of reference against which other models can be constructed." (Hallin, Mancini, Chap. 1, Kindle Edition) Ecuador's media system most closely parallels the Polarized Pluralist Model, with "an elite-oriented press with relatively small circulation and a corresponding centrality of electronic media. (Hallin, Mancini, Part 2, Chap. 4, Kindle Edition)

Like the Southern European examples cited by Hallin and Mancini, Ecuador does not have a period of history when papers grew into mass circulation newspapers. By contrast, United States newspapers experienced a period of growth described by sociology professor Paul Starr in his book, *The Creation of the Media*. He wrote "Between 1870 and 1900, the number of dailies nearly quadrupled, from 574 to 2,226 and their average circulation increased by an even larger factor, up from 2,600 to more than 15,000, with the largest newspapers exceeding half a million readers by the century's end." (p. 252)

Such growth – which Starr had deemed “staggering” – was to Hallin and Mancini, a critical stage of developing the Liberal Model of media. They wrote that “a true mass-circulation press never fully emerged in any of the Mediterranean countries. The process went furthest in France, and this is one important way in which France is a borderline case.” (Part 2, Chapter 5, Kindle Edition) France combined aspects of Polarized Pluralistic and Liberal models. A period of news industry growth (late 19th century to World War I) featured commercial newspapers somewhat patterned on the U.S. penny press and high circulations. *Le Petit Parisien* for example, enjoyed a near nationwide circulation of over two million by the beginning of World War I. Hallin and Mancini cite a study by Albert that found that for every 1,000 inhabitants, 244 newspapers were sold in France. This was “about the same as the United States at 255 per thousand, and higher than Britain at 160 per thousand (Albert 1983: 24-5).” The commercial press in France however, did not displace the press of opinion, as happened in neighboring Britain. Thus, by 1914 “the mass circulation press of the French ‘Golden Age’ did not develop into a powerful and lasting newspaper industry.” (Part 2, Chapter 5, Kindle Edition)

El Comercio reporter Nancy Verdezoto cited findings by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo* (National Statistics and Census Institute, INEC) revealing that just three of 10 Ecuadorians surveyed dedicate free time to reading (30 of 100). More than a century earlier a New York newspaper’s readership study found 121 copies of newspapers circulated to 100 households (more than one paper per household). In 1889 New York City had 55 daily papers. (Starr p. 252) On Sunday, July 28, 2013, a day when 600,000 newspapers circulated in Ecuador according to Verdezoto, three of every

100 Ecuadorians received a newspaper. (*Casi 600,000 diarios pueden circular en un dia*) Lower distributions would have marked earlier decades in Ecuador due to poorer infrastructure.

Another aspect of the Polarized Pluralistic media system is the centrality of the state. As a classed society, Ecuador has implemented central planning, extensive social programs, and state ownership of utilities (presently telecommunications) as well as industries (petroleum). A significant part of the national budget is supplied by Petroecuador, a state-run oil firm. “What distinguishes Southern Europe—and to a lesser degree France—from the rest of Western Europe and from North America is most basically the fact that liberal institutions, including both capitalist industrialism and political democracy, developed later,” wrote Hallin and Mancini. “The forces of the *ancien regime*—the landholding aristocracy, the absolutist state, and the Catholic or Orthodox Church—were stronger there, and liberalism triumphed only after a protracted political conflict that continued in many cases well into the twentieth century. One important legacy of this history is the fact that the political spectrum remained wider and political differences sharper in Southern Europe than in Northern Europe or North America.” (Part 2, Chap. 5, Kindle Edition)

The authors also refer to political parallelism, which tends to run high in Polarized Pluralistic media models where “the press is marked by a strong focus on political life, external pluralism, and a tradition of commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism [that] persists more strongly than in other parts of Europe.” (Hallin and Mancini, Part 2, Chap. 4, Kindle Edition) An emphasis on advocacy is given priority in the Polarized Pluralistic model, whereas information journalism is more highly

represented in the Liberal Model. One would find commentary-oriented journalism more strongly emphasized in Ecuadorian media than in the United States. For example, within a short video interview at Stanford University with Martin Pallares, a John S. Knight fellow, the Ecuadorian columnist of *Grupo El Comercio*'s used the term "opinion journalism" four times. He viewed opinion journalism as threatened by the Correa presidency. (Transforming Opinion Journalism) The interview took place months prior to 30-S, in which *Radio Pública* was utilized by Ecuador's Minister of Foreign Relations Ricardo Patiño to rally people to march on the Police Hospital and rescue President Correa from mutinous police.

These are examples of advocacy journalism playing a more prominent role than information giving. *El Comercio* viewed the *Radio Pública* as activist, which was deemed as not appropriate to a publicly-funded media outlet. However, such participation was not new in Ecuador. Several years earlier in 2005 when nightly street protests in Ecuador's capital bubbled into a political crisis, authorities "cast the blame on an unusual source: a local radio station that has directed the public to an estimated 200 demonstrations in the past six days," according to Monty Reel, a reporter for *The Washington Post*. The same unrest was deemed "Ecuador's 'open mike' revolution" by BBC News, which cited one protestor as saying that "Ecuadorian society doesn't trust traditional media. [Radio] *La Luna* has been a catalyst for change." (Hennessy) The 2005 protests culminated with President Lucio Gutierrez fleeing the palace and his elected office when Ecuador's military removed its backing.

A leading proponent of *La Luna*'s activist role in 2005 was Paco Velasco, who later joined President Correa's PAIS party and in May 2013 became the Minister of

Culture. Such shifts from journalism to politics are common in Southern Mediterranean countries, where, as Hallin and Mancini stated, “Italian newspapers have also often taken an activist role, mobilizing their readers to support political causes and participate in political events. Of course, this role was central to the party press; but it was never exclusive to them. Commercial papers as well often include information on how to get to a political demonstration, and will at times campaign for political causes.” (Part II, Chapter 5 Kindle Edition)

To illustrate the concept of party-press parallelism, the authors cite early media system comparative studies by Seymour-Ure 1974; Blumler and Gurevitch 1975, who offered ideas attempting to determine the degree which a media model mirrors the surrounding political system. Political parallelism and party-press parallelism are related. Within political parallelism, the reporters, editors and other media people throw themselves into the political realm (Part 1, Chap. 2, Kindle Edition) whereas in information journalism, objectivity is held up as a standard. One early Correa administration accusation after 30-S charged that Carlos Vera, a television anchor whose career ambitions had turned toward politics, had helped to foster an assassination attempt on the president.

Within the Polarized Pluralistic media model, Hallin and Mancini also see instrumentation as important, that is, the use of media for gain or advancement by certain entities or individuals. Instrumentalization, a term explained within Marxist theory, may be engineered by the government, by political parties, and by industrialists. The structuralist view of instrumentalization concentrates on exploiting the impersonal structure and mechanisms of the state. According to Hallin and Mancini, “perhaps the

most significant form of instrumentalization, however, has been the use of media by commercial owners—sometimes private and sometimes state-linked, as in the case of state-owned enterprises—to wield influence in the political world.” (Part 2, Chap. 4, Kindle Edition) In Italy for example, large-scale nationally circulated newspapers are backed by industrial and financial enterprises, the most important being two steel companies, primarily as a means of enhancing the companies’ political influence.

Finally, one other aspect of the Polarized Pluralistic media model is the late arrival of freedom of the press and the development of commercial media industries. (Hallin, Mancini, Part 2, Chap. 4, Kindle Edition) In colonial America, newspapers were delivered to the frontier in the early 1800s, according to Paul Starr. With the rise of the penny press in the 1830s and 1840s, newspapers like Horace Greeley’s *New York Tribune* succeeded in attaining financial independence from the political parties that formerly had funded their existence and controlled their content. These penny press newspapers were commercially successful, relying upon subscription income and, to a lesser extent, advertising revenues.

It was decades later in Ecuador when two brothers, Carlos and Cesar Mantilla started *El Comercio* in 1906. Today with 249 company shareholders, the majority of shares in *Grupo El Comercio* (El Comercio Group) remain in the Mantilla family’s hands. The newspaper is among the 106 dailies that compete for the readership of Ecuador’s 15 million people, according to Nancy Verdezoto in *El Comercio*.

The heaviest concentrations of dailies are in two provinces, Guayas with 22 and Pichincha 19.

<i>El Universo</i>	149,758 copies
<i>Extra</i>	146,500 copies
<i>El Comercio</i>	140,071 copies

Three other commercial papers, *La Hora*, *Súper*, *Expreso* distributed from 27,000 to 40,000, with *Hoy* at just under 20,000. The state-run *El Telégrafo* distributed about 14,000 (10% of *El Comercio*'s distribution). A state-run tabloid, *Periódico Popular La Verdad* was at 7, 757 newspapers. Larger dailies with content on the Internet averaged 110,000 unique visits per day. (*Casi 600,000 diarios pueden circular en un día*)

Verdezoto predicted continued stability of readership for the leading dailies, citing Lucía Lemos of the College of Communication at *Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador* (Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador, PUCE). Lemos offered that “newspapers like *El Comercio*, *Hoy* and *El Universo*, to mention a few, continue and shall continue being read by habitual readers, thanks to their tradition of seriousness and ethics.”

In contrast to Lemos' statement crediting Ecuador's leading dailies with seriousness and ethics, Guillermo Navarro painted a different picture. In *¿Medios públicos o empresas públicas?*, he maintained that commercial media have acquiesced to Ecuador's moneyed interests. However, the published balance sheets of *Grupo El Comercio* (El Comercio Group) reveal realities that make the newspaper business look gritty not glamorous. The year in which Rafael Correa's presidential campaign employed a clever use of his surname to promise retribution against the elites – *Dale Correa* or “Give Them the Belt” (Correa means “belt” in Spanish) – the *Grupo El*

Comercio had a profit margin of 5.5 percent. Such operating margins hearken back to newspapering days of yesteryear in the United States. For example, when the family-owned *Des Moines Register* was purchased by Gannett Company, Inc. in 1985 the paper's operating margin was around 10 percent, according to Philip Meyer in *The Vanishing Newspaper-Saving Journalism in the Information Age* (Meyer).

That same year –2006– was the year that *El Comercio* began circulation in Spain. The director, Guadalupe Mantilla Acquaviva, a third generation owner, announced the expansion would reflect the media group's commitment to covering news and public affairs. She told EFE News that her paper would differ from publications that “are not of quality and do not give information that people need to know.” (*El Comercio de Quito se prepara para viajar*) As many as 2 million people left Ecuador after the 1999 banking crisis. Many worked in Spain's agriculture, fishing and construction sectors. The newspaper group lost three quarters of a million dollars that year. Then in 2007 – Correa's first year in office – the media group's profit rose to 8.75 percent.

Newspaper owners, including the Bingham family of the *Louisville Courier Journal* and Eugene Meyer of *The Washington Post*, considered media ownership a public trust. “The newspaper's duty is to its readers and to the public at large, and not to the private interests of its owners,” wrote Eugene Meyer in 1933. “In the pursuit of truth, the newspaper shall be prepared to make sacrifices of its material fortunes, if such a course be necessary for the public good.” (Quoted in Howell) In 2011, *Grupo El Comercio*'s gross income was \$49.8 million with an operating margin of \$2.1 million before taxes. The following year, 2012, saw income at \$51.4 million with \$2.5 million

margin, according to a report published on the group's website. The company paid around \$1 million in taxes each of those years (grupoelcomercio.com). Other group publications include *Líderes* (business), *Deportes Lunes* (sports), *Familia* (family) and a youth publication, *Xona*. The group's broadcast outlet is *Radio Quito*, where a studio guest several years ago for an exclusive interview was then Secretary of State Colin Powell.

In addition to news of local and national interest, *Grupo El Comercio*'s regional content sharing agreements (broadcast and print) have proven useful for timely content. When border tensions flared between Ecuador and Colombia in 2009 after a Colombian air attack on guerrillas within Ecuador, the agreement with *Radio Colombia Nacional* (RCN) produced a *Radio Quito* telephone interview with Colombia's president even as diplomatic bilateral discussions were underway. Additionally, *El Comercio* contributes to the Newspaper Group of the Americas (GDA), which described its readership as "highly educated individuals with financial resources and high decision-making power." *El Comercio* can thus be characterized as a quality newspaper for Ecuador's decision makers. The group's afternoon tabloid, *Ultimas Noticias*, caters to readers less inclined toward reading about the affairs of state.

Continuous civilian democracy did not take hold in Ecuador until 1979. Prior to that, elected leaders and military dictatorships had curtailed free press and sometimes jailed publishers. Among the newspapermen jailed by authorities at one time was Carlos Mantilla of *El Comercio*.

El Telégrafo first appeared as a commercial venture in 1884. According to the newspaper's own account of its history, the paper embraced the views of the Liberals,

even as Ecuador was ruled by Conservatives who had overthrown the presidency of Ignacio de Veintimilla. (*El Telégrafo afirma tradición de revolución periodística*) With the assassination of a Liberal leader in early 1885, the newspaper publicly denounced the killing. Hundreds of citizens signed a protest document, which, when published in the newspaper provoked a government reaction. The newspaper's director was jailed and then banished to Chile. Closed in 1886, the newspaper did not begin publishing again for a decade. It then enjoyed a span of publishing articles that exposed injustices and informed readers.

“Beginning in 1972, which coincided with newspapers becoming the properties of bankers and businessmen including Rodrigo Ycaza Candel, José Antón y Fernando Aspiazu,” the history continued, “there began a slow decline that accelerated during Aspiazu's ownership. He used the paper to defend himself against charges of banking fraud.” (*El Telégrafo afirma tradición de revolución periodística*)

Chapter 7

Literature Review

I'll carry this flag to the grave if I must, 'cause it's a flag that I love and a flag that I trust.

–“Hero of War” by Rise Against (Z. Blair, T. McIlrath, J. Principe, B. Barne)

News frame analysis is rooted in the theoretical work of Erving Goffman. A Canadian, Goffman made theoretical contributions across a broad spectrum, from analyzing acceptable behaviors that were rewarded at mental institutions to the theories applied to gambling. His blend of theory and practice saw this university sociology professor working for a time as a pit boss in a gambling casino. His book, *Frame Analysis – the Organization of Human Experience* offered his detailed observations on how people organize their experiences into frames or a strip of frames. This mental procedure, not fully understood or even perceived by its possessor, aids in explaining reality. Goffman used the term “frames” to describe the organizing mechanism. Additionally, because life is a continuous affair, Goffman frequently refers to a “strip” of frames that help a person to organize his or her perceptions. A primary framework, according to Goffman, is “one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful.” The sociologist continued that:

“Primary frameworks vary in degree of organization. Some are neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates, and rules; others—indeed,

most others—appear to have no apparent articulated shape, providing only a lore of understanding, an approach, a perspective. Whatever the degree of organization, however, each primary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms. He is likely to be unaware of such organized features as the framework has and unable to describe the framework with any completeness if asked, yet these handicaps are no bar to his easily and fully applying it. (p. 21)

The continuous and imperceptible mental procedure of framing one's experience is matched by another concept explained by Goffman. Situations arise in the human experience in which the frames themselves have been— or are being— transformed. That is to say, primary frames are being changed and he terms this change or transformation, a primary frame being *keyed*. Sporting events —termed *contests* by Goffman— are transformed or keyed from primary frames of real life, for example. When spectators at a rodeo see a saddle bronc rider hang on for dear life until the bell sounds, they all understand that the cowboy is not attempting to break the horse. But this rodeo event represents life as it happened in yesteryear with real cowboys, real mustangs and a real breaking of horses for riding (with some broken bones of cowboys too.) The early beginnings of rodeo events had been keyed from life on the ranch or on the range, that is to say, keyed from the primary frame of breaking mustangs for use in driving cattle. However, rodeo has since become a primary frame, a contest between man and animal merely for people's entertainment. The contests that Goffman mentions, some of which

are keyings of elementary combative activity, include “boxing, horse racing, jousting, fox hunting, and the like.” (p. 56)

Along with contests, he mentions other human activities that represent keyings of the primary frame: make-believe, ceremonials, technical redoings and regroundings. “In brief, a play keys life; a ceremony keys an event,” wrote Goffman, illustrating that ceremony serves to represent what is taking place. A wedding represents union; a funeral represents a person’s passing. (p. 58) People observe their untethering from long-held debt when they burn the paper of a home mortgage.

Goffman also described technical redoings as practices for the eventuality of a real event, including dry runs, practices, and rehearsals. In defining regrounding, he offered both a definition and a story from the *San Francisco Chronicle* in late 1965. He called regrounding “the performance of an activity more or less openly for reasons or motives felt to be radically different from those that govern ordinary actors.” (All humans are actors in this context.) Doing volunteer work at a church bazaar in Ballater, Scotland, Princess Margaret assisted a young man in search of nylons to buy.

““What size?” asked Princess Margaret. The man blushed, then said: ‘I don’t know, but they’re for a young lady about your size.’ ‘Oh,’ smiled Margaret, ‘then you’ll want eights.’” (p. 74)

Goffman’s casino experience helped him also write of the practice of shilling, which is the legitimate insertion of a casino staff person into the game if it is exceedingly slow. “The current argument in the industry is that many players do not like

to enter a game that is not in play, so skills provide an appearance of action,” he wrote.
(p. 76)

With ample illustration from the theater, Goffman also inserted newspaper clippings he had gathered. A maxim about “life influences art or art influences life” may be applicable to his illustrations, and certainly he acknowledged that news reporting can play a part –again, imperceptible but a subject of later study –in the behaviors of people. “The reporting of an event and its documentation are not only seen as reductions of or abstractions from the original, but are also understood to possibly influence latter occurrences of the real thing,” he wrote. “Thus, for example, there is concern that the detailed reporting of a crime may lead to further crimes modeled after the report. But although this sort of circularity may be imagined and presumably occurs, we seem to have a strong feeling that reportings and documentations ought not to be the cause of the actual event they record; the causality should always be in the other direction.” (p. 79)

Whereas Gregory Bateson, a theorist cited by Goffman, had observed during visits to Fleishacker Zoo that in instinct taught those of the animal kingdom when play had turned to fighting, Goffman analyzed more complexities in human experience. He probed the ways by which humans process experiences and shape their reality. The mind processes “actions framed entirely in terms of a primary framework [which] are said to be real actual, to be really or actually occurring” blended with “the *staging* of these actions” which too can be real, such as sports competitions, dramas and—once in a lifetime or so—receiving help from a princess in sizing nylons. “Indeed, the real or the actually happening seems to be very much a mixed class containing events perceived within a primary perspective and also transformed events when these are identified in

terms of their status as transformations,” Goffman continued. “And to this must be added the real that is construed retrospectively—brought to mind because of our way of defining something as not qualifying in that way. (p. 47)

When a *keying* of a frame is intended to shift a person’s or a group’s perception on what presently is comprehended as a primary frame, the new frame is termed by Goffman as a fabricated frame. “A nefarious design is involved,” he wrote, “a plot or treacherous plan leading—when realized—to a falsification of some part of the world. So it would appear that a strip of activity can litter the world in two ways, can serve as a model from whose design two types of reworking can be produced: a keying or a fabrication.” (p. 83) Applied to an early incident in the 30-S strip of activities might prompt a question of what President Correa perceived upon arriving at Quito Regimiento No. 1 as protesting police chanted slogans and waved hand-lettered placards amid burned tires and a generally tense environment. Was the protest a primary frame? Or was the protest a fabricated frame to obscure something beneath, the true primary frame? The 30-S tension revolved around this question, and continues to do so. Following the much-publicized Correa speech at the barracks, key 30-S actors subjected other events to similar framing fights.

Goffman’s *Frame Analysis-An Essay on the Organization of Experience* was published in 1974. Then in the 1990s, Robert M. Entman applied framing to news. In *Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power*, Entman also acknowledged a lack of academic research on exactly what constitutes bias. While it is an accessible and easy accusation by political actors desiring favorable media coverage, more work is necessary

to measure bias empirically. In characterizing three ways in which bias is generally perceived, he wrote of distortion bias, content bias, and decision-making bias.

The former –distortion bias– is dismissed by Entman “mainly as an epithet against news that some actors [political players] dislike.” Working without a notion of distortion bias, “avoids irresolvable questions about truth and reality.” (p. 166)

“Because almost any nontrivial reality will be controversial—susceptible to two or more framings—what we can and should do is determine *whose power over government action is likely enhanced by media framing,*” Entman wrote. (Emphasis his) (p. 166)

The research for this paper attempted not to show what is true of 30-S but instead to show what has been framed about 30-S. The day remains to many Ecuadorians, an open, unsolved case involving allegations of a coup attempt, kidnapping, and attempted assassination. People have already died in the service of furthering one of the two dominant narratives on the day.

Another—decision bias— is unquestionably present, according to Entman who wrote, “All information-processing persons and organizations employ what might more neutrally be called heuristics.”(p. 166) Heuristics are a mental means of processing, and even the question “What is newsworthy?” brings into play long-held industry biases. Attendees to an Introduction to Journalism class may hear the aphoristic phrase that when a man bites a dog, it is not news but if the reverse happens, then it *is* news. “The press emphasizes the exceptional rather than the representative; the sensational rather than the significant,” wrote As University of Missouri journalism instructor Geneva Overholzer citing a Hutchins Commission statement from decades earlier. (On Behalf of

Journalism: A Manifesto for Change) Decision bias is at play in news judgment and research has shown it to exist in reporting in political issues. The level differs from individual to individual, story to story, and news agency to news agency, but it is real.

Content bias, according to Entman, is defined as “consistent patterns in the framing of mediated communication that promote the influence of one side in conflicts over the use of government power.” (p. 166) He aspires to “make bias a robust, rigorous, theory-driven, and productive research concept” through studies that more precisely delineate the variants of decision bias and content bias (p. 163). To help in determining content bias, scholars must show in empirical ways that “patterns of slant persist across time, message dimensions, and media outlets.” (p. 166)

He distinguishes between bias and slant, in which “the framing favors one side over the other in a current or potential dispute. Mainstream news organizations contend that they treat competing news frames equivalently, ensuring that their reports do not slant. Yet, political actors constantly (and strategically) complain that media favor their opponents.” (p. 163) Sometimes the political actors have it right, Entman concedes, saying “Slanted news is not, as journalists tend to insist, the rare exception.” (p. 165)

Having laid this out as groundwork, Entman observed, “Conveniently enough for analysts, the United States has two significant political parties, and journalists organize their source networks and news narratives around them.” He then details a method of describing the degree of news slant in an environment “where there are but two strategic actors competing over the framing of news in the national media.” (p. 168) He offers a descriptive metric of “aggregate slant” which compares the national media to a

marketplace of ideas. He also suggests a market concentration index from economics (Hirschman-Herfindahl index) as a way to move from more subjective evaluation into analyzed data that provide measurement of media slant.

While these indices were not used in this research, Entman's appraisal of an aspect of U.S. politics parallels that of the 30-S situation in Ecuador. The Ecuadorian media offered two basic narratives, with one coming from the government and the other from commercial media.

Numerous academics since then have studied ways that news frames are made, who constructs the frames and for what purposes, and what effects may come about, with some attempt at measuring the effects. Dietram A. Scheufele summed up in an article, "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects," "On the one hand, mass media have a strong impact by constructing social reality, that is, 'by framing images of reality ... in a predictable way' (McQuail, 1994, p. 331). On the other hand, media effects are limited by an interaction between mass media and recipients." (Scheufele, p. 105)

"Media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct meaning," continued Scheufele, citing other theorists, "and public opinion is part of the process by which journalists ... develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse" Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 2; see also McLeod, Kosicki, Pan & Allen, 1987).

Framings in different contexts around the world were examined in determining the direction of this research. Among the academic work reviewed was the use of metaphor in speeches by U.S. President George W. Bush leading up to U.S. troop deployment Operation Iraqi Freedom. Also in preparing this paper, content analysis

research was reviewed. The different projects had compared newspaper coverage of protests in France and Egypt. Another study attempted to determine if a Dutch politician had been “demonized” in the press. A summary of these academic studies follows:

- *Greeted Like Liberators: Media, Metaphor and Myth in the Rhetorical Construction of Operation Iraqi Freedom.* If indeed news agencies traffic in facts and journalists diligently fact-check their content, then by what process do they arrive at knowing that some assertion is factual. In his paper, Charles F. Bisbee probed the inner workings of a process through which metaphor functions as frame. He then examines the public instances in recent U.S. history when metaphor morphed into “fact,” especially when unchallenged by the media. Within academia, Bisbee found that “questions of language and rhetorical theory seem rarely raised,” in helping to explore the field of framing current events. He employed the ancient tools of rhetoric to evaluate the Bush speeches, finding that the U.S. press had genuflected before Bush in uncritically reporting what he had told them. A nation’s war effort was not part of Ecuador’s 30-S scenario. However, President Correa—and specifically some of the assertions he had made—were central to the day. Research was needed to show whether coverage by Ecuadorian media had echoed the president’s claims without first critically examining them.

- *Framing the French Riots: A Comparative Study of Frame Variation.* The authors Snow, Vliegenthart and Corrigan-Brown characterized most research preceding theirs as investigating “the way an issue or movement is framed from one point in time to another (Berbrier 1998; Ellingson 1995; Ferree et al. 2002). Within what they deemed a “dearth of comparative framing research” the researchers found that “even less

attention devoted to variation in framing the same event across different actors.” Story framings varied within a country’s different regions, according to studies they cited by Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon 2001. Additionally, transnational comparisons by Dimitrova and Stromback 2005 and Ferree et al. 2002 added to the literature.

The researchers Snow, Vliegenthart and Corrigan-Brown asserted that few studies investigated ways in which key players – be they journalists or otherwise – determined how events would be framed. They probed how such factors as a) ideology b) contextual factors c) event proximity and d) the passage of time or temporality can all affect the chronicling of an event. Their content analysis pulled from 12 newspapers about the 2005 French riots. Coding the more than 400 articles The three researchers coded the news articles themselves, with framing characteristics as their dependent variable. The “actors” determining the framing were a) media, b) members of French government except Nicolas Sarkozy c) the French minister of internal affairs d) Sarkozy e) French opposition f) international actors g) residents/participants and h) other miscellaneous actors. Coverage fell into two broad categories– diagnostic and prognostic, with mixed to weak support for hypotheses rooted in that coverage varies based on a player’s ideology. Other hypotheses that considered the event’s contexts or attribution of blame for the French riots showed up as strongly supported by the research. Over time, coverage shifted the blame to immigrants and France. This showed temporality as accounting for frame variation. The French study was useful to this research in that a key message maker during the 30-S drama was Correa himself, held within the walls of the Police Hospital as angry police protestors kept watch outside and fended off citizens rallied by Interior Minister Patiño. A key event seems to have been

the Correa interview on *Radio Pública* in which the president described himself as a hostage.

- *Framing the 2011 Egyptian Revolution within ideological boundaries:*

One incident, three stories. A conference paper exploring the framing by Chinese media observed that “this seemingly remote event taking place in Northern Africa actually has significant relevance to the Greater China area. In Greater China, with the haunting memory of the 1989 Beijing Spring anti-government demonstrations and then bloodshed, and the Chinese government and Mainland China society currently having many of the same problems and issues as in Egypt, media of the three regions closely monitored and covered the Revolution throughout its course as well as its aftermath.” (Framing the 2011 Egyptian Revolution within Ideological Boundaries) The content comparison of coverage in three regions in Greater China suggested that “the newspapers in China took a favorable perspective towards the Egyptian government whereas those in Hong Kong and Taiwan were more in favor of the protestors.” (Framing the 2011 Egyptian Revolution within Ideological Boundaries) Protestor claims in 30-S coverage became more or less buried under a barrage of Correa messages about coup attempt, kidnapping and conspiratorial undertones to what had appeared earlier in the day as a protest. The Egyptian Revolution study, when applied to this research, affirms that news coverage sometimes does lean either in the direction of a sitting government or the other way.

- A favorable tilt toward official press statements is affirmed by Regula Hänggli, whose paper was *Key Factors in Frame Building: How Strategic*

Political Actors Shape News Media Coverage. In it, Hänggli details her study of journalists' choices in the composition or application of frames. (This is known as frame building). The term "indexing" describes a press/government relationship by which journalists serve more as stenographers in repeating the government's narrative, rather than critically analyzing it. She used different media frames as dependent variables. Hanggli concluded that power is a key ingredient in frame building. (She mentions two others.) "The key factor for frame presence is the power of the political organizations that promote a frame," wrote Hänggli.

Earlier studies cited by Hänggli have supported a so-called "indexing hypothesis" on news coverage. Based upon the actor's power, one could predict story coverage; the less powerful would receive less coverage and vice versa for the powerful players. "Accordingly, the frames of the weak actors will less likely be covered," added Hänggli. "I call this the power bias hypothesis." With the 30-S actors basically reduced to two, the narratives were pitched one against the other. The government's explanation of events was rebutted by the commercial media's challenges to it.

- *News reporting on Pim Fortuyn: framing in two Dutch newspapers.* With this paper, Jan Bosman and Leen d'Haenens sought to answer whether Dutch newspaper coverage had "demonized" a right-leaning politician, Pim Fortuyn, prior to his assassination. They did not develop frames in an open-ended appraisal of newspaper texts, but instead worked with five generic frames developed by an earlier research project (Semetko and Valkenburg). The frames are: a) conflict b) human interest c)

responsibility d) moral consequences and e) economic consequences. The authors conceded that these generic frames in themselves do not necessarily indicate bias, “unless the particular selection involved also influences the interpretations that are derived from a text. Generic frames seem to do so to a different degree.” (p. 739)

Their study reviewed coverage of Fortuyn himself. When compared with the newspapers’ coverage of the Netherlands’ extreme right, the similarities of coverage represented to these Dutch authors, an indicator of demonization. “It will be argued that the degree of framing is an indicator of biased reporting and evidence for this position will be presented,” the researchers said.

“The left-oriented *de Volksrant* reacted violently to the rise of Fortuyn and its coverage of Fortuyn was characterized by heavy framing,” the authors wrote. “In contrast, the right-oriented *De Telegraaf* was not particularly aroused by the events and its articles about Fortuyn barely showed any framing at all.” (p. 744)

Bosman and d’Haenens wrote that as time passed and Fortuyn became a political force to be reckoned with, the left-oriented newspaper’s high level of framing continued. “Apparently, the events that affected reporting about Fortuyn, viz. his rise in the polls and his sudden death, also had an impact on reporting about the extreme right. This suggests that for *de Volkskrant* Fortuyn was the extreme right. He was categorized and treated as an extreme right-wing politician.” In Holland, the term suggests association with Nazis and with fascism so “In this sense it may be concluded that *de Volkskrant* demonized Pim Fortuyn.” (p. 746)

The ambition of the Dutch researchers is to be admired. With the variables of right/left newspapers and extreme right/ Fortuyn, they determined more or less to what degree of framing had occurred. “The *degree of framing* – or the *extent to which frames appear in stories*, as this concept is referred to by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) – therefore appears to be related to the objectivity of reporting.”

The reach of this research on 30-S is not as far as that of Bosman and d’Haenens’ study of newspaper coverage of Pim Fortuyn. Inserting a second independent variable—such as the Dutch academics’ insertion of coverage of the extreme right— was not attempted. While this research may appear similar in that it focuses on events that seem to all revolve around President Correa, its methodology only measures coverage of 30-S. The second metric is not present.

In this, the research possesses a more rudimentary metric than does the Dutch study on what *degree* the newspapers have either favored or opposed the government’s narrative. The frames are merely tallied, then story segments selected to illustrate how the leading frames were employed in news stories and editorial/opinion pieces of both *El Comercio* and *El Telégrafo*.

Chapter 8

Methodology

Its primary duty is to present information daily, truthful, unbiased, comprehensive, interesting and informative, with sufficient analysis tools for the public to understand reality, form their own judgment and take free and informed positions on issues that are of concern. –Editorial Guide, ECTV, 2009

The research for this paper explored the framing that public media and commercial media employed in 30-S coverage. A seven-day content comparison was conducted on coverage by *El Comercio* (commercial) and *El Telégrafo* (public) to determine which frames were utilized most frequently by each entity. The unit of analysis for this research was the individual newspaper article. The newspaper articles were categorized into one and only one frame. If more than one frame appeared in a story, the most dominant frame was selected and the story was placed there.

In seven days following the police uprising, *El Comercio*'s print edition published around 150 stories related to 30-S. Of these, 80 stories (53 percent) were coded to determine each story's dominant frame. Most of the *El Comercio* content was obtained via the newspaper's Internet homepage, which replicated the print edition stories (<http://www.elcomercio.com/>). *El Telégrafo* (public) published around 115 stories in its print edition. Of these, around 40 stories (35 percent) were coded to determine each one's dominant frame.

Date	30-S coverage <i>El Telégrafo</i>	30-S/Total Newspaper	<i>El Telégrafo</i> Articles	30-S coverage <i>El Comercio</i>	30-S/Total Newspaper	<i>El Comercio</i> articles
October 1	10 pages of 30	33%	23	12 pages of 32	37%	27
October 2	10 pages of 24	42%	27	10 pages of 36	30%	34
October 3	10 pages of 28	36%	18	8 pages of 46	17%	19
October 4	4 pages of 30	13%	12	6.5 pages of 26	25%	17
October 5	3 pages of 28	9%	8	5.5 pages of 30	18%	14
October 6	7 pages of 32	22%	21	6 pages of 30	20%	15
October 7	4 pages of 32	13%	7	8 pages of 32	25%	25
Totals and Averages		24% average over 7 days	116 articles		25% average over 7 days	151 articles

Most of the public media stories were scanned at the one known complete collection of October 2010 of *El Telégrafo* in the capital city, Quito. A wand scanner was used.

With both commercial and public newspapers, stories of 400 words and more were coded; stories under 400 words were not coded. One aspect of the omission of shorter articles was to make coding a manageable task for one researcher. Also, as the two Dutch researchers, Jan Bosman and Leen d’Haenens observed, “The longer the articles are, the greater the chance that these features occur and therefore it is possible that the degree of framing is related to the length of an article.” (Bosman and d’Haenens)

Shorter does not always guarantee lesser framing, as the Dutch academics and this research both acknowledge. For this paper, some 30-S stories eliminated from coding contained evident framing. For example, *Cuero Responsibiliza PSP* (Cuero Holds the PSP Responsible) in the public newspaper *El Telégrafo* read,

“The governor of Guayas, Roberto Cuero, held responsible the members of the Party Patriotic Society (PSP) for the acts of violence that occurred during the police uprising that culminated with the kidnapping of President Rafael Correa.

‘Behind this was the hand of the Patriotic Society Party. They kidnapped the President of the Republic, holding him as a hostage. The nation has to know that behind this was the Patriotic Society,’ stressed the Executive representative of the province.” (*Cuero Responsibiliza al PSP*) The story citing Cuero’s assertions about a kidnapping having been masterminded by an opposition party contained only 164 words.

In addition to coding by the researcher, a second person coded 32 (about 25 percent) of the content. The sample for the second coder was randomly selected using Microsoft Excel’s randomization function. Instructions on coding were brief via e-mail exchanges between the principal investigator and the coder. To establish face validity, the two communicated afterwards finding their choices agreed on six 30-S frames and six of the broader Entman frames. This agreement between coders seemed low. The second coder found at times, the content did not perfectly fit into any of the frames offered. He surmised that his Spanish might be “rusty” (his own description). Nevertheless, he reads and speaks both English and Spanish, has a ministry degree, has taught communications courses in both English and Spanish, and written books on

communication. For the last few decades he has lived internationally, much of the time in Latin America and reading Spanish-language newspapers. The researcher for this paper takes responsibility for any shortcomings in validating the coding procedure. Communications theorists Roger D. Wimmer and Joseph R. Dominick wrote of the face validity research technique, “This validation technique assumes that an instrument adequately measures what it purports to measure if the categories are rigidly and satisfactorily defined and if the procedures of the analysis have been adequately conducted.” (p. 176) Perhaps in paring down the number of 30-S frames, the selection of available frames became too narrow.

After these coding comparisons were discussed, the framing choices recorded in an Excel spreadsheet were tallied. The leading frames are described in this paper’s Findings section in the following chapter.

A number of event-specific or 30-S frames were developed. Creation of these was based upon observations during the day’s framing contest and upon media coverage afterwards. Clearly evident, the framing contest influenced the researcher’s assignment of an assignment of “a” or “b” to each frame. The “b” frames echoed, supported or expanded upon the president’s narrative. The “a” contested or rebutted his claims. The stories were classified specifically into one and only one of the 30-S descriptive frames, which were mutually exclusive.

a. President Blamed for provocation of Police	b. Defense of a Threatened Democracy
a. Empathy with Protestors' Claims	b. Support for Democratically Elected Leader
a. Liberty of Expression Trammeled	b. Rescue of Correa Equated with Rescue of Democracy
a. Insubordination: Police Betrayed their Duty	b. Police Hospital Trapped the President
a. Police Protest Was Warranted	b. New Law: Intended to Curtail Corruption by Public Servants
a. Police Hospital Helped the President	b. Hostage Drama: People March to Demand President's Release
a. New Law: Perceived Erosion of Police Benefits	b. Conspiracy Puts President's Life In Jeopardy
a. President Conducted Business While Detained by Renegade Police	b. Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage
a. Coup Thesis Requires Further Examination	b. Coup: Dangerous Elements Co-Opted Revolt
a. President's Style of Governance	

This research attempted to locate and scan as many stories as possible from the first seven days after 30-S to code. After eliminating shorter pieces, some 124 stories were coded by one researcher. This high volume of content coding did not allow for multiple frames per story, and some richness was lost by determining only one dominant frame per story. For example, an op/ed column by of former Quito mayor, Roque Sevilla, observed that “no organization or functionary of the State that participated in the sad acts of that day did so with intelligence or an ounce of common sense.” He then proceeded to list those at fault as the police, the *Asamblea Nacional*, and President Correa who, “with a super macho gesture, exposing himself with his tie yanked loose so that some nut case could take a shot at his presidential chest.” (*Lote de irresonsables*)

A more workable coding was attained by deciding upon one dominant frame, which was often evident by the headline alone. The *El Telégrafo* headline *Intento de magnicidio escondían los audios* (Audios Hiding Assassination Attempt) showed for example, an attempt to assassinate Correa would be the story frame. Twenty-two 30-S descriptive frames were initially developed. The number was eventually reduced to 19.

Omitted from List of Frames to Choose	Added to List of Frames to Choose
Conspirators Blamed for Staging Coup Attempt	President Correa's Style of Governance
Over-Reaching Executive Orders	
Excessive Government Force and Violence	
Civil Order Restored after President's Rescue	

The rationale behind a reduction in frames was to simplify if possible the coding chart. It was also determined that “Conspirators Blamed for Staging Coup Attempt” was similar to an already existing frame about conspirators. An overlap of frames would potentially confuse the coder and possibly the frames would be combined eventually anyway. So too, “Civil Order Restored after President's Rescue” implied the same civil unrest as the frame, “Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage.” The frame, “President Correa's Style of Governance,” reflected content the researcher read in *El Comercio* – particularly in the editorials– and so was added to the coding chart.

Although mutually exclusive, the 30-S frames were fitted into four common communication framing uses, as proposed by communications framing theorist, Robert

Entman: •Problem Definition •Causal Interpretation •Moral Evaluation •Treatment
Recommendation. (Entman).

Problem Definition	Causal Interpretation	Moral Evaluation	Treatment Recommendation
a. Police Hospital Helped the President	a. President Blamed for Provocation of Police	a. Police Protest Was Warranted	a. New Law: Perceived Erosion of Police Benefits
b. Police Hospital Trapped the President	b. Conspiracy Puts President's Life In Jeopardy	b. Rescue of Correa Equated with Rescue of Democracy	b. New Law: Intended to Curtail Corruption
a. Coup Thesis Requires Further Examination	a. President Conducted Business While Detained by Renegade Police	a. Liberty of Expression Trammeled	a. President Correa's Style of Governance
b. Hostage Drama: People March to Demand President's Release	b. Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage	b. Coup: Dangerous Elements Co-Opted Revolt	b. Support for Democratically Elected Leader
b. Insurrection: Police Betrayed their Duty		a. Empathy with Protestor Claims	
b. Insurrection: Police Betrayed their Duty		b. Defense of A Threatened Democracy	

The research questions asked were:

RQ1: What frame received the highest number of editorials and opinion pieces in private media?

RQ2: What frame received the highest number of news pieces in private media?

RQ3: What frame received the highest number of editorials and opinion pieces in public media?

RQ4: What frame received the highest number of news pieces in public media?

RQ5: In comparing news with editorials, did private media news coverage parallel the opinions expressed in its opinion/editorial [op/ed] pieces?

RQ6: In comparing news with editorials, did public media news coverage parallel the opinions expressed in its opinion/editorial [op/ed] pieces?

RQ7: To what extent did the use of frames polarize when comparing public media's frame use with that of commercial media? That is to say, to what extent did public media employ one set of frames and did this contrast with the set of frames used by commercial media.

The Internet proved more useful in finding *El Comercio* content than to find content from *El Telégrafo* (<http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/>). A list of Quito-based libraries details how a search for October 2010 archived copies of *El Telégrafo* (public) was eventually located. Two asterisks show the most complete collections at *Biblioteca Aurelio Espinoza Polit* and *Biblioteca Eugenio Espejo de la Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana*.

1. Alliance Academy International Learning Resources Center (Quito)	< http://www.alliance.k12.ec/ >
2. <i>**Biblioteca Aurelio Espinoza Polít</i> (Quito)	< http://www.beaep.ec/ >
3. <i>Biblioteca de Ministerio de Cultura y Patrimonio</i> (Quito)	< http://www.culturaypatrimonio.gob.ec/biblioteca/ >
4. <i>Biblioteca Lincoln, Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América</i> (Quito) Lincoln Library, U.S. Embassy, Quito.	< http://spanish.ecuador.usembassy.gov/lincoln-irc.html >
5. <i>**Centro Cultural Metropolitano</i> (Quito) Metropolitan Culture Center	< http://www.centrocultural-quito.com/ccmq.php?c=45 >
6. <i>El Telégrafo</i> (Guayaquil)	< http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/ediciones-impresas/el-telegrafo.html >
7. <i>Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales</i> (Quito)	< http://iaen.edu.ec >
8. <i>La Biblioteca Nacional del Ecuador Eugenio Espejo</i> (Quito) Eugenio Espejo National Library	< http://www.casadelacultura.gob.ec >
9. <i>Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador</i> (PUCE) (Quito) Catholic University of Ecuador	< http://www.puce.edu.ec >
10. <i>Universidad San Francisco de Quito</i> (Quito) San Francisco de Quito University	< http://www.usfq.edu.ec/Paginas/Inicio.aspx >

In writing this paper, Google Translate translations from Spanish to English were checked with Francisco Xavier Almeida, who holds a Ph.D. in Spanish language and literature, with a minor in linguistics from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. On occasion the researcher and Dr. Almeida agreed upon a transliterated version for clarity.

Chapter 9

Findings

The oil company calls it “seepage.” Environmentalists describe it as a “blow out.”

Lead sentence of a story on a leak at Oil Sands Project in Alberta, Canada -Ian Austen, The New York Times, 8 Aug. 2013

This chapter shall explore and amplify upon the results that were revealed by coding some 129 stories from *El Comercio* and *El Telégrafo* in the days that immediately followed 30-S. These findings shall be brought to bear upon the research questions (stated previously in an earlier chapter). Combining the questions, the findings shall explore two general areas, op/ed columns and news. What frames received the highest number of editorials and opinion pieces in private media? In public media?

***El Comercio* Opinion/Editorial columns**

President Correa's Style of Governance	18 op/ed columns (about 50 percent)
Coup Thesis Requires Further Examination	4 op/ed columns (10 percent)
President Conducted Business While at Hospital	4 (op/ed columns 10 percent)
Liberty of Expression Trammled	4 op/ed columns (10 percent)
New Law: Intended to Curtail Corruption	3 op/ed columns
President Blamed for Provoking Protestors	3 op/ed columns
Support for Democratically Elected Leader	2 op/ed columns
Defense of a Threatened Democracy	1 op/ed column
Conspiracy Puts President's Life In Jeopardy	1 op/ed column

Insubordination: Police Betrayed Their Duty	1 op/ed columns pieces
Total: <i>El Comercio</i> –Op/Ed Columns	37 op/ed columns

***El Comercio* – Commercial**

About 50 percent of 37 *El Comercio* editorials were placed into the frame, President Correa’s Style of Governance. Eighteen editorials questioned, critiqued or criticized the head of state’s approach to shaping public policy. The columnists approached Correa’s leadership from different angles. Some reviewed the more immediate 30-S situation, finding fault with Correa’s decision to personally attempt to defuse the police protest at the barracks. Others took a longer view by re-visiting his reactions to opposition on earlier proposed institutional change. Other writers still considered the *Asamblea Nacional*’s acquiescence to Correa, looking at Ecuador’s democracy and exposing what they considered a system that lacked a balance of powers.

The frame, President Correa’s Style of Governance, was broad enough to contain all these critiques. “So what went wrong?” wrote Grace Jaramillo in the editorial *Las lecciones* (Lessons) “I believe the first and most important answer is governance style, not only for President Correa and his ministers, but for the whole majority bloc. It is no small matter, whether this addresses the highest authority of the State going to a trouble spot, risking his life and in effect, the stability of the democracy.” (*Las lecciones*) In a column by the newspaper’s editorial group, *Es innecesario llegar al precipicio* (No Need to Arrive at the Precipice), the writer stated that Correa’s theory that a corrupt press had spread misinformation about the public service law was “despicable; it avoids the responsibility of officials and legislators who processed the

Public Service Act, to inform and seek consensus.” Then referring to Correa’s re-election in 2009 following a rewriting of the constitution a year earlier, the writer said, “It has become customary, on behalf of a mandate achieved at the ballot box, to sweep aside the views that do not match those of the president, but that do represent broad sectors.” (*Es innecesario llegar al precipicio*)

In lamenting the way in which changes were brought about, Leon Roldós Aguilera wrote, “On October 4, 2010 the government accepted what the insurgents on Thursday September 30 demanded: either Correa’s veto was reconsidered, or the fuzzy salary scales promised were redefined. His editorial, *La vía de la violencia* (The Way of Violence) then detailed how existing economic benefits of promotions, awards and bonuses would be extended through December 2010, with a different compensation for the military and police beginning the following year, 2011. Sadly, the 30-S strip of activities “demonstrated that only violence reorients those in authority who are believed to be almost infallible, owners of the market of truth,” according to Roldós. (*La vía de la violencia*)

“To avoid such conflicts the government must change its way of exercising power. Instead of buying loyalties, consensus must be built, based upon reasoning and persuasion,” wrote Gonzalo Maldonado Albán in *Modelo Inservible* (Unworkable Model). “This means encouraging dialogue and setting aside the [method of] imposition; yielding spaces of influence and placing all bets on a truly inclusive and democratic agenda. Is President Correa prepared to do that?” (*Modelo inservible*)

El Comercio’s coverage that focused on the frames, Coup Thesis Requires Further Examination and President Conducted Business While at Hospital, totaled six

stories. Both of these frames either rebutted or cast doubts upon the 30-S statements issued by the president—that a coup threatened to unseat the president and that police had kidnapped him. Four editorials were placed into the frame, Liberty of Expression Trammeled.

Two opinion pieces were coded under Support for Democratically Elected Leader, which was a more popular frame for *El Telégrafo*, the public newspaper. A Colombian columnist whose editorial appeared in *El Comercio* made observations on Correa's governance style and his pre-30-S relationship with the *Asamblea*. In *Intentona en Ecuador* he wrote, "The President threatens dissolution of the Legislative Power for the slow passage of bills. . ." (*Intentona en Ecuador*) Referring to Ecuador's instability because of 30-S chaos, lootings and robberies, the editorialist deemed as appropriate the *Unasur* group's response in supporting Correa.

***El Telégrafo* Opinion/Editorial Columns**

Rescue of Correa Equated with Rescue of Democracy	4 op/ed columns (30 percent)
Defense of a Threatened Democracy	2 op/ed columns (18 percent)
Conspiracy Puts President's Life In Jeopardy	2 op/ed columns (15 percent)
Coup: Dangerous Elements Co-opted Revolt	1 op/ed column
Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage	1 op/ed column
Insubordination: Police Betrayed Their Duty	1 op/ed column
Total: <i>El Telégrafo</i>–Op/Ed Columns	11 op/ed columns

***El Telégrafo* – Public**

The editorials from the public newspaper, *El Telégrafo*, were coded into frames that portrayed Correa as an elected leader besieged by an attempt at overthrowing not only him but the nation's democracy. Of 11 opinion/editorial columns coded from *El Telégrafo*, about half were placed in the frames of Rescue of Correa Equated with Rescue of Democracy (four columns) and Defense of a Threatened Democracy (three columns). "Democracy is represented by our president," wrote Sebastián Vallejo in *democracia... ¿Dónde estás?* (Democracy Where Are You?) "Democracy is threatened by weapons and physical force; democracy is threatened by the old ghosts of 'taurazos'." (*democracia... ¿Dónde estás?*) (The writer was referring to the 1987 hostage taking of President León Febres Cordero by mutineer Air Force officers at an air base in Guayas Province.)

"There is no arguing that it was an act of rebellion against the highest authority," wrote Aníbal Bonilla for *El Telégrafo*. "Indeed, it was irrationality fostered by an exactly that body entrusted with guarding the peace. President Rafael Correa was trapped in the hospital by the police aggression."

News Coverage

Two other research questions dealt with what frame received the highest number of news pieces in private media? In public media?

***El Comercio* News Stories**

Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage	16 stories
Coup Thesis Requires Further Examination	5 stories
Liberty of Expression Trammled	3 stories
New Law: Erosion of Police Benefits	3 stories
Police Hospital Helped the President	2 stories
Insubordination: Police Betrayed Their Duty	2 stories
President Blamed for Provoking Protestors	2 stories
Empathy with Protestors' Claims	2 stories
Support for Democratically Elected Leader	2 stories
President Correa's Style of Governance	2 stories
New Law: Intended to Curtail Corruption	1 story
Defense of a Threatened Democracy	1 story
President Conducted Business While at Hospital	1 story
Hostage Drama: March to Demand President's Release	1 story
<i>El Comercio</i> —Total News Stories Coded	43 stories

Of 43 *El Comercio* (commercial media) news stories coded, 16 (38 percent) were placed into the frame Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage. This was the leading frame, not only for commercial media but also for public media. These *El Comercio* stories, totaling some 9,500 words, represent 20 percent of all of the newspaper's 79 coded units, to include news stories and editorial/opinion columns. The primary threats

to civil order were the lootings of stores in Guayaquil, televised at the time and prompting a general uneasiness both in the coast city as well as in Quito. The newspaper accounts afterwards recounted not only that the lootings had occurred but also efforts by authorities afterwards to recuperate stolen goods. “The political crisis that erupted yesterday in the country struck production and commercial activities in major Ecuadorian cities,” one *El Comercio* story said. The article cited the Quito Chamber of Commerce as estimating \$11 million dollars in lost sales for the day, beginning around noon.

“After a moment of silence for a policeman who died during the rescue of President Rafael Correa, 7,000 police resumed patrols in Guayas,” wrote an *El Comercio* journalist about the restoration of order in Ecuador. “But theirs was not the only security coverage, as 960 members of the [military] Joint Task Force joined them in patrolling. They were under the command of Jorge Gross, who met yesterday with various government authorities.” (*7.000 policías y 960 militares salen a las calles*)

Other stories covered the dismissals of classes and challenges faced by students, parents and commuters attempting to return home. The suspension of classes was reported as having contributed to a lower use of public transportation, that is, the trolley system running through Quito, a long and narrow city stretched out in a valley between mountain ranges of the Andes. For example, the newspaper recounted how four articulated busses of the trolley transportation system of Quito had been commandeered by rioting police. “Management estimates that the number of users of the system was reduced by 40 000 passengers on the trolley and the ‘green line.’ The trolley normally transports 265,000 passengers [daily] and yesterday it was down to 225,000. The ‘green

line’ which normally transports 105,000 was down to 90,000 yesterday.” (*La normalidad retornó a la capital desde la mañana*)

El Telégrafo News Stories

Conspiracy Puts President’s Life In Jeopardy	6 stories
Insubordination: Police Betrayed Their Duty	4 stories
Defense of a Threatened Democracy	4 stories
Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage	4 stories
Coup: Dangerous Elements Co-opted Revolt	4 stories
New Law: Intended to Curtail Corruption	3 stories
Police Hospital Trapped the President	2 stories
Rescue of Correa Equated with Rescue of Democracy	2 stories
Support for Democratically Elected Leader	2 stories
Hostage Drama: March to Demand President’s Release	1 story
<i>El Telégrafo</i> Total News Stories Coded	33 stories

News Stories – Public Media

A few different government sources were cited by the public newspaper *El Telégrafo* in the stories that were coded in the frame Conspiracy Puts President’s Life in Danger. Somehow the dialogues between insubordinate police had been recorded from a police radio scanner or at the base station, compiled and publicized by the state-run news agency. The agency, ANDES, described it as a compilation of audios, approximately 28 minutes long, in which are heard the dialogues of insurrectionist police who took over

Quito Regiment No. 1 and Police Hospital installations, where the Chief Commander [Correa] was detained.” (*Intento de magnicidio escondían los audios*) “While the aggression against the Head of State was underway during the morning at the Quito Regiment, heard on the patrol central radio was, ‘Don’t let that son of a b**** leave, first he must sign (the demands) and from there he can go, if not, that goat will leave dead.’” When one recorded voice countered with, “Don’t seed discord please (...) Seek peace,” the plea went unheeded by the others, according to the *El Telégrafo* story. (*Intento de magnicidio . . .*) After circulating on websites, the recording has not apparently been subject to verification to determine its authenticity.

“Eight days after police insubordination against the government, research to find those responsible has intensified,” reported an October 7 *El Telégrafo* story. “By yesterday [October 6] there were 62 people under investigation, of which 58 are arrested.” The story went on to portray the police protest as “a pretext for an action that members of the political opposition parties took part in.” (*Fiscalía investiga los incidentes del pasado jueves*) The same story continued, “The President stated that what he went through last Thursday was ‘an attempted coup’ and that, after the failure of this strategy, the ‘plan B’ was to kill him.”

Pointed accusations of a provincial leader in Guayas Province, Roberto Cuero, were also published by the public newspaper. Cuero, who is of Correa’s *Alianza País* party, told *El Telégrafo*, “We have seen in television images Fidel Jaramillo on the phone. In the middle of the demonstration, we have seen the lawyer of Lucio Gutiérrez [Pablo Guerrero] who went to take over the Ecuador TV facilities. All these people have

been identified; it was they who incited a group of police to demand rights that they themselves did not even understand.” (*Recuperarse la confianza será difícil*)

Six of 46 *El Telégrafo* news stories (13 percent) were coded into the category, Insubordination: Police Betrayed Their Duty. In an objective, informative style, Juan Carlos Naranjo wrote, “The gradual restoration of the functions by the police, after the intuitional crisis of the previous Thursday, made the military limit its contingency [patrolling] to points considered strategic. The military yielded patrol areas to the police, so the police could develop the mission assigned to them by the Constitution, which is public safety and public order.”

A story in *El Telégrafo* reported that with the National Police off patrol, “The situation caused nervousness among employees of banks and investors. Elsa Lopez, responsible for cleaning a north Quito branch of *Banco Pichincha*, admitted to feeling ‘helpless’ without police support. After rejecting the police protest she said, “We are concerned that we were left unprotected.” (*Bancos cierran sus puertas por Seguridad*)

In one *El Telégrafo* story coded as Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, José Miguel Insulza, was cited. Referring to what he called an attempted coup in Ecuador on September 30, he said that it “‘must be investigated and sanctions must be imposed on the guilty.’” The story continued, “Here, this matter cannot simply be forgotten, and justice must be wielded against those people responsible,’ insisted Insulza in a statement to reporters after meeting with Correa in Carondelet [the presidential palace].” (*Fiscalía investiga los incidentes del pasado jueves*)

Newspapers' Editorial Lines in Comparison with News Coverage

The research questions five and six asked, in comparing news with editorials, whether the frames emphasized in the editorial pieces of private media were also emphasized in the news coverage, and whether that was also true for public media. The *El Comercio* editorial/opinion stance is reflected in 18 columns (around 50 percent) that questioned or explicitly rebutted Correa's handling of the immediate crisis and of his style of governance. However, of 43 news stories by the paper, only two (under five percent) were coded within the frame President Correa's Style of Governance.

This ranking of President Correa's Style of Governance put the frame in a six-way tie for fifth place among the *El Comercio* news frames. Its presence in within the news is noted, but it would not be considered a leading frame of the *El Comercio* coverage of 30-S. In this, the commercial newspaper did not show strong parallels between its leading editorial frame and its news coverage. The frame, Liberty of Expression Trammeled—a distant second behind the leading *El Comercio* frame—received four editorials and three news stories. This is a much closer parallel between the paper's editorial stance and its news.

Top Op/Ed Frames and News Frames for Both Newspapers

Top op/ed frames <i>El Telégrafo</i>	Top news frames <i>El Telégrafo</i>	Top op/ed frames <i>El Comercio</i>	Top news frames <i>El Comercio</i>
Rescue of Correa Equated with Rescue of Democracy– 4	Conspiracy Puts President's Life In Jeopardy–6	President Correa's Style of Governance –18	Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage–16
Defense of a Threatened Democracy–2	Defense of a Threatened Democracy–4	Liberty of Expression Trammeled–4	Coup Thesis Requires Further Examination–5
Conspiracy Puts President's Life In Jeopardy–2	Coup: Dangerous Elements Co-opted Revolt–4	Coup Thesis Requires Further Examination–4	New Law: Erosion of Police Benefits–3
Insubordination: Police Betrayed Their Duty –1	Insubordination: Police Betrayed Their Duty–4	President Blamed for Provoking Protestors–3	Liberty of Expression Trammeled–3
Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage – 1	Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage–4	New Law: Erosion of Police Benefits–3	<i>President Correa's Style of Governance was one of the six frames with two stories.</i>
Coup: Dangerous Elements Co-opted Revolt–1	New Law: Intended to Curtail Corruption–3	Support for Democratically Elected Leader–2	

Unlike the unquestionable leading frames in the commercial newspaper (both in op/ed and in news), the *El Telégrafo* data demonstrated closely grouped rankings, a sort of neck-and-neck horserace. In some instances, the rankings were determined by differences of just one or two stories. Nevertheless, even in this coding environment, a prominent idea emerged. It explained 30-S as an attempted coup. This actually came across more strongly in news coverage than in editorials that were coded. When frames were combined, the coup notion was nearly matched with framings that pictured a thin

layer of civil order and even the nation's democracy nearly unraveling due to the police refusal to go on patrol and the ensuing chaos that followed.

The frame, Rescue of Correa Equated with Rescue of Democracy, led the public newspaper's editorial/opinion frames. However, its ranking among coded news stories was much lower compared to editorials – eighth place – with six stories between it and the lead news frame.

Two other frames combined, Defense of a Threatened Democracy and Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage, showed up in three op/ed columns(27 percent) whereas these frames each garnered four in news, totally eight. This represents 24 percent of the news stories coded. As to coverage of the police and the new law, LOSEP, one lone editorial addressed this aspect of 30-S. Again, news outdistanced the op/ed page. Four news stories (12 percent) were framed as indicating they had betrayed their duties and three stories (9 percent) interpreted LOSEP as new legislation to curtail corruption. These two frames totaled around 21 percent of news coded.

El Telégrafo surpassed by a bit in news coverage what the editorials had framed about a conspiracy against Correa, that is, the notion of the police protest having served as a smokescreen while other seditious work was underway in an attempted overthrow of Correa. The frame, Conspiracy Puts President's Life In Jeopardy, appeared moderately strong (two of 11 stories coded, or around 20 percent) on the op/ed page. This was matched at around 18 percent of news stories (six stories.) However, when combined with another leading news coverage frame, the sum of conspiracy frames

increase. Together, Coup: Dangerous Elements Co-opted Revolt and Conspiracy Puts President's Life in Jeopardy, total 10 stories.

The data collection of *El Telégrafo* did not produce great numbers of stories, just 33. However, the coding of these stories showed around 30 percent reflected the editorial line regarding a conspiracy. This suggests that *El Telégrafo* news content closely reflected the paper's editorial position page.

Public Media Framing Compared with Commercial Media Framing

In this paper's chapter on Methodology, it was explained that the event-specific frames were aimed at capturing the framing contest that accompanied 30-S in Ecuador. Some media echoed, supported or expanded upon President Correa's explanations of what had happened. These were indicated by the letter "b" and those frames that either contested or rebutted the president's his claims were labeled with an "a" in the chart. A seventh research question asked to what extent the use of frames polarized in comparing public media coverage with that of commercial media. In other words, how much of the 30-S narrative by the commercial newspaper, *El Comercio*, in no way aligned with the reporting done by *El Telégrafo*, the public media? Did the two media employ such different frames that the narratives moved off in completely different directions?

News Frames Without Commonalities between Public and Commercial Media

Event-specific frame (30-S)	Used by <i>El Comercio</i>	Used by <i>El Telégrafo</i>
b. Conspiracy Puts President's Life In Jeopardy	No–0	Yes–6 news stories
a. Coup Thesis Requires Further Examination	Yes–5 news stories	No–0
b. Coup: Dangerous Elements Co-Opted Revolt	No–0	Yes–4 news stories
a. New Law: Perceived Erosion of Police Benefits	Yes–3 news stories	No–0
a. Liberty of Expression Trammelled	Yes–3 news stories	No–0
b. Rescue of Correa Equated with Rescue of Democracy	No–0	Yes–2 news stories
b. Police Hospital Trapped the President	No–0	Yes–2 news stories
a. President Blamed for provocation of Police	Yes–2 news stories	No–0
a. Empathy with Protestors' Claims	Yes–2 news stories	No–0
a. President's Style of Governance	Yes–2 news stories	No–0
a. Police Hospital Helped the President	Yes–2 news stories	No–0
a. President Conducted Business While Detained by Renegade Police	Yes–1 news story	No–0
Totals on Polarized Narrative	20 of 43 stories (47 percent)	14 of 33 stories (42 percent)

With the articles coded into one dominant frame, as per the methodology chosen for this paper, the data indicate that 42 to 47 percent of 30-S news stories informed readers of a narrative that was exclusive to either public media or commercial media. In

12 of the 19 event-specific frames, the two media entities diverged completely. On these dozen frames, the two opposing narratives found no commonalities in describing the 30-S story. To those familiar with plotting a Venn diagram of overlapping circles to establish where common themes emerge, this would show—if 19 frames could be plotted—that these 12 frames would not touch those of the other media entity, much less overlap.

Put into the terms of informing oneself about 30-S, Ecuadorians had some 53 to 58 percent of the 30-S coverage by these two papers in which both entities found areas of agreement. These areas could be considered as what both *El Comercio* and *El Telégrafo* considered to be the facts of 30-S.

News Frames with Commonalities on the 30-S Narrative

Event-specific (30-S) frame	Used by <i>El Comercio</i>	Used by <i>El Telégrafo</i>
b. Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage	Yes—16	Yes—4
a. Insubordination: Police Betrayed their Duty	Yes—2	Yes—4
b. Defense of a Threatened Democracy	Yes—1	Yes—4
b. New Law: Intended to Curtail Corruption by Public Servants	Yes—1	Yes—3
b. Support for Democratically Elected Leader	Yes—2	Yes—2
b. Hostage Drama: People March to Demand President's Release	Yes—1	Yes—1

The Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage frame was deemed a public media frame. It was believed that public media would use this frame more in order to demonstrate that 30-S was a day that democracy was severely threatened, with commercial media placing more emphasis on the police protest. However, 16 *El Comercio* news stories (37 percent) were placed into Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage.

The Insubordination: Police betrayed their Duty frame was deemed a commercial media frame. It played up “insubordination” thus playing down the coup narrative of the president. However, 12 percent of *El Telégrafo* stories were coded into Insubordination: Police Betrayed their Duty. No additional *El Telégrafo* stories were coded into commercial media frames, whereas five more *El Comercio* news stories (12 percent) were coded into public media frames. *El Comercio* crossed over with 21 of 43 news stories (49 percent) into a public media frame. *El Telégrafo* crossed over with 4 of 33 news stories (12 percent) into a commercial news frame.

El Comercio coverage of the *Unasur* conference was noteworthy, given that the emergency meeting in Quito by Latin American leaders nodded to the government’s narrative on 30-S. The commercial newspaper offered a blend of direct quotes from the leaders who supported Correa’s coup theme, with indications that the newspaper refused to report 30-S as a coup attempt. On October 2 *El Comercio* reported on Correa’s speech to *Unasur* foreign ministers was reported on. That story cited the president as saying “The protests by the police were not caused by wage concerns but by a ‘conspiracy’ of politicians and of ‘the corrupt press that distorted’ things.” (*Los cancilleres de Unasur se citaron en Quito*)

As a final note, the frame, Police Protest Was Warranted, was created based upon one Ecuadorian academic's reference to how a commercial media (not *El Comercio*) had attempted to justify the police protest. Initially considered a valid frame, this research found no stories to be coded into Police Protest Was Warranted.

Framing Uses Proposed by Entman:

Frame Used as:	Total used in <i>El Comercio</i>	Total used in <i>El Telégrafo</i>
Problem Definition	14 (19 percent)	9 (20 percent)
Causal Interpretation	23 (28 percent)	13 (30 percent)
Moral Evaluation	11 (14 percent)	17 (38 percent)
Treatment Recommendation	31 (31 percent)	5 (11 percent)
Total Units (Articles) Coded	79	44

Problem Definition, Causal Interpretation, Moral Evaluation and Treatment Recommendation

The 30-S frames determined were placed within the broader frames contributed by a communications theorist, Robert M. Entman. On Entman's frames of problem definition and causal interpretation, the coded data from each newspaper showed similar results. *El Comercio* and *El Telégrafo* each showed around 20 percent of all stories coded were into problem definition, with around 30 percent in the causal interpretation frame.

A majority of *El Telégrafo* stories were placed into the Entman frame, moral evaluation (17 stories or 38 percent), with five stories (11 percent) in treatment recommendation. A majority of *El Comercio* stories coded were placed into the frame,

treatment recommendation (31 stories or 31 percent), with moral evaluation garnering 11 stories (14 percent).

Chapter 10

Conclusion

Five-Year Plans and New Deals, wrapped in golden chains

And I wonder, Still I wonder, Who 'll stop the rain? – John C. Fogerty

If you're there to inform people, if you're there to do what Thomas Jefferson said must be done, which is to have an informed electorate so we can have a democratic society that works, then go into journalism. –Jim Lehrer, Public Broadcasting System NewsHour host

In summary, this research investigated the framing of 30-S by two Ecuadorian newspapers, one public and one commercial. A content comparison used news stories and editorial columns from both newspapers. A common thread running through news content and op/ed columns alike was democracy and its requirements from those who enjoy it.

Differences became evident however, in how to nurture democracy and prolong its existence. Ecuador's first public newspaper emphasized democracy's rise or fall hinging upon one elected official, that is to say President Correa. *El Telégrafo* story frames in news and editorials alike equated democracy with uninterrupted leadership by President Correa. The newspaper also bolstered his narrative that the democracy was threatened by forces desiring his removal, even plotting assassination.

The commercial newspaper's leading news frames demonstrated a threat to civil society and a nation at the brink because of lack of police enforcement. The *El Comercio*

led its appraisal of 30-S by questioning Correa's style of governance. The commercial paper urged a balance of power so essential to democracy.

The data showed a clear parallel between *El Telégrafo*'s opinion/editorial page and the newspaper's newsroom. This was not nearly as evident in *El Comercio* content, where the newsroom seemed to function more autonomously to set the story framing.

Content from both newspapers indicated that framing was used in the primary agenda setting frame of problem definition. Both also used secondary agenda setting, such as causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation. On the latter two, the *El Telégrafo* moved strongly toward moral evaluation. *El Comercio* led its content in treatment recommendation.

The commercial newspaper crossed over to use a public media frame, such as Civil Order Threatened by Work Stoppage. This was less than reciprocal by the public media however, indicating a lower contribution to a pool of generally agreed upon facts of 30-S. *El Telégrafo* and *El Comercio*, offered similar accounts of 30-S in just under 60 percent of the stories coded.

The other 40 percent or so of coverage was given to disputing whether or not President Correa had been kidnapped, if his life was endangered, and whether or not the country had endured a coup attempt. This represents a polarized media model and a polarized nation. Ecuador is at a crossroads in deciding how resilient will be its democracy. Its leaders must decide upon such principles as balance of power and an informed electorate.

As part of this the nation's media—public and commercial— are at crossroads as well. From lessons learned in days of testing such as 30-S imposed, they must forge their role in fostering a lasting democracy.

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Appendix A

Index of Terms

30-S – September 30, 2010

Asamblea Nacional – Ecuador’s National Assembly or Congress

ECTV – Ecuador Television – public media

El Ciudadano – government media

El Comercio – comercial (privately owned) media

El Telégrafo – public media

LOSEP - Ley Organica de Servicio Publico/Organic Law of Public Service

Policía Nacional - National Police. 42,000 member police force

Radio Pública – public media

UNASUR - Union de Naciones Suramericanas/Union of South American Nations

Clarification of names and identities:

This paper makes reference to a radio reporter, Cristian Zurita Pozo. He is not to be confused with the Cristian Zurita who, with Juan Carlos Calderón, co-authored a book titled *El Gran Hermano*. The book, about the government contracts between Ecuador and the older brother of Rafael Correa, prompted a civil lawsuit by Correa against the authors. In 2012, a court ruled that Calderón and Zurita were guilty of moral damage to the president and ordered them to pay two million dollars.

María Isabel Cevallos was a television news anchor with ECTV and reported on the 30-S events. This was the public television studio invaded later the same day by a dozen or so Ecuadorians demanding that both sides of the story be told. Among them was a protestor named María Cevallos.

Appendix B

Transcript of English-language interview with Martin Pallares, *El Comercio*

Telephone interview with Martin Pallares, *Grupo El Comercio*, February 2014

Pallares. Okay. Now I'm . . . my last post I was like in charge of the . . . all of the digital operations of the . . . of the paper. Now I'm exploring new digital media projects and ah . . . also writing. I'm ah . . . like the coordinator of a new product in *El Comercio* that's called, Ideas. It appears every Sunday.

Kurtenbach: okay.

Pallares Ahh, yeah. Basically I have like the, like the main story on that product. Um, and yes. Also I . . . I also help on the op/ ed page. . . I've got some work do there.

Kurtenbach. So columnist and um . . .

Pallares: I'm columnist and journalist as well.

Kurtenbach. Yeah and director of digital, ah . . . digital projects.

Pallares: New digital projects.

Kurtenbach. New digital projects.

Kurtenbach. Mmm hmm. Before we get to the matter of September 30, 2010, ah, would you be able to summarize the coverage of *Losep*, [Law of Public Service] the public service employees law . . . the . . . In the lead-up to the police revolt. Ah, would you say . . . a lot of coverage by *El Comercio*? An educational aspect to tell readers what was it about, what it was about, what the law was about? Umm. Can you summarize that?

Pallares: You mean the . . . ah . . . you mean the *Ley de Comunicaciones* [Communications Law]?

Kurtenbach The *Ley de Servicio Publico* [Public Service Law]. . um the *ley* that . . . ah prompted the police revolt.

Pallares: Oh. Ah. . that was another project. In fact that . . . ah that . . . Not only the police, and also the military. They were not going to get some . . . ah. Some extra recognition. Some bonuses. I can't remember exactly . . . uh what it was about. It was a law that . . . that yeah, basically was . . . it was vanishing some bonuses for the police and for the military.

Kurtenbach Do you think that *El Comercio* . . . ah, provided quite a bit of education to the readers . . . to newspaper readers about the content of the law?

Pallares: Ah . . . I can hardly remember this but um . . . I wouldn't put it like the word "education." I . . . I . . . I would prefer to use the word "information" in this case. Um . . .

I think the word of education and all, in giving the whole picture of the law was a, was a huge mistake of the government towards the people who was going to be affected by the, by the law. I 'm not very sure about the coverage of this, of this project and of the law. Um, so . . . I'm not really. .

Kurtenbach. Okay.

Pallares. Yeah I . . . you know, when this thing happened I was just coming back from ah . . . from my fellowship at Stanford. Well it was like 18 or 20 days after my comeback.

Kurtenbach: Yes.

Pallares: So I can't remember it very well how was the coverage of this, of this issue.

Kurtenbach: okay. Okay very good. Now on September 30 2010 . . . em, well let's just say that mostly I will be using newspaper coverage in the days after September 30. But you were involved in the digital coverage of the homepage.

Kurtenbach Uh huh. Umm, was there a lot of traffic on Twitter and was there, were there a lot of updates on *El Comercio*'s homepage?

Pallares: Well um, we had a huge problem that day. And it was, we were not prepared for such a, such a huge ah . . . amount of people trying to read our home page. So our servers just broke down, okay?

Kurtenbach. Yes.

Pallares. I would have to . . . we, we . . . the whole system was not ready for, for . . . for receiving so many . . . so many visits, so many clicks on our home page. And so ah . . . yeah, we . . . we . . . we couldn't handle the home page and we decided to start giving information through our social media accounts. And that's how we kept the people informed for at least . . . I would say like . . . like ah . . . three hours.

Then we . . . we, we made up a new homepage with a different system. Ah, it wasn't . . . ah accessed by the whole audience because it was a very rudimentary . . . ah . . . solution that we gave to the problem. So yeah, basically we were informing through our social media tools that at the time weren't very sophisticated . . . weren't very good. Um . . . you know at that time Twitter was just beginning in Ecuador. But I can . . . can tell you that we had a reporter that was inside the Police Hospital and she was um . . . she was. . ah . . . ah, keeping her account. I mean telling everything that was going on inside the hospital through her Twitter account.

Kurtenbach: mm hmm.

Pallares And that was a huge success. Her name is Susana . . . Her name? Yeah, Susana Moran. And that was a big thing. Basically I would say that it was kind of a disaster ah . . . that happened that day . . . because there was no TV information, no independent media information at that time because as you can remember there was a . . . ah . . .

information blackout for the independent media. So the only non-official account of what was going on was social media.

Kurtenbach: And do you . . . and so you attribute the high traffic to your *El Comercio* site to the fact people wanted information that was not the government explanation of the situation?

Pallares Yes, yes I think that's one side of the story. We cannot know. And we haven't been able to establish whether there was an attempt to make a fake um. . – how do you say – a fake. . . um access or . . . I don't know how to say this. What word I can use for saying this.

Kurtenbach. Well . . .

Pallares. . . from the government.

Kurtenbach. Okay.

Pallares: Because you cannot discard that. . that. . that option either . . . if the government was interested in bringing our page down. Ah, but as far as we know it was the huge amount of people who tried to reach our homepage.

Kurtenbach: I see . . . I see. Very good. Emm. There are similarities, Martin, between words like revolt, mutiny, copy. We say *sublevacion* and *Golpe de estado, revuelta*. There are lots of words that are . . . kind of all neighbors to each other. Ah, all in the same *vencidad*, the same neighborhood. But this is more than a semantic discussion, is it not?

Pallares: I think it is. . that I think that in this case it was . . . it was more than just a semantic issue and I'll tell you why. Because there were . . . you know the official recount [account] of the story . . . was full of the word coup. They were saying there was a coup going on in that moment. And I see a . . . I see a difference between coup and mutiny or sublevacion because when you're talking about a coup you're talking about a very . . . a more rational attempt to overthrow the regime. And that's what I . . . I don't see in a mutiny or in a rebellion policial and that's the way I call what happened that day.

Umm, there was no evidence of leadership trying to . . . to overthrow the government. Umm . . . Correa was always having control of the situation. He was giving orders during his stay in the hospital. He was . . . he was able to give some interviews. There was a very famous interview with . . . ah *Radio Nacional* [Radio Publica] was it? Yes. Umm . . . and with some international news outlets as well. So I don't . . . I don't see that . . . well I . . . I see a difference between a coup and a sublevacion in this case. And I think that the official recount [account] of the whole thing was making use of, and overuse of, the word coup. Because there was a . . . there was a political interest . . .

Kurtenbach: yes, okay.

Pallares. . in using this word. I think it was very intentional.

Kurtenbach: Emm . . . Afterwards *El Comercio* did run an editorial on – maybe it’s a news story – *Golpe o una revuelta Ahi la confusion* [Coup or revolt – there is the confusion.]

Pallares: Mmm hmm.

Kurtenbach: So would you . . . would you agree. .. eh . . . there was potential for confusion in the situation? At the time?

Pallares: Okay. There’s the . . . there’s something that I . . . I . . . I would concede in favor of the coup theory or. . . um that it’s . . . that the. . the chance that it’s . . . there was a little chance that somebody could kill the president.

I can understand why it is so hard for some people to distinguish between the coup and the rebellion, um, but in my point of view, in my opinion, I think it wasn’t a coup.

Kurtenbach Okay.

Pallares: I . . . I . . . I . . . just believe that it wasn’t a coup in that moment. As I just told you um . . . the president was in control of the situation, he was in control of the military – that’s very important – he was running the country. Um, I . . . he was giving interviews in full information that we had that day. We knew that Correa was able to just walk away from the hospital without . . . ah . . . military invention, the intervention that occurred at the last moment of the day.

Kurtenbach: Do you think it was easier to know domestically, here in Ecuador, what was going on than in places like Spain? One of the countries mentioned in the article, *Golpe o una revuelta, Ahi la confusion*? It mentions news agencies in Spain. Domestically here in Ecuador, easier to know what was happening?

Pallares: I think that . . . It depends, it depends. Because . . . maybe here in Quito we had more access to a lot of social media accounts that some people in Spain wouldn’t be able to get it. Ah, but the other side I think that for the international journalists would be as much afraid of giving all the information they were watching or receiving. I think that 30 September was a major moment in behalf of what started to be a huge . . . trend of self-censorship.

Kurtenbach: So . . .

Pallares I think that that’s what it really started – that moment.

Kurtenbach: Can we define Ecuador as pre-September 30 and post September 30? Is it that much of a dividing point?

Pallares Yes. I think so. Yes. I think so. I think that that’s the point when the independent media started to be more afraid of (phone ringing) . . . of denying the official version of any story.

Kurtenbach Do you remember at what pint in the day you wrote a column titled “What Coup?” I think it was called “What Coup?” *Que Golpe de Estado?*

Pallares I think it was later in the afternoon. Um. I became very skeptical of the official recount [account] You know, after listening, many, many times they were repeating the word, coup, basically on the TV because you know, there was only one recount [account] of the whole thing, and it was the official one. And I started to be suspicious about this because, I noticed that there was an intention on repeating and repeating and repeating this word. And all the guests that were going to the TV station . . . to the plateau, they were somehow obsessed with the issue of the coup. Everybody that was going through the program, through the *cadena*, [nationwide government broadcast] was talking about the coup. And you know, as a journalist you start doubting about this kind of version of things. And . . . yeah, and then I started to *abarcados*, [cover it] you know. To . . . and then I started to think that there was no . . . no . . . evident intention of overthrowing Correa from power.

Kurtenbach Would you characterize that as . . . did you refute the President's claim? R did you call it into question? How would you describe that?

Pallares: I would say "refute."

Kurtenbach: Refute.

Pallares: Uh huh.

Kurtenbach: And what kind of success of your message . . . what kind of success of your message do you think you really had? Did others begin to question the coup theory after you did?

Pallares: Well you know, there's my . . . this post that I put on my blog. It went viral. Um, I had like 11,000 clicks/ visits. Um, that was a big thing.

Kurtenbach: Yes.

Pallares: That was a huge thing at the moment. You know, considering that the social media was not as strong as it is now. I think that was a big thing, um. I started to receive a lot of international phone calls from media outlets outside of Ecuador. Especially from Venezuela. I remember this pretty good. Um, there were a lot of journalists from Venezuela who started to call me. I can't remember, for instance . . . Nelson Bocaranda, and I was on his radio show. And yea . . . also I . . . wel I received some other phone calls from . . . the opposite side I would say. Like from *Telesur* [South Television]. I remember having a phone call from *Telesur*, who were not very happy with my, with post. Yeah, but that how I . . . I have the sense that . . . that my post made a difference in the information that there was going all around an issue.

Kurtenbach So did *Telesur* call you to get two sides of the story?

Pallares Ah, yes the called me. I just say that well, they called me. They weren't that very happy with my . . .

Kurtenbach. Yes

Pallares with my version of . . .

Kurtenbach Did *Radio Publica* call you?

Pallares No.

Kurtenbach: Or ECTV?

Pallares Right now I can't remember of any national Ecuadorian outlets calling me.

Kurtenbach: Okay. Um, have you interviewed President Correa and if so, when?

Pallares: Yes I have interviewed him, like three times. Two of them before he was . . . when he was a candidate. Yes. And then once when . . . at his first year in power. And I think that, yeah. That's the last time I interviewed him.

Kurtenbach: Have you attempted to interview him since? MP. Ah, I think once I sent a request for an interview. But yeah, it didn't come up. Yeah, it didn't work.

Kurtenbach You might not be on his list.

Pallares Ah, I don't think so. (laughs)

Kurtenbach. He has referred to you on his Saturday addresses, the *sabatinos*, [Saturday broadcasts] right? And what are the terms he uses, or has he used to describe you?

Pallares Well basically as a liar, um, he used that word a lot of times. At least five or six. As a sick man. Like *enfermo*.

Kurtenbach: Mmm hmmm.

Pallares That's something that always holds my attention.

Kurtenbach: Like in the U.S. we might say a "real sicko".

Pallares Exactly, yeah.

Kurtenbach: Have you interviewed Alvarado.

Pallares I guess that, well . . . there's been some other words Correa used. He called me coward, . . . well sometimes. Coward, for not being able to go in front of him and have . . . a fight.

Kurtenbach Have you called President Correa names in your column?

Pallares I . . . I . . . well, yes. I have . . . I wouldn't use the word names. I have described him . . . his conduct and actions as not have been honest.

Kurtenbach: Okay, okay. Um. Can we move to the Alvarado question?

Pallares Yes, you're talking about . . .

Kurtenbach: I can't remember which of the brothers is . . .

Pallares Ah, yes. Vinicio.

Kurtenbach: Okay, Vinicio Alvarado. Um . . . I did see a text of . . . a transcript. Em, it seems like you asked him something like “Are you the Goebbels . . . Goebbels of the administration, referring to the publicity director for Hitler?”

Pallares Mmm hmm.

Kurtenbach. Was that one of your questions?

Pallares That was one of my questions, that’s right.

Kurtenbach: Is it . . . do you think it exaggerates the situation or exaggerated the situation to refer to Nazi Germany at all?

Pallares Yes and that was my intention. Um, I wanted to give him an exaggerated idea. You know what I mean.

Kurtenbach Yes

Pallares Cause I wanted to see his reaction. And in fact, um, for my surprise, he reacted like very normal. Um, He even told me that his daughter gave him a book of Goebbels, and that it was a very interesting book. So I’ll say that, something like that. I don’t know how if that . . . I put that on the transcript.

Kurtenbach So you sometimes do use hyperbole to get a reaction. MP How do I . . . how would I describe his reaction?

Kurtenbach No, I say hyperbole – exaggeration. It was intended to see what kind of reaction it would generate in . . .

Pallares Exactly, in Vinicio Alvarado. Exactly, uh huh. But I know that Correa’s not Hitler and Vinicio is not Goebbels but um, I just wanted to . . . and you know what because . . . somewhere I heard about this comparison between Alvarado and Goebbels. It was somewhere that I saw this. And I thought it was going to . . . I thought Vinicio would react a lit bit more . . . I don’t know, more angry?

Kurtenbach Yeah. Is it part of Ecuadorian culture to be combative, or would that be more within political culture?

Pallares What do you mean? In media or?

Kurtenbach Actually I mean in general . . . Is it within Ecuador, are people more confrontational or less confrontational in dealing with each other about issues?

Kurtenbach Okay but you mean now? After this government? Or in general?

Kurtenbach I’m speaking about in general. Can we attribute terms like calling a journalist sicko, or calling a journalist a big fat slob, or a party member a fat slob . . . Is that Ecuadorian?

Pallares No. It’s Ecuadorian since 2007, I think.

Kurtenbach Okay.

Pallares This is very new. This is new. Um, I guess maybe that with Abadala Bucaram we had a little bit. And with Leon Febres Cordero as well. But not this much. In those times, that was a scandal.

Kurtenbach Yes.

Pallares When Febres Cordero or Bucaram would refer to a journalist as a sicko that would have been a scandal.

Kurtenbach Were you a political reporter when Sixto Duran Ballen. . ?

Pallares Yes

Kurtenbach Did he ever call you a name?

Pallares. No. No, no, no. Not, not at all. He was very respectful.

Kurtenbach: Much more decorum?

Pallares Much more than who?

Kurtenbach. It's called decorum – how you – how you address people. Decorum.

Pallares . Yes, Yes sure.

Kurtenbach Okay, um . . . how about defining media in Ecuador. Um . . . let's just say the Liberal model of journalism and media – the U.S. and Britain would probably fit into that – and then there's a Southern Mediterranean model called Pluralistic and Polarized. That . . . well I'm wondering whether Ecuador might fit into a kind of Polarized Pluralistic model. Kind of consists of a lot of different political parties . . .

Pallares Mmm hmm.

Kurtenbach And um . . . and polarized being, people migrate to very different positions and the media reflects that. I don't know if I described it very well.

Pallares It's a very interesting question. Um, I'm not sure if I can answer because sometimes Ecuadorian media is more like the . . . it's more polarized and then it can become very plural.

Kurtenbach Let's ask you this Martin; I have seen academic work that characterizes Ecuador media as assuming the role of the opposition.

Pallares Uhh huh.

Kurtenbach Do you think that Ecuador's private media or Ecuador's commercial media has assumed the role of the opposition?

Pallares No, no. I think that power's trying to convince the society that the media, because it criticizes power, assuming that it is in the side of the opposition. Andy why?

Because I think that the regime – and I’m basically referring to this government – needs an enemy. And there’s no opposition. There’s no political parties . . . or there’s no strong political parties on the opposition. So when they need an enemy, there’s the press. And that’s also a way of *deslegitimar* [delegitimize] the critics, from the press, and the *fiscalizacion* that the press can have towards the government. When they call opposition and it’s something that they call it every time, when they refer to the independent press, they call it the press of opposition press.

Kurtenbach When you say *fiscalizacion* . . .

Pallares Yea, it’s like . . .

Kurtenbach Like an attorney general or like a lawyer, or like a watch, would watchdog be a . . .

Pallares like being a watchdog, yea. Being like a watchdog of the government.

Kurtenbach And so, would that be how you see the media’s role in Ecuadorian society is to be a watchdog of government?

Pallares Yes, as much as it can. That’s the way we would love to be . . . like a watchdog. Now there’s so many obstacles in this *Ley de Comunicaciones* [Communications Law] that it’s something that is undermining this role in society, of being a watchdog.

Kurtenbach Do you have an opinion on whether Ecuador has needed public media?

Pallares Wow! That’s a . . . that’s a very good question. Um, I would say yes. But I think that Ecuador was not ready to have a public media. And when I say public media I am talking about a media that does not belong to the political party that is in charge of power. When I say a public media I would refer more to a model where this public media wouldn’t be acting as a part of the government. I’m making a difference between government and State.

Kurtenbach Yes. Um, because what happened . . . I think that the idea was not bad at all. But what happened really was that public media became part of the propaganda system of the government. Yes, I think that it’s not bad to have some public media and could belong to the State or could belong to some kind of non-profit organization. Like NPR, I would say.

Kurtenbach I. um.

Pallares I know that that’s a model that doesn’t work in Latin America. I’m talking about NPR, or, yeah, basically to NPR. It’s quite a different model.

Kurtenbach You know this about Latin America in general that it is not a model that would work.

Pallares I don’t feel confident to make a statement on that because I don’t know very good how things work in, let’s say, Brazil or Chile.

Kurtenbach Okay.

Pallares Uh, but for what I know I think that there's some public media that work pretty much in a proper way in Chile. Maybe Uruguay.

Kurtenbach Martin have you had opportunity to look at the – sort of a journalistic style manual – programming manual – on the website of *Radio Publica*?

Pallares No.

Kurtenbach Okay.

Pallares No.

Kurtenbach Because there are guidelines that at least in the book talk about neutrality, objectivity, which sources to quote, those kinds of things.

Pallares I see it. Yeah.

Kurtenbach. Um, just wondering if you had seen that. What is it that I have not asked in this interview, Martin? And I know you need to . . . you're a busy man. I need to let you get to work. What do we need to talk about yet before we close this interview? What haven't I covered?

Pallares Hmmm. Maybe . . . I would like to talk about the situation right now for the media outlets and for the journalists as individuals. I think that we're going through a very hard time. Uh, there's a huge self-censorship going on. A lot of fear. Um . . . newspapers, or well basically media are not telling everything that they would be telling in a normal situation.

Uh, we're working with lawyers every . . . every time. I mean when we make a headline, we talk with a lawyer. And I think that's not normal. I think that is terrible for Ecuadorian society. I think that's awful for us as individuals, as journalists as individuals, not only as part of a . . . as a newspaper or TV station or whatever. We are, I think, that this fear is making the audience not trusting much on us. And being distrustful of our work. Because people can feel that we are not telling the whole thing, the whole truth of what is going on.

Kurtenbach Would that extend to coverage about Venezuela presently as well?

Pallares Uh . . . yes. Yes I would say that there's a . . . you know, I think that there's a . . . I don't know if there's a word in English for . . . like “overfear.” Like we have overreacting. With . . . *estamos con mas miedo que* . . . I don't even know how to express myself in Spanish [we have more fear than. . .].

Kurtenbach More fear than is really warranted by the situation?

Pallares Yes. I have that feeling. I have that feeling, yeah. If you see the headlines on the Venezuelan situation, I think you can have this feeling of independent media of not going towards one side or the other, of trying to be neutral in a very aseptic way. I don't

know . . . yeah. Like being afraid of not . . . of *tener miedo del contradecir la decision oficial del poder*. Yeah. [fearful of contradicting the official decision of government].

Kurtenbach Is objectivity something you still strive for Martin?

Pallares Oh yes. Yes. We're always looking for objectivity and we cannot leave behind our convictions and our beliefs that a free society needs a true freedom of expression.

Kurtenbach with regards to self-censorship would you say if September 30, 2010 was a *hito* – a landmark– would the lawsuit against Emilio Palacio of *El Universo* – a different newspaper, privately held in Ecuador, not with the *El Comercio Group* – would that lawsuit about the editorial/opinion column, *No Mas Mentiras* [No More Lies] would that be another major landmark?

Pallares Yes, sure.

Kurtenbach Would it be more so even than September 30? Or how would you compare the September 30, 2010 and *No Mas Mentiras*.

Pallares I think that that was the day that the government became more aggressive to the independent media and um . . . after the lawsuit against the *Universo* we became more aware of how they control the judiciary, the *sistema oficial*. [official system] And yeah, there's a difference there.

Kurtenbach Very good Martin. Anything else?

Pallares No I think that's all.

Kurtenbach May I call you back if I have any additional questions?

Pallares Sure. Sure, sure.

Kurtenbach I appreciate the help and thank you very much.

Pallares I'm very glad to help you.

Kurtenbach Okay.

Pallares Okay

Kurtenbach Bye, bye.

Pallares Bye, bye.

Appendix C

Translated transcription of Cristian Zurita Interview, HCJB La Voz de Los Andes

30-S Interview With Cristian Zurita Pozo, journalist with Radio HCJB , Quito , Ecuador
October 15, 2010 , HCJB studios

Kurtenbach: October Fifteen , no? Fifteen . If yes October 15th today . October Fifteen two thousand ten. Ten.

Zurita: Yes.

Kurtenbach: This is . . . This is Control. .

Zurita: Five.

Kurtenbach: We are in the Control Five . In five , four, three , two and one. I'm here with Cristian Zurita , HCJB reporter, The Voice of the Andes. I am grateful that you participate in an interview today Cristian. We thank you for taking time to talk about the unfortunate events of September 30th here in Ecuador . It started in the morning with a protest and police work strike across the country , as I understand it . And roughly 11 , I say 12 hours later people were killed, a rescue of the president from the police hospital , uh . . And there were speeches by President Rafael Correa in the government palace . Um . . . we would like to focus on our interview today Cristian, on your participation for HCJB News in covering the events there in the police hospital from ten in the morning until ten or eleven at night. Um . . . what were the key points that day. Um , please tell us how it started and the key points in that . . . that day and what you did there .

Zurita: Thank you Ralph . Well, HCJB as it was our duty—we had to inform the public - the dear friends , listeners about what was happening. Before half past nine , eh . . . Well, we noticed the TV again and specifically as tempers were gradually heating up , the tone was already changing anything at first . . . uh , I think Ralph, it should be mentioned , too, that I must cross the city from south to north in that day, requiring about one hour forty minutes. There was no problem. There was commuter transportation . The trolleybus system was working perfectly and allowed me to reach HCJB facilities on time without any problems.

Then after reviewing the information that the police almost took several areas of the country, it was not known if the protest was nationwide . Reports from colleagues doing coverage in the Amazon region indicated that things were quiet, as policemen there were playing volleyball and in other activities. Many were unaware of what was happening here in Quito and Guayaquil.

Once we defined that the problem was out of control [here], I coordinated with the News Director, Edwin Chamorro, on what we would do in terms of coverage . Then after reflecting the possibilities that could have including violence , ah. . . after appropriate recommendations, Edwin authorized me to go to Regiment No. One, one of the largest barracks in Quito. I was there when the president arrived and was entering the building where he later tried to talk to the police, for this as there was one of the first incidents and clashes by the head of state and had problems that forced him to go to his car . It seems that both the General Commander of the Police as the min . . . new interior minister gave assurances asked him he could return to talk with the police , and so he did.

The President was given an opportunity to speak at the barracks from . . . uh , a two-story building . He appeared at one of the windows , with microphone in hand , and attempted to talk to the police. But tempers were so heated that was unsuccessful . The President spent approximately fifteen to twenty five minutes . And so he went down, but could no longer get to the cars as his personal bodyguard got separated from him. There were only the police bodyguard . The military somehow managed to divide them and they stayed outside. The President of the Republic had been forced to delay until about ten fifty-five in the morning. At this time the President was the victim of insults, blows , especially his leg trying to attack them, the right knee that was recently operated . It was in the process . . . still is in the process of recovery.

There were six - six , maybe five - no, six that I counted always trying to safeguard the president. Until they came to gate. It seems that they [protestors] took advantage of a moment of chaos where they threw a tear gas canister, even one of them came close to the Presidency of the Republic. Then people started to disperse, the security guards seem to have broken this gate and entered. It was a door to the hospital, adjoining the national police barracks. The President of the Republic managed to enter the emergency area at ten- fifty-five. For almost an hour the president was delayed on the premises [barracks].

They entered the emergency area of the hospital of Police and the president began to be seen by physicians at this medical center of the National Police.

Kurtenbach: (unintelligible).

Zurita. That's right, the majority. Then as a reporter leveraging my relationship with a police general, I chatted with him and soon enough, had entered the emergency room without anybody noticing me. Taking advantage of this, I talked with Gen. Euclides Mantilla. Leaving there, I entered the area where the sick are tended to. I stayed there, witnessing the entry of nurses with ice. You could see their concern for the President of the Republic. I talked with one of the doctors who treated the President. He said it was good that his knee had not suffered much. And so it did not need surgery because it was in perfect condition. Well, good condition, if not perfect condition but in good condition.

Kurtenbach: One moment, giving reports to Edwin [Chamorro], ah. . . as it happened ?

Zurita: Trying to call in reports to HCJB, but the problem was this – and it became a bigger problem -- others were doing the same thing, using their cell phones and so the cell space was saturated. The system sort of collapsed. Then tried to talk to my bosses here – Tati [de la Torre], and Edwin.

Kurtenbach: Not.

Zurita: No, it didn't work, no calls entering or leaving . So that made me leave the hospital and go to each corner of the parking lot , no signal is reactivated. That actually worked for me. After several attempts, I made a call. My first report detailed the health status of the President of the Republic.

Likewise, before noon it had been much speculated about the day's first two deaths, saying that they were part of the National Police after a confrontation with the military escort of the President of the Republic. HCJB obviously stands for a level of professionalism, so I attempted to confirm this with the Chief Medical Officer at the

hospital. She is a doctor and she said no, that no one was dead although there had been a person struck by a truck. By that time, police had created a certain amount of chaos by closing off the two main routes to the hospital. It appears that a truck driver was not aware and invested those soldiers after he was admitted to the emergency but they were dead before noon.

Kurtenbach: So at that time, you gave information to Edwin either confirming or not confirming such things.

Zurita: Sure. Because these are the events where there uprising -- that is the right word - and know presumed by that time that it was a coup , uh . . . is very easy to fall into speculation . Then it is optimal to use eh . . . filters in this case.

I told Edwin [Chamorro] what was happening, what I saw, then together with Edwin we determined that this is appropriate to report or this is not appropriate to report merely for its shock effect. We did not want people speculating without confirmed facts.

Then this was our communication form, going the almost ten, eleven hours by reporting what was happening at the Police Hospital. With hot tempers, the police had left the barracks and virtually took over the Police Hospital. They surrounded the hospital, took the helipad just in case the President of the Republic tried to flee in the helicopter. We also learned that the president, confined by police inside the hospital. . . held a press conference - no press conference really- but made statements to the public media.

Kurtenbach: Hmm.

Zurita: So the president was talking about coup and all that, he was kidnapped, that affected the way police were thinking about the situation. They came to the hospital and started to look for him.

Kurtenbach: Hmmm.

Zurita: The people trusted by President Rafael Correa had to move him to a room on the hospital's third floor. Outside, the national police were a bit exaggerated in terms of aggression to the patients' visitors at the hospital – those who did not agree with they were doing. In fact, they started to attack their own comrades if that person viewed it differently he was immediately called a Correaista [Correa supporter] and their relationships began to disintegrate. (cell phone begins ringing)

Kurtenbach: Three , two, one. Just to recap after stopping, policemen were aggressive to hospital visitors and people were called Correaistas.

Zurita: Right.

Kurtenbach: Bothered?

Zurita: It resulted in people hitting each other and I repeat, including police hitting their own comrades. So this continued until two in the afternoon. During this time, the Defense Minister spoke publicly, saying the Armed Forces had pledged their support to the President of the Republic. So this apparently came to appease the spirits or at least slightly mitigated the situation, prompting the police to think about things but not really so much.

More violence followed. Later it will be to respond and was ready qu3e operation to rescue the President of the Republic. For this, eh . . . the insurgents also began to persecute journalists. To them the only worthwhile message was that of the television station, *Teleamazonas*. Those of us of other communication media -- television, radio, press -- they began to seek us out and to get us out of the hospital. They did so by pushing, with insults, eh . . . at least five journalists were affected. A colleague, a radio colleague was pepper sprayed him in the eyes. They hit a photographer of an international agency, took his camera and burned it.

And among these five was an HCJB journalist, also a victim of pushing -- not serious but shoved to the grounds.

Kurtenbach: Speaking of yourself.

Zurita: Right. So we were not on the information of what was happening in the hospital but around. We witnessed the State Accountant General Luis Polit came, who was prevented from entry to the hospital. And also, the Chancellor of the Republic Ricardo Patiño came but at the entryway they just sprayed him, threw water bottles, and insulted him. We also saw the police taking advantage of having police motorcycles, driving back and forth on the Mariscal Sucre [main thoroughfare] and the Avenida Mariana de Jesus, which are the main streets around the hospital.

Kurtenbach: Mariscal Sucre.

Zurita: Or the Occidental [major north/south thoroughfare]. Because it involved supporters of President Rafael Correa came to give their support.

Kurtenbach: After the Minister Patino dared to call on the radio for a citizen protest.

Zurita: It's well. Then, still until three in the afternoon there was a majority group that came to support the President of the Republic, were few. But the fighting and, already noticed. The police met with sticks and those Correa supporters.

Kurtenbach: Hmmmm.

Zurita: Roughly six ten or so in the evening, including sixteen hours and seventeen hours . . . uhmm . . . General Euclides Mantilla and a Corporal Luis Garcia came to try to appease the angry police. They began with them a dialogue, especially the corporal. . . eh . . . I think I must stress this, because he used language that was Christian. He used Christian terms, no? Even when he, before heading to his companions he told them that had asked God to give him the right words to converse with peers.

And so, his companions were silent, and the tension dropped by one hundred percent. They said had not read the Public Service Act that the National Assembly had passed the night before -- that is, September 29 - which allegedly took away many benefits to the members of the Police. In fact, it was not so.

Then they recognized publicly acknowledged the support audios no, they had not read the text. Then, that's when the corporal said, "Come, come, sit down and we can dialogue peacefully." Then the general intervened and in the beginning, almost lost control of the situation, but eventually prevailed and said, "Let's go to the barracks. Let's go home and talk."

Apparently things would finish there. . . eh. And it seemed that the departure of President of the Republic would be peaceful. That's why reporters who were covering that we decided to return to the police building, we get a lot and there was no obstacle in the door.

Kurtenbach: That was at five in the afternoon?

Zurita: That was at. . . about five in the afternoon.

Kurtenbach: Seventeen hundred hours.

Zurita: So the main doors to the hospital, the building, there was no way. Then we had to use the emergency stairs doors to enter through the door and to the third floor. Yes it is on the third floor that eh . . . eh well, we got comments from officials coming in, then the Hospital Director of the National Police National Assembly also spoke. And in his statements he said that the President was doing well and ruled that the President was kidnapped or something similar. More or less at six o'clock a rumor began to spread

Kurtenbach: (interrupting) Umm , a little clarification on that point of whether the president was "kidnapped" or "detained" . . . a kidnapping victim could not really, uh . . . call , uh . . . and talk to *Radio Publica*. . . uh, but also could not leave the hospital . Or yes, could he?

Zurita: No, he could not leave. With people on the outside, especially . . . umm . . . showing no openness to dialogue. So personally as a journalist, [I would say] he was a victim. Umm . . . I do not know what would have happened to the President of the Republic, who was the central point of the matter involved.

Kurtenbach: A target then.

Zurita: Right. That was the case

Kurtenbach: At the hospital he was. . .

Zurita: . . The hospital. . . so, the term hitherto that I will use is "retained" - held that he could not leave.

Kurtenbach: Mmm Hmmm.

Zurita: He had to be protected, so staying at the third floor of the National Police Hospital until the security team, until it gradually getting trusted people in place . Then at about six o'clock, half past six p.m. , we began to hear rumors of GEO intervention – the Special Operations Group. It is part of the military.

Kurtenbach: You said "rumors."

Zurita: Yes, because you could hear on the radio as the police communicated. So between them, they were saying "They'll get the 'chuspangos' which is a slang phrase used to refer to those of the military. "They'll get the chuspangos. An operation is in place to rescue the President." At about this time, eh . . . people knew where the President was, and we were seeing people whom we know are military and they're in the area of the President's room. So now with this familiarity we could see the military from five in the evening - perhaps earlier - beginning to reach the third floor , dressed in civilian clothes, and wearing backpacks. Surely they were also part of the preparations for getting the President of the Republic Hospital. Then began arriving gradually also members of the Special Operations Group of the National Police. To the point at which, - or rather - until quite a large contingent of armed men –I cannot really say, I did not

count the number— but the passage or alley . . . that is, the hallway, that's the exact term—to get to the President of the Republic was, that hallway was almost crowded with GOE.

Once some rumors began circulating . . . some journalists tried to leave the building and it was difficult. They had blocked all exit doors and access, so leaving was complicated.

. . .

Kurtenbach: (interrupting) Blocked by the police ?

Zurita: By the police.

Kurtenbach: Rebels.

Zurita: Rebels, it is.

Kurtenbach: Okay.

Zurita: So because of eh . . . eh . . . the circumstances we had to stay on the scene, that is, the third floor , where the President of the Republic was. Again, we were receiving statements until that time from officials inside. Even though we could not get out of there, we could move from floor to floor, sit in the stairwells, there were movements by the police, such as doing that within the building.

Kurtenbach: And with you in touch with Edwin [Chamorro]?

Zurita: Always giving reports. Reports came from , eh . . . possible because Ralph , remember that there was a provision binding since. . . we were in state of emergency. Then Article 165 of the Constitution says that the President may make use of the private media. And that is what he did. So we were bound to a kind of syndicated broadcast , but in ways we sent our own reports always to recount what the situation was. This lasted until just before nine in the evening. We listened to the radio, waiting and ready.

A little past nine o'clock in the evening, the first shots began, with those first shots in the street outside. I perceived that it began with those of the Armed Forces . . . with the police returning fire. So then we had to collect ourselves. There were between 20 to 30 journalists, more or less in this corridor. It was one of the corridors that led to the area where the President of the Republic was. So our first choice was to drop to the floor to avoid stray bullets. . . eh . . . and to seek the areas where air was flowing. Because for this operation, as there was . . . they threw in tear gas early on.

Kurtenbach: That is in the neo natal . . . and at this time there's the presence of . . . tear gas.

Zurita: Yes the President of the Republic was in the neo-natal area. Eh . . . that is, was recovering in the neo— the newborn area. I could not find out much about them because the doors of the rooms —where there were patients—were locked. It was impossible. Nurses who attended that area . . . well when they commented, they said they had no time to prepare patients [for the incursion].

Kurtenbach: Hmmm .

Zurita: I had found some even with IV tubes under the beds for getting good collection, they also knew it was the shooting. . . eh . . . eh . . . had not time to put patients — including children —into safer places. But thank God it seems that nothing happened to them. At least that is what I say unofficially, a nurse told me that nothing had happened. It seems that the gas had not much complicated their situation, but I myself was affected. But it seems it was not serious.

Then. . . em . . . At five past nine p.m. and threw a tear gas bomb inside the building, inside the department where we were, then they assumed that it would create chaos and allow for the President of the Republic to leave. Because the corridors in this area were very narrow and, well somehow journalists were in the way. Because regarding, especially television and newspapers, they want exclusive video and photography. Tear gas was fired and in those moments a group of. . . eh . . . the . . . GOE troops of the Armed Forces . . . and left with the President of the Republic.

So what we wanted to do was cross to the north side of the building to the south side of the same floor. We could do more as journalists on the ground, and there we began reflecting on that, because we were dependent upon the insubordinate police. About this time we heard on the radio that the police said, “We are losing. We are losing. Eh . . . We need more ammunition. Take out the ammunition.” Such comments as these. And at the ends of the corridors, Ralph, there were large windows. On the one hand there was not much problem possibly because as the building is tall and Avenida Mariana de Jesus is down below, giving us some assurance that the bullets could not reach. But at the other end is—that on the west side of the building—the window had been shaking some too. The policemen were shooting, but this is also not an instant I forgot that some policemen were firing from inside the hospital. And the nurses and doctors shouted over the noise, saying, “No, do not shoot. Do not make this, this danger by shooting inside the hospital. Get yourselves under control in this situation.”

Returning , eh . . . to the situation of journalists, we were told by two uniformed GOE - Special Operations Group – men who said to us, “Gentlemen, we cannot stay here longer. We have to go to where the President is.” And they left. But before that, we had to decide if we would submit to what they told us. After a brief split-second decision, my colleagues said “Let’s do what they say. No more.” Then accepting that, we went along to where the President of the Republic was . Good. To expect that all happens, no we had not. Not that we witnessed the shooting outside. There were those who took away people desperate, crying colleagues, along with silent peers, but still under stress. The shooting lasted up until about ten in the evening. At 10:40 they gave us notice that we can go down quietly. As for this too, there were reports on media – on television a special communication - to inform the President of the Republic and came out with the protective cars with him, along with people of the GOE, GEO, the GIR too.

Zurita: Those people, the GIR, the GOE with him also managed to remove the building. For this specific time and learned of the death of a policeman, a policeman. That we left the third floor eh . . . as we walked down the steps like , we could see all that was destroyed, such as doors , windows , then on the ground floor which is the area, the cashier’s window and the information desk was total disaster, no? There were broken windows , doors, glass access door to the hospital itself was broken. The metal access door facing the street was also bent. So that was a sign that the confrontation was . . . was pretty serious.

Besides that, there were shell casings, tear gas canisters, which were also silent witnesses to what happened at that time. (Pause)

Kurtenbach: You experienced fear ? Inside you ? That you might lose a life ? Your own life?

Zurita: Ralph, to tell the truth, yes. Hey but this was not the first time. Unfortunately, our country in recent years has made the news for government overthrows , violent ousters in this case. I had the opportunity to be at the ouster of Jamil Mahuad , then the ouster of Lucio Gutiérrez in April 2005. And the latter, no. Between these events I have gained some experience as to proceed in terms of taking care of myself. That's one aspect. By another . . . psychologically I know what it is to have walls around me. I quiet, otherwise the bullets could not reach us. Not quite, but I did have some confidence.

Now you also mentioned, Ralph, who , here on the radio so that, by its very essence, it is Christ-centered. Um . . . through the microphones every day we point people to Faith. We always point that out. I received a call from Edwin, when he told me that colleagues were praying for me. So that's why I am sure that also had peace, that gave me peace of mind. And I never lost communication with my boss , my wife, my family. They were attentive and knew I was in perfect condition.

So, uh . . . I think that too helped me a lot, contributing that to me which was not part of the chaos, especially comforting but somehow at that time one of the partners. I had shown a one of the exhibitions, Ralph, who knew not even my companion radio colleague who is pregnant. She was in that event and she was three months pregnant. Well, I was comforting her and saying "Quiet. God will not allow anything. God is love, your hope and quiet is good." Actually that worked. And days later, she found out she was pregnant. (Laughter) Yes sir.

Kurtenbach: Edwin told you then, that the team here was praying for you and for the situation there in the hospital.

Zurita: Right. On the next day, no? On the same night one of my radio colleagues was there in when we returned, just roughly ten forty- five p.m. A missionary, Douglas, and I met another missionary No, no , no, no I can't recall the name .

Well, they greeted me with words of compassion, with words of encouragement, they encouraged me, no? Well , I said it was well appreciated , I was in perfect condition. Eh , . . my coworkers in the same, the ALAS network, local radio, administrative. It seems I was aware of what was happening and well, when they had the opportunity to personally well , they extended their solidarity and said, "Good to see you." So this motivates me very much. It's what makes us different than secular media, Ralph.

Kurtenbach: Yeah, yeah . To clarify . . . eh. The police understood that the Assembly had passed a law on Thursday September 29. But you told me something was not—supposedly did, but it was not. I do not understand , do not understand exactly what happened in the Assembly last night.

Zurita Ralph, what happened is that, uh . . . before you check this bill had inequities. You have to read the text. There were inequities, no? That for example, that's what the President always mentions. And that as a journalist in the obligation to read, we observed.

While the police were satisfied with a Christmas gift of say eighty, one hundred dollars, with the same article benefitted other officials from institutions like, say for example, the Controller. In the same article, bonds benefitted twenty thousand or ten thousand dollars. So the President was trying to equip, to equalize. Police no longer contented with a hundred, a gift of ten, hundred and fifty dollars is nothing compared to bonuses of ten thousand, twenty thousand dollars.

Then as the Police eh . . . at least most had not read the text, were convinced they want to take profits. So that's what motivates them to that uprising.

Kurtenbach: Mmm Hmmm . Then it can be . . . can say that the intent of the change was, as you said, even more fair to all . . . to all public employees .

Zurita: At least that is the intention in the text.

Kurtenbach: Uhh. . . only a bit more to background this. . a little more about the relationship between police rebels and journalists. Why newspapers told him wrong . . . journalists . . . *El Comercio* for example? Why. . . and read and sometimes reporting . . . of the newspaper, not very friendly to President Correa. Eh . . . I do not know . . . I do not know if it is considered totally opposed to an opposition but when you think other regional otherwise the President Correa says opinions. But the police . . . eh *Teleamazonas* is considered that the only way to please them, you said, right?

Zurita You need to analyze the media situation. A written media or print media offered no immediate information that they wanted at the time. So that is why they focused on *Teleamazonas*, a television channel that was broadcasting live. Then they offered more - according to them - more quickly than they wanted to express.

Kurtenbach: And captures the emotion, the mood of the . . .

Zurita Right.

Kurtenbach: Increased anger and frustration . . . everything. Whole situation. Something else to add, ahhh . . . Cristian? On the situation of . . . of yourself? In the situation? Or something we have not talked about yet?

Zurita Well, Ralph . I really am very sorry, I was personally moved to see the police in a State of Emergency. For example, they had to leave their work in the Presidency of the Republic, had to leave another State that is a function of the Legislature. It is responsible to the Legislative Escort guard that, that organism. They had to leave because . . . by distrust that the Government has in this situation now, and not only the government but the people in the streets, Ralph . The comments you hear are not sandpapers . . . uh, um. . . for a focus of a description, are insults. Even sometimes a gesture. Do you realize, no, people intend to shred the Police now.

Then all that work was done to try to reconstruct the image of police solidarity, working Police, Police honored the Dedicated Police, went to the floor in virtually have to start from scratch.

Kurtenbach: Mmm hmmm. Where today and who is your hope, your hope. Uh. . . facing difficult situations facing. . . uh difficulties here at home, our. . . our country. In that is your hope.

Zurita. Ralph, the conclusion that I reach is that as a Christian I have an obligation not to give up in prayer. I think that's key, that is base. Because in my case I could see the faces of humans, not Ecuadorian. But human beings, transformed completely disfigured by hatred and rancor. Humans using communication systems to say "Kill! Kill! And killed! "So that's not over the enemy's space and manipulate apodérale many people. Y. . . and distorted that God wants in our lives, which is peace. That is to love one another. So my commitment is to develop prayer. I already told my teammates, "We need to pray much for our country. We need to pray much for those hearts offended, resentful that maybe be thinking of revenge (ahem). . . Forgiveness. They are thinking of revenge, be healed. I have healed. For the love of God which is the one, Ralph. Because maybe a human or another human mu going to be difficult, a rather complicated task.

Kurtenbach: Thanks Cristian

Zurita Thanks Ralph

Kurtenbach: We're talking to Cristian Zurita, HCJB reporter about the events of September 30 and the days following. I know that. . . the following weeks here in Ecuador. I am Raphael Kurtenbach, communications coordinator re. . . Latin American region of HCJB Global.

Appendix D Transcript of Spanish Language Interview with Cristian Zurita Pozo

15 octubre 2010, estudios de HCJB

Kurtenbach: Quince de octubre, no? Quince. Si hoy yes quince de octubre. Quince de octubre de mil diez. Diez.

Zurita: Sí.

Kurtenbach: Este es. . . este es el Control. .

Zurita: Cinco. Estamos en el Control Cinco. En cinco, cuatro, tres, dos y uno. Aquí estoy con Cristian Zurita, reportero de HCJB, La Voz de Los Andes. Estoy muy agradecido que tu participas en una entrevista hoy Cristian. Te damos gracias por tomar tiempo para hablar sobre los eventos desafortunados del día 30 de septiembre aquí en el Ecuador. Empezó en la mañana con protestas y un paro de trabajo de los policías de todo el país, según entiendo yo. Y a más o menos 11, digo 12 horas después Había muertos, había rescate del presidente, del hospital del a policía, uh. . Y había discursos del Presidente Rafael Correa en el palacio del gobierno. Um . . . quisiéramos enfocar en nuestra entrevista hoy Cristian, en la participación tuya de parte de HCJB Noticias en dar cobertura a los sucesos allí en el hospital de la policía a partir de las diez de la mañana hasta las diez, once de la noche.

Um . . . cuáles fueron los puntos claves en ese día. Pu . . . ahm, cuéntenos por favor como empezó y los puntos claves en ese. . . ese día y allí lo que hiciste tú.

Zurita: Muchísimas gracias Ralph. Bueno, la cobertura de HCJB por obligación nos tocaba informar a la ciudadanía -- los queridos amigos y amigas, los oyentes sobre lo que estaba ocurriendo. Antes de las nueve y treinta de la mañana, eh. . . bueno, notábamos otra vez de la televisión y en específico como los ánimos poco a poco los estaban caldeando, estaba ya cambiando algo tono, en un principio. . . uh, creo que hay que mencionar Ralph, también, que yo debo cruzar la ciudad de sur a norte en ese día invertí aproximadamente una hora cuarenta minutos. No hubo ningún inconveniente. Hubo transporte intercontinental. El sistema de trolebús funcionaba perfectamente y era me permitió llegar a las instalaciones de HCJB a tiempo sin ningún problema. Entonces luego de revisar la información que los policías prácticamente se tomas varios cuarteles del país, en no se sabe, si todo el país Ralph. Testimonios de compañeros que estaban haciendo cobertura por ejemplo en las Américas que en la que estuvo todo tranquilo. Más pereció que los policías estaban jugando vole en otras actividades y muchos no conocían de lo que estaba pasando aquí en Quito y en Guayaquil.

Una vez que definimos que el problema estaba saliendo de control, coordinamos con el Jefe de Noticias Edwin Chamorro lo que vamos a hacer en cuanto a la cobertura.

Entonces luego de reflexionar las posibilidades incluyendo que podrían haber hechos de violencia, ah. . . luego de las recomendaciones del caso, Edwin autorizo que salga para el Regimiento Numero Uno que es uno de los cuarteles más grandes de Quito.

Fui allí, llegue cuando el presidente ya estaba ingresando al edificio donde posteriormente se pronunció y trato de conversar con los policías, para esto ya hubo uno de los primeros incidentes e enfrentamientos antes el Jefe de Estado ya tuvo problemas él se obligó a ir a su carro de seguridad. El que fue prácticamente pero parece que tanto al Comandante General de la Policía como el min. . . nuevo Ministro del Interior le dieron garantías de pidieron que pudo regresar a conversar con los policías, quien le hizo conformes. Después que el Presidente se une con una oportunidad lograr traer al cuartel.

Entra. . . uh, un edificio de dos plantas, aparece un uno de los ventanales, con micrófono en mano, pues intento dialogar con los policías. Pero los ánimos estaban tan caldeados que fue infructuoso. No incendio. El Presidente invirtió aproximadamente quince y veinte cinco minutos. No logro más de intervención más de intervención de él. Y tuvo que bajar. Pero él se encontró con los represa hay que ya no pudo entrar en esos carros de seguridad que su escolta personal estaba dividida, estaban solamente los guardaespaldas de la policía. Los militares de alguna forma lograron dividirles y ellos se quedaron afuera. Es por eso que el Presidente de la Republica se había obligado a deambular por las instalaciones del cuartel hasta alas más o menos diez cincuenta y cinco de la mañana en este lapso el Presidente fue víctima de agravios, golpes, especialmente intentaban agredirles su pierna, la rodilla derecha que estaba recién operada. Estaba en el proceso de. . . está en el proceso de recuperación.

Entonces los seis guarde espaldas – entre seis, cinco a lo mejor – no, son los seis que yo conté. Eh. . . siempre procuraron dar resguardo al presidente. Hasta que llegaron a una puerta de malla entonces parece que ellos aprovecharon de un momento de caos donde lanzaron bomba lacrimógenas incluso una de ellas casi llega a la Presidencia de la Republica. Entonces la gente el rato que empieza a dispersarse, el parece que los guardaespaldas lograron romper la seguridad de esta puerta e ingresaron.

Es una puerta que colinda entra el cuartel el hospital de la Policía Nacional. Entonces logran entrar ingresar por el área de la emergencia del La Presidencia de La Republica y que por esto era y a las diez y cincuenta y cinco horas. Prácticamente el Presidente estuvo con una hora recorriendo en las instalaciones. Bueno que anticipe.

Ingresa al área de las emergencias del hospital de la Policía y el Presidente empieza a ser atendido por gas galenos de este centro de salud medio y entre ellos médicos, de la propia Policía Nacional.

Kurtenbach (unintelligible) También.

Zurita. Así es, la mayoría. Entonces como reportero aprovechando de una relación que como conocido de uno del general de la policía mientras charlábamos, sin que ellos se den cuenta pues yo logre a ingresar a la emergencia. Aprovechando de esta charla que tuve con el general Euclides Mantilla. Entonces me quede en el primer pasillo antes de entrar el área de donde atiendes prácticamente de los enfermos. Allí me quede entonces pude ser testigo de entraban las enfermeras y le Dian hielos e se notaba que estaba preocupados por el Presidente de la Republica. Pude conversar un uno de los médicos que trato al Presidente y bueno él decía que la rodilla no había sufrido mucho. Y por eso es que no necesitaba una intervención quirúrgica porque estaba en perfectas condiciones. Bueno, buenas condiciones, no si fuera perfectas condiciones pero en buenas condiciones.

Lego de esto, eh . . .

Kurtenbach. Momentito, dando reportes a Edwin, ah. . . mientras que sucedió. . .

Zurita: Intente dar reportes para HCJB pero el problema es que como ya el problema se hizo más grande, se saturaron los demás. . Eh los servicios del sistema móvil, no funcionaba. Se. . . colapsaron. Entonces intentaba conversar con mis jefes aquí – Tati, Edwin, y . . .

Kurtenbach. No

Zurita: No funcionaba, ni entraban ni salían llamadas. Entonces eso me obligaba salir del hospital e irme a uno del a un Rincón del parqueadero, trata de no señal se reactiva.

Eso efectivamente me funciono. Varios intentos e hizo una llamada y se limpió el primer reporte. Informando del estado de salud del Presidente de la Republica. Paralelo, antes de medio día ya se especuló muchísimo de que hubo los dos primeros muertos de parte de la Policia Nacional tras un enfrentamiento con la escolta militar del Presidente de la Republica. Luego, HCJB obviamente que le destaca con el profesionalismo que esta confirma con el Jefe Médico del hospital y es una doctora y ella dijo que no. Que no había muertos, que efectivamente habían sido atropellados vestidos eh. . . por un camión. Por el momento del caos porque la Policia cerro parte de dos vías principales, que colina con el hospital. Entonces al cerrar parece que un conductor de camión no se percató e invistió esos uniformados después le ingresaron a la emergencia pero no estaban muertos hasta antes del mediodía.

Kurtenbach: entonces datos confirmados o no confirmados te diste al Edwin en ese tiempo. **Zurita:** Claro. Porque en estos es estos eventos donde hay sublevación que es el término adecuado, y que sepan presumía por esa entonces que era un golpe de estado, uh. . . es muy fácil caerse en especulaciones. Entonces lo óptimo es usar eh. . . filtros en este caso. Comentaba Edwin que estaba ocurriendo yo veía, entonces con Edwin canalizábamos y decía eso es oportuno informar, esto no es oportuno informar con el propósito de no conmocionar a la gente mucho peor caer en especulaciones sin hechos confirmados. Entonces un es con esta canal que prácticamente funcionamos las diez, once horas que estamos reportando lo que ocurría en el Hospital de La Policia Nacional. Para esta ya los uniformados con los ánimos caldeados salieron del cuartel y se tomaron prácticamente el Hospital de La Policia Nacional. Rodearon el hospital, se tomaron la terraza por el Presidente de la Republica pretendía salir en el helicóptero. Eh, supimos también que empezó un perseguía al Presidente por el interior del hospital por que el e mucha policía. . . ofreció una rueda de prensa – no rueda de prensa -- el ofreció declaraciones a un medio público.

Kurtenbach: Hmm.

Zurita Entonces como el Presidente ya estaba hablando de golpe de estado y todo eso, que estaba secuestrado, eso alerta más o caldeo más los ánimos de los policías. Por eso que ellos entran al hospital y empezar a buscarle por el hospital.

Kurtenbach. Hmmm.

Zurita: Eh, según gente de confianza del Presidente Rafael Correa tuvo que moverse por unos cuartos dentro del hospital hasta llegar al piso tres. Hasta tanto en los exteriores, policías nacionales y creo que exageraron un poco en cuanto a las agresión a visitantes a los pacientes dentro del hospital, los sacaban si es que no estaban de acuerdo con que ellos hacían. Empezaron a agredir a sus propios compañeros si no les hacían caso de que le saquen a tal persona asociaban inmediatamente con Correaste y sus desintegren cavan sus indignas. (cell phone begins ringing)

Kurtenbach: Tres, dos, uno. Me contaste de los policías – otros policías, uh. . . sin no hizo caso, a los que entran, visitantes. Eh, le llamaron Correistas y le golpearon, le golpearon o algo.

Zurita Así es.

Kurtenbach. A molestaron.

Zurita si, siembre terminaba en agresiones, no. Siempre terminan golpeándoles. E insisto, incluidos a sus propios compañeros. Entonces esta tónica hasta las dos de la tarde. En este tiempo aproximadamente ya se pronunciaron el Ministro de Defensa el

primero donde manifestaba que las Fuerzas Armadas ratificaron su apoyo al Presidente de La Republica. Entonces este aparentemente vino a apaciguar los ánimos o por lo menos poco mitigó a reflexionar los policías pero no del todo. Siguió los. . . los hechos de violencia. Más tarde será a las tres se mromocion al Comando de la junta y el ya hablo de que estaba listo el operativo para rescatar El Presidente de la Republica. Para esto, eh. . . los policías sublevadas empezaron a perseguir a los periodistas. Ya nos empezaron a perseguir porque para ellos el único medio que valía la pena según sus propias palabras era Teleamazonas. Entonces el resto de medio de comunicaciones – televisoras, de radio, prensa, nos empezaron a buscar y a sacarnos de los predios del hospital. Lo hacían con empujones, con insultos, eh. . . al menos cinco periodistas fueron afectados. Una compañera, una radio colega le rociaron gas pimienta en sus ojos. A un fotógrafo de una agencia internacional le golpearon. Le quitaron la camera de fotos y la quemaron. Y así entre los casos no destacados acá. El periodista de HCJB también fue víctima de empujones no de a graves pero si empujones para sacarle de los predios del hospital.

Kurtenbach es decir tú mismo.

Zurita Así es. Entonces ya no estábamos en la información de lo que ocurría en el hospital sino que en los alrededores. Fuimos testigos por ejemplo un de la visita de Contador General del Estado Luis Polit, quien atento entrar en el hospital y no lo dejaron. Y también de lo que llego el Canciller de la Republica Ricardo Patino con uno asambleísta as si lograron a entrar pero hasta hazar la puerta principal igual le rociaron gas, le lanzaron botellas de agua, e insultaban. Lo seguía con pador a golpearlo también y también pudimos observar que los policías especialmente los motorizados aprovechando de las motocicletas se movilizaban entre la mariana de Jesús y la mariscal sucre, que son las avenidas principales que esta alrededor del hospital.

Kurtenbach Mariscal Sucre.

Zurita o el occidental. Porque ya dedican los simpatizantes del Presidente Rafael Correa venían a dar su apoyo.

Kurtenbach. Después de llamo del Ministro Patino atreves de Radio Publica.

Zurita. Así Es. MINUTO: 15: 41

Zurita Entonces, todavía hasta las tres de la tarde no era un grupo mayoritario que llegaba a apoyar el presidente de la república, eran pocos. Pero ya los enfrentamientos ya, ya se notaban. Los policías lanzaban bombas lagrimones y los simpatizantes de Correa pues, ya cumplía con palos.

Kurtenbach. Hmmm.

Zurita: más o menos a las diez y seis, entre diez y seis horas y diez y siete horas. . . uhmm. . . baja un general. Justo el General Euclides Mantilla. Y un Cabo Primero Luis García, para intentar apaciguar los animados, los compañeros. Con ellos entraban dialogo, especialmente el Cabo. . . eh. . . esto creo yo debo insistir, porque el lenguaje era cristiana. El usó términos cristianos, no? Incluso cuando él, antes de dirigirse a sus compañeros él dijo que había pedido a Dios que le de las palabras adecuadas para poder conversar con sus compañeros. Y entre ellos términos más. Y así fue, sus compañeros se callaron y restaron el cien por ciento de la tensión y él se hizo reflexionar que había o no había leído la Ley de Servicio Público que la noche anterior – es decir la 29 de septiembre – había revisado la Asamblea Nacional, que supuestamente les quitaron muchos beneficios a los integrantes de la Policia. De hecho, que no era así. Entonces

reconocieron públicamente ellos reconocieron a los audios del respaldo que no, que no habían leído el texto. Entonces, allí es cuando el Cabo a primera instancia dice, “Vamos, vamos, sentémonos y dialoguemos pacíficamente.” Luego interviene el general en un principio, casi perdió el control de la situación, pero al final imperó y dijo, “Vámonos al cuartel. Vamos a nuestra casa y dialogar.” Allí aparentemente las cosas. . . eh, iban a terminar. Y parecía que la salida del Presidente de la Republica iba a ser de forma pacífica. Es por eso que los reporteros que estábamos cubriendo eso decidimos regresar al edificio de la Policia, logramos entrar y ya no hubo mucho obstáculo en la puerta principal.

Kurtenbach. Eso fue a las cinco de la tarde.

Zurita Eso fue a las. . . aproximadamente a las cinco de la tarde.

Kurtenbach Diez y siete horas.

Zurita Entonces por las puertas principales al hospital, al edificio, no había como. Entonces teníamos que usar las puertas escaleras de emergencia para ingresar por la puerta es SOT y para el tercer piso. Es sí que en el tercer piso eh. . . eh bueno, recopilábamos testimonios de los funcionarios que llegaban a entrar, luego también habló el Director del Hospital de la Policia Nacional, y buen él en sus declaraciones dijo que el Presidente está en un buen estado y descartó que el Presidente estuviera secuestrado o algo similar. Más o menos a las seis un poco más ya se empezó a correr el rumor

Kurtenbach (interrumpiendo) Umm, un poco de aclaración en ese punto de “secuestrado”, “detenido” . . . un víctima de secuestro no puede, uh . . . llamar por teléfono, uh . . . hablar a Radio Pública, . . . uh pero no pudo salir del Hospital. O sí, pudo?

Zurita No, no pudo salir. Es que la gente en los exteriores, en especial. . . umm. . . no daban muestra de apertura al dialogo. Entonces personalmente como periodista fue víctima de sus empujones. Umm. . . no sé qué hubiera pasado en el Presidente de la Republica que era el principal involucrado del asunto.

Kurtenbach: El tiro blanco de todo.

Zurita Así es.

Kurtenbach Si por si acaso saldría del Hospital.

Zurita. . Del hospital. . . así es, el termino que hasta ahora se usa es “retenido” – retenido por que no pudiera salir.

Kurtenbach: Mmm Hmmm.

Zurita tuvo que para proteger integridad, quedarse en ese tercer piso del Hospital de la Policia Nacional hasta que se arme el operativo, hasta que empiece, a llegar poco a poco la gente de confianza. Entonces más o menos a las seis, seis y media de la tarde. Y se empieza escuchar los rumores de la intervención del GEO (HEY oh) – Grupo Especial de Operaciones. Que ese pertenece a las Fuerzas Armadas.

Kurtenbach Me dijiste rumores.

Zurita Sí. Porque se escuchaban por las radios por la se comunicaban los policías. Entonces entre ellos, decían “Van a llegar los ‘Chus pangos’ es que como los a podan a los militares. “Van a llegar los Chus pangos. Viene un operativo a rescatar al Presidente.” Paralelo, eh. . . quiénes descubrimos la fuente de la Presidencia, ya nos familiarizamos con rostros militares del Escolta Presidencial que son militares. Entonces ya con esta familiaridad divisábamos que los militares desde las cinco de la tarde –

quizás antes – empezaban a llegar al tercer piso, vestidos de civiles, con mochilas. Seguramente ellos también formaron parte de los preparativos para sacar al Presidente de la Republica del Hospital. Luego empezaron a llegar poco a poco también los integrantes del Grupo Operaciones Especiales de la Policia Nacional. Y hasta que llego – o mejor dicho – hasta que se armó todo un contingente numeroso, no podía precisar, no conté el numero pero el pasaje o el callejón para . . . el pasillo es el termino exacto para entrar donde estaba el Presidente de la Republica, prácticamente estaba lleno de gente del GOE. Entonces una vez que visten los rumores eh. . . algunos periodistas intentábamos salir del edificio y ya fue difícil. Estaba bloqueadas todas las puertas de salir y acceso. Eso complicó

Kurtenbach (interrumpiendo) Bloqueadas por los policías?

Zurita: Por los policías.

Kurtenbach: Sublevados.

Zurita: Sublevados, así es.

Kurtenbach: Okay.

Zurita: Entonces, allí eh. . . eh. . . ante esas circunstancias teníamos a quedar en el lugar de los hechos, es decir, el tercer piso, donde estaba el Presidente de la Republica. Insisto, estábamos receptando declaraciones de los funcionarios hasta esa entonces al interior si bien, no se podía salir de allí pero se podía mover de piso a piso, sentarse en las gradas, ese tipo de movimientos había como hacer lo dentro del edificio de la Policia.

Kurtenbach Y tú en contacto con Edwin.

Zurita Siempre dando reportes. Provenía reportes, eh. . . lo posible porque Ralph, recordará que había una disposición. Atábamos. . . estamos en Estado de Excepción. Entonces el Artículo 165 de la Constitución dice que allí el Presidente puede hacer uso de los medios de comunicación privados. Y eso fue lo que hizo. Entonces estuvo enlazado a una especie de Cadena, pero de todos maneras cuando era oportuno siempre enviábamos nuestros propios reportes para contar como estaba la situación. Esta tónica duró hasta antes de las nueve de la noche. Y ya para esto ya escuchábamos a la radio que todo estaba listo. Antes de las nueve de la noche y más, ya empezaron los primeros tiros, con los primeros disparos afuera en la calle. Eso ya nos dio entender que la gente de las Fuerzas Armadas que. . . que los policías conformes estaba enfrentándose con ellos. Entonces tuvimos que ponernos recaude. Estábamos entre veinte a treinta periodistas más o menos en este pasillo. En uno de los pasillos que coordinaban con el área donde estaba el Presidente de la Republica. Entonces la primera elección fue ir al suelo para evitar balas perdidas. . . eh. . . tal, temp. . . Procurar áreas donde oxígeno fluía porque ya para esto, ya hubo. . . se lanzaron las primeras bombas lacrimógenas.

Kurtenbach Que de los neo natal. . . natos en este periodo con los lagrimacían. . . gas lacrimógenos.

Zurita Sí el Presidente de la Republica estaba en el área de los neo natos. Eh. . . es decir que los neos - - recién nacieron – estaba recuperándose. No logré averiguar mucho sobre ellos porque las puertas de las habitaciones, donde estaban los pacientes, estaban cerradas con llave. Era imposible. Las enfermeras que atendían esa área. Bueno cuando ellas comentaban que no habían tiempo para preparar los pacientes.

Kurtenbach. Hmmm.

Zurita Que habían encontrado algunos incluso con las mangueras de los sueros bajo de las camas poniéndose bien de recaudo pues, ellos también sabían que fue el tiroteo . . .

eh . . . de los niños pues . . . eh . . . tampoco tuvieron tiempo de poder ponerlos en sitios más seguros. Pero dando gracias a Dios parece que no pasó nada con ellos por lo menos, lo que me dice extra oficialmente, me dijo una enfermera que no había pasado nada. Parece que el gas tampoco les había complicado mucho. Les había afectado. Pero parece que no fue con seriedad. Entonces. . . em. . . A las nueve y cinco de la noche ya lanzaron una bomba lacrimógena dentro del edificio, dentro del piso donde estábamos, Entonces presumimos que eso creara el caos para ya permitir la salida del Presidente de la Republica. Porque los pasillos en esta área eran muy estrechos y, bueno los periodistas de alguna forma también, estábamos obstaculizando. Porque, especialmente ellos de televisión y periódicos, quieren exclusivos en cuanto a video y fotografía. Se lanzó la primera bomba lacrimógena y solamente se avanzó haberes el grupo. . . eh. . . del. . . de personas de GOE, de las Fuerzas Armadas. . . el Presidente de la Republica salía.

MINUTE 25: 53

Entonces lo que quisieron nos cruzarse de la parte norte del edificio a la parte sur del mismo piso. No pudimos hacer más igual seguimos los periodistas en el suelo y allí se empezó ya la reflexión en sí o no, porque nos quedamos dependientes de los policías que eran no conformes. Y para esto ya escuchábamos en el radio que los policías decían que, “Estamos perdiendo. Estamos perdiendo. Eh. . . Necesitamos más municiones. Saquen las taquetes.” Todo ese tipo de comentarios. Y en los extremos de los pasillos, Ralph, había ventanales grandes. Por un lado posiblemente no había mucho problema porque como el edificio es alto y la Mariana de Jesús es en picada, daba cierta seguridad de que las balas no podían llegar. Pero el otro extremo es decir, que en la parte oeste del edificio, ha si el ventanal estaba labar o con le daba con una peña que también coleaba. Disparaban los policías. Pero esto también no me olvidaba que un instan de que algunos policías estaban disparando desde dentro del hospital. Y gritaban las enfermeras y médicos mayores y que decían, no, que no disparen. Que no cometen esa, ese torpeza disparen dentro del hospital. Y parecen que lograron a controlar esa situación.

Retomando, eh. . . la situación de los periodistas, quedamos a merced que los policías inconformes vinieron dos uniformados de GOE – Grupo de Operaciones Especiales -- y nos dijeron, “Señores, aquí no podemos quedarnos. Tenemos que entrar a donde está el Presidente,” y ya se fue. Pero antes de esto teníamos que decidir si nos sometíamos a que ellos decían. ¿O que hacíamos? Tras una breve decisión en fracción de segundos, los compañeros dijimos “Sometámonos. No hay más.” Entonces aceptamos de lo que ellos propusieron y nos alejamos a donde estaba el Presidente de la Republica. Bueno. A esperar que todo pasa, no. No es que fuimos testigos de los disparos en el exterior. Gente que quitaba, gente desesperadas, compañeras que lloraban, compañeros también que con su silencio pero de todas maneras estaban bajo stress. Este tiroteo duró máximo aproximadamente hasta las diez de la noche. Diez y cuarenta ya ce nos dio el aviso que podemos bajar tranquilamente. Ya para esto también los medios de puc – te comunicación de televisión en especial – el informar que el Presidente de la Republica ya salió con los carros blindados con le gente de la GOE, de la GIR del GOE también.

MINUTE 28:31

Zurita la gente del GEO, del GIR, del GOE que también le acompañaban lograron sacar del edificio. Para este momento en específico ya supimos de la muerte de un policía, de un policía. En eso abandonábamos el tercer piso eh. . . mientras bajábamos por las gradas igual, pudimos divisar como estaba destruidas las puertas, ventanales, en la planta

baja que es el área donde esta caja, información, era total un desastre, no. Estaban rotas ventanales, puertas, la puerta de acceso misma al vidrio al Hospital estaba rota. La puerta de acceso la que daba a la calle de metal también estaba doblada. Entonces eso era muestra de que el enfrentamiento fue, fue bastante serio. Además que había los casquillos de bala, los casquillos de lacrimógenas, que también eran testigos mudos, no, de que, de que lo que pasó en ese momento. (Pausa)

Kurtenbach Había miedo? Dentro de ti? De perder tu vida? Tu propia vida?

Zurita Ralph, en la verdad, que sí. Eh, este no es el primer evento. Lamentablemente nuestro país en los últimos años ha hecho noticias por el derrocamiento, la salida de gobiernos, salidas violentas en este caso. Tuve la oportunidad de estar en la salida de Jamil Mahuad, luego en la salida de Lucio Gutiérrez en Abril del 2005. Y esta última, no. Entre eso ya como que acumulo cierta experiencia en cuanto a proceder en cuanto a cuidar mi integridad. Eso por un lado. Por el otro que . . . psicológicamente al saber que habías paredes rodeándome. Me de otra forma de tranquilidad de que las balas no podían llegarnos. No del todo pero algo de confianza me daba. Ahora que también a citar, Ralph, que, que aquí en la radio por lo que, por su esencia mismo, Cristo céntrico, Um. . . por la fe que siempre en señalarnos a través de los micrófonos todos los días, recibí la llamada de Edwin, cuando él me decía que los compañeros estaban orando por me. Entonces por eso yo estoy seguro que también me dio paz, me dio tranquilidad. Y nunca perdí la comunicación con mis jefes, con mi esposa, con mi familia. Ellos estaban atentos y sabían que estaba en perfectas condiciones. Entonces, eh. . . eso también creo que, que me ayudó muchísimo, contribuyendo que para yo no forme parte del caos en especial sino de alguna forma Consuelo en ese momento con una de las compañeras. Había manifestado una yo en una de las exposiciones, Ralph, que no sabíamos ni siquiera mi compañera de radio colega que está embarazada. Estaba en ese evento ya estado con tres meses del embarazo. Y bueno es ella consolando y dije “Tranquila. Dios no va a permitir nada. Dios es amor, tu tranquila es esperanza y bueno.” En realidad eso funciona. Y días después nos enteramos que está embarazada. (Risas) Si Señor.

Kurtenbach Entonces el equipo aquí orando por ti, por la situación allá en el hospital. Edwin te conto.

Zurita Así es. Bueno el día siguiente, no. El día siguiente, fue esa noche misma uno de mis compañeros fue al retirarme de allá en el auto de la radio y cuando regrese acaba más o menos a las diez cuarenta y cinco de la noche, encontré a misionero como Douglas, otro misionero que No, no, no, no re – el nombre. Y bien, ellos me recibían con palaras de compasión, con palabras de aliento, me motivaron, no. Y bueno, me decías agradecía que estaba bien, estaba en perfectas condiciones. Eh, . . . mis compañeríos igual . . . de tareas, de ALAS, de Radio Local, los administrativos, parece que estaba atentos de lo que pasaba y bueno, cuando tuvieron la oportunidad personalmente igual, me extendían su solidaridad y me decían, “Que bueno verte.” Entonces esto me motive machismo. Es lo que marca la diferencia con medios seculares, Ralph.

Kurtenbach Ya, ya. Para aclarar . . . eh. Los policías entendían que lo que hizo la Asamblea del jueves 29 fue sacar beneficios. Pero tú me dijiste algo de, no fue -- supuestamente fue así, pero no fue así. No entiendo, no entiendo exactamente lo que sucedió en la Asamblea la noche anterior.

Zurita Ralph, lo que paso es que, eh. . . antes de se revise este Proyecto de Ley había desigualdades. Hay que leerle el texto no. Había desigualdades, no. Que por ejemplo, eso es lo que siempre menciona el Presidente. Y eso como periodista en la obligación de leerlo, pudimos constatar. Mientras al Policia por ejemplo se le contentaba con un regalo de la Navidad, los ochenta, cien dólares. Con el mismo Artículo se beneficiaban otros funcionarios de instituciones como La Procuraría por ejemplo, La Controlaría, con el mismo Artículo se benefició con bonos de hasta veinte mil, diez mil dólares. Entonces el Presidente lo que intenta es equiparse, igualarse. Ya no contentaron la Policia con cien, un regalo de diez, de ciento cincuenta dólares que no es nada en comparación de bonos de diez mil, de veinte mil dólares. Entonces como el Policia eh . . . al menos la mayoría no había leído el texto, estaban convencidos que quieran quitar beneficios. Entonces eso fue lo que les motive a esa sublevación.

Kurtenbach: Mmmm Hmmm. Entonces puede ser . . . puede decir que el intento del cambio fue, como dijiste, nivelar para hacer algo más justo a toda . . . a todos los empleados públicos.

Zurita por lo menos esa es la intención en el texto. MINUTO 35

Kurtenbach Uhh . . . solo para detallar las . . . Un poco más sobre la relación entre los policías sublevados y los periodistas. Por qué le contaron mal los periódicos . . . los periodistas de . . . del Comercio por ejemplo? Por qué . . . y leo y a veces el reportaje de . . . de ese periódico, no es muy amigable al Presidente Correa. Eh . . . no sé . . . no sé si se considera totalmente opuesto a una oposición pero cuando piensas otra, de otra forma del regional de Presidente Correa, lo dice en opiniones. Pero los policías . . . eh consideraron que Teleamazonas es el único medio a favor de ellos, me dijiste, verdad?

Zurita Es que hay que analizar la situación mediática. Un medio de prensa, o medo escrito, no les ofrece la información inmediata que ellos querían en ese momento. Entonces es por eso que ellos enfocaron a Teleamazonas que es un canal de televisión que estaba transmitiendo en vivo en directo. Entonces les ofrecía más – según ellos – más rapidez de lo que ellos quisieran manifestar.

Kurtenbach y capta la emoción, el ánimo de la . . .

Zurita Así es.

Kurtenbach Hasta el enojo y la frustración del . . . de todo. Toda la situación. Algo más a añadir, ahhh . . . Cristian. Sobre la situación, de . . . de tu mismo? De la situación? O algo que no hemos hablado todavía?

Zurita Bueno es lo posterior, Ralph. Realmente da mucha pena, me conmueve en lo personal a ver los policías en Estado de Excepción. Por ejemplo, tuvieron que abandonar sus labores en La Presidencia de La Republica, tuvieron que salir de otra función del Estado que es La Legislatura. Que le compete a La Escolta Legislativa custodiar ese, ese organismo. Tuvieron que salir porque . . . por la desconfianza que el Gobierno no tiene en esta situación ahora, y no solamente el Gobierno sino la gente en las calles, Ralph. Los comentarios que se escucha, no son alijadores . . . uh, em . . . para un enfoco de una descripción, son insultos. Incluso a veces en gestos unos. No se dé cuenta, no, la gente pretende desmenuzar a la Policia ahora. Entonces todo lo que el trabajo que se hizo para tratar de reconstruir, esa imagen del Policia solidario, Policia trabajados, Policia honrado, el Policia Dedicado, se fue al piso en prácticamente hay que empezar de cero.

Kurtenbach mmm hmmm. En donde hoy y quien es su esperanza, tu esperanza. Uh . . . enfrentando situaciones difíciles, enfrentando . . . uh dificultades aquí en el país, nuestro . . . nuestra patria. En que es tu esperanza.

Zurita. Ralph, la conclusión de que llegue yo es que como cristiano tengo la obligación de no desistir en mi oración. Creo que eso es clave, eso es base. Porque en mi caso pude ver a rostros de seres humanos, no ecuatorianos. Sino de seres humanos, transformados totalmente desfigurados, por el odio y el rancor. Seres humanos que usaban sistemas de comunicación para decir “maten! Maten! Y maten!” Entonces eso no es mas de que el enemigo se apodérase de espacio y manipulo a mucha gente. Y . . . y distorsionó de que Dios quiere en nuestras vidas, que es paz. Que es amarnos a unos a los otros. Entonces mi compromiso es desarrollar la oración. Yo dije ya a mis compañeros “Tenemos que orar mucho por nuestro país. Tenemos que orar mucho para que esos corazones ofendidos, resentidos que a lo mejor estar pensando en la venganza (ahem). . . Perdón. Que está pensando en la venganza, sean sanados. E han curados. Por el amor de Dios que es el único, Ralph. Porque a lo mejor de un ser humano u otro ser humano va a ser muy difícil, una tarea bastante complicada.


Kurtenbach Muchas gracias Cristian

Zurita Gracias Ralph

Kurtenbach Estamos hablando con Cristian Zurita, reportero de HCJB sobre los eventos de treinta de septiembre y los días siguientes. Lo sé. . . las semanas siguientes aquí en el Ecuador. Yo soy Rafael Kurtenbach, coordinador de comunicaciones de la re. . . de la región América Latina de HCJB Global.

(3 October 2013)

Appendix E Error message on attempted link to *El Telégrafo* archive content



Appendix F

Request for digitized archive content from *El Telégrafo* newspaper

Quito, 27 de Febrero de 2014.

Orlando Pérez.
DIRECTOR DIARIO EL TELÉGRAFO.

Reciba un cordial saludo de Cristian Zurita Pozo (CI: 1712573243), productor de noticias de Radio HCJB La Voz de Los Andes.

El motivo de la presente, es solicitarle por favor, autorice a quien corresponda, se facilite las ediciones impresas o digitales, de las publicaciones generadas después del 30 de septiembre de 2010 (Intento de Golpe de Estado), hasta el 31 de octubre de 2010.

Este material servirá de respaldo para documentar y sustentar una tesis para un Masterado en Comunicación.

Espero contar con su favorable y estaré atento a sugerencias o recomendaciones para poder acceder a este material.

Agradezco de antemano, su tiempo y atención a la presente.

Atte,

Cristian Zurita Pozo.
PRODUCTOR DE
NOTICIAS HCJB
Cel: 0997097517
2266808 ext 4472.
czurita@hcjb.org

Edito GRAN S.A.
EDITORES GRAFICOS NACIONALES
Orlinda Ortega
97-03-9114

Appendix G

Open Letter of *El Telégrafo* editorialist to express concerns about start-up of government newspaper within same public media group



Appendix H Decree Signed by President Correa to Declare State of Emergency



PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA

No. 488

CONSIDERANDO:

Que los dos primeros incisos del artículo 1 de la Constitución de la República establece:

"Que el Ecuador es un Estado constitucional de derechos y justicia, social, democrático, soberano, independiente, unitario, intercultural, plurinacional y laico. Se organiza en forma de república y se gobierna de manera descentralizada.

La soberanía radica en el pueblo, cuya voluntad es el fundamento de la autoridad, y se ejerce a través de los órganos del poder público y de las formas de participación directa previstas en la Constitución."

Que el numeral 8 del artículo 3 de la Constitución de la República instituye que uno de los deberes primordiales del Estado es el de garantizar a sus habitantes el derecho a una cultura de paz, a la seguridad integral y a vivir en una sociedad democrática y libre de corrupción.

Que el apartado a) del numeral 3 del artículo 66 de la Constitución de la República establece que el Estado reconoce y garantiza a las personas el derecho a la integridad personal que incluye entre otras la integridad física, psíquica y moral.

Que el artículo 393 de la Constitución de la República estatuye que el *Estado garantizará la seguridad humana a través de políticas y acciones integradas, para asegurar la convivencia pacífica de las personas, promover una cultura de paz y prevenir las formas de violencia y discriminación y la comisión de infracciones y delitos. La planificación y aplicación de estas políticas se encargará a órganos especializados en los diferentes niveles de gobierno.*

Que en el día de hoy algunos integrantes de la Policía Nacional han protagonizado hechos que comprometen el cabal cumplimiento del artículo 163 de la Constitución que en sus dos primeros incisos ordena que:

"La Policía Nacional es una institución estatal de carácter civil, armada, técnica, jerarquizada, disciplinada, profesional y altamente especializada, cuya misión es atender la seguridad ciudadana y el orden público, y proteger el libre ejercicio de los derechos y la seguridad de las personas dentro del territorio nacional.

Los miembros de la Policía Nacional tendrán una formación basada en derechos humanos, investigación especializada, prevención, control y prevención del delito y utilización de medios de disuasión y conciliación como alternativas al uso de la fuerza."

Que la severa distorsión o el abandono de la misión de algunos de los integrantes de la Policía Nacional podría generar una grave conmoción interna.

Firma Digital de Documentos

Por favor conecte su Token y Seleccione un archivo.

Firma Electrónica de Archivos

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Examinar...

Firmar Archivo

Resultados de la Firma Electrónica de Archivos

Datos del Archivo:

- Documento Original: C:\Users\peraltav\Documents\EXCEPCION DE HOY DEF.doc
- Documento Firmado: C:\Users\peraltav\Documents\EXCEPCION DE HOY DEF.doc.p7m

Datos de el(los) Firmante(s):

Cédula	Nombres	Institución	Cargo	Fecha
0905813512	Rafael Correa	Presidencia de la Republica	=)Presidente Constitucional de la Republica	30/09/2010 13:21:43

Datos del Certificado:

- Cédula: 0905813512
- Nombres: Rafael
- Apellidos: Correa Delgado
- Institución: Presidencia de la Republica
- Cargo: =)Presidente Constitucional de la Republica

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PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA

En ejercicio de las facultades que le confieren los artículos 164, 165 y siguientes de la Constitución de la República; y, 29 y, 36 y siguientes de la Ley de Seguridad Pública y del Estado;

DECRETA:

Artículo 1.- Declarar el Estado de Excepción en todo el territorio nacional, en razón de que algunos integrantes de la Policía Nacional han distorsionado severamente o abandonado su misión de policías nacionales y por ende sus deberes consagrados en la Constitución y la Ley lo que podría generar gran conmoción interna en cuanto a la seguridad interna, ciudadana y humana garantizada y tutelada por la Constitución de la República y deber fundamental del Estado.

Artículo 2.- La movilización nacional y militar de las Fuerzas Armadas para garantizar la soberanía nacional y el orden interno en toda la República.

Se dispone al señor Ministro de Defensa Nacional para que mediante el Comando Conjunto General de las Fuerzas Armadas ejecuten un plan de contingencia con la finalidad de que sus efectivos intervengan en la situación producida para garantizar a los habitantes del Ecuador la seguridad interna, ciudadana y humana, derechos tutelados por la Constitución de la República y deber fundamental del Estado.

Artículo 3.- El periodo de duración de este estado de excepción es de cinco días a partir de la suscripción del presente decreto ejecutivo. El ámbito territorial de aplicación es en toda la República.

Artículo 4.- El Ministerio de Finanzas situará los recursos suficientes para atender la emergencia.

Artículo 5.- Notifíquese esta declaratoria a la Asamblea Nacional, a la Corte Constitucional, a la Organización de los Estados Americanos y a la Organización de las Naciones Unidas.

Artículo 6.- De la ejecución del presente Decreto Ejecutivo que entrará en vigencia desde la fecha de su expedición, sin perjuicio de su publicación en el Registro Oficial, encárguense los Ministros de Defensa, del Interior y de Finanzas.

Dado en San Francisco de Quito, Distrito Metropolitano, el día de hoy 30 de septiembre de 2010.

Rafael Correa Delgado
PRESIDENTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA REPUBLICA

Appendix I Government order to broadcast outlets to air exclusively public media content

Jose Morales

Asunto: CADENA NACIONAL RADIO Y TV EMERGENCIA, INDEFINIDA E ININTERRUMPIDA

Señores

GERENTES DE ESTACIONES DE RADIO Y TELEVISIÓN

Presente.-

De mi consideración

De conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 59 letra b) de la Ley de Radiodifusión y Televisión; y 63, 65, 66 y 70 de su Reglamento General; y por petición de la Presidencia de la República se dispone la difusión de la cadena de radio y televisión a nivel nacional, conforme al siguiente detalle:

FECHA	Jueves 30 de septiembre de 2010
HORA	11h30
DURACIÓN	INDEFINIDA E ININTERRUMPIDA HASTA SEGUNDA ORDEN
MATRIZ	ECUADOR TV y Radio Pública
TEMA	Informe de hechos de actualidad

Esta disposición es de CUMPLIMIENTO OBLIGATORIO E INMEDIATO, la estación de radio o televisión que la incumpla será sancionado con todo el rigor de la Ley.

En consecuencia, esta cadena nacional de radio y televisión es **indefinida e ininterrumpida asta segunda orden**.

La matrices tanto para estaciones de radio como de televisión serán RADIO PÚBLICA Y/O ECUADOR TV

En espera de su colaboración, le reitero mis sentimientos de consideración y estima

Atentamente

SECRETARIA NACIONAL DE TELECOMUNICACIONES

Presidencia de la República